Daily Report

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U.S. Chemical Weapons To Leave FRG

LD0703183890 Moscow TASS in English 1819 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] Bonn March 7 TASS—"All American chemical weapons are planned to be withdrawn from West Germany's territory before the end of this year, in line with an accord reached between the West German and the United States' Governments," West German Defence Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg said at a news conference in Bonn.

Over 100,000 artillery shells, weighing a total of 7,000 tonnes, are to be withdrawn. Armed with the nerve toxic gas V-X and Zarin, they are now stockpiled in the area of Klausen, not far from Pirmasens, in Rheinland-Pfalz. The total quantity of toxic agents in the shells amounts to over 400 tonnes.

According to Stoltenberg, the withdrawal of chemical weapons is planned to begin in July this year and to be completed late in December.

The shells are planned to first be transported to the American depot in the area of Miesau (about 40 kilometers from Klausen) and then will be taken by rail to the port of Nordenham. The shells will be reloaded on American vessels and taken to the Johnston Atoll to be destroyed. For safety reasons, the shells will be packed in hermetic cassettes inside steel containers.

The full withdrawal and the subsequent destruction of American chemical weapons on West German territory will be a major step towards the universal prohibition of chemical weapons, Stoltenberg said.

This will also be a major contribution to a Soviet-American accord on a considerable reduction and reduction of both super powers' chemical weapon stocks.

The Federal Government's priority is to work towards a universal, efficient and varifiable treaty that will envisage the prohibition of the development, the manufacture, the acquisition, the distribution and use of all types of chemical weapons and also the destruction of chemical weapons stocks under international control.

Karpov Comments on Strategic Arms Reductions

LD1103114590 Mosow TASS in English 1117 GMT 11 Mar 90

[By TASS correspondents Konstantin Voitsekhovich and Boris Zverev]

[Text] Moscow March 11 TASS—The Soviet-American agreement on a 50 per cent reduction of strategic offensive armaments, which is being worked out, should be regarded as a step towards further strategic arms reductions, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Karpov said. He told TASS today that the reduction of Soviet and American strategic forces, which would follow the implementation of the agreement, should "create a situation in which none of the sides will be able to attack first."

Speaking about specific aspects of the implementation of the agreement, Karpov called attention to the fact that, according to the document, both countries would reduce by about 50 per cent the number of nuclear warheads on strategic delivery vehilces, while the number of delivery vehicles themselves would be reduced by 25-30 per cent. He belives that as a first step there is no need to make greater reductions in the number of delivery vehicles—the concentration of many warheads on a small number of delivery vehicles can be a destabilising factor.

The reductions should be more severe in the future—during the second stage of the strategic arms reduction, Karpov continued. On this stage the sides should consider the gradual transfer from missiles with several warheads to missiles with one warhead.

"Some directions for qualitative restrictions are being outlined today," Karpov stressed and pointed to the Soviet Union's pledge to reduce its heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles to 150 even under the present agreement. The very logic of "establishing in the agreement levels and sublevels for various component parts of the strategic armed forces will compel both sides to develop a new balance between planes, intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-based ballistic missiles," he said.

Karpov believes that during the next stage in the reduction of strategic offensive armaments, "coordinated rules for the development of Soviet and American strategic forces should be introduced."

Karpov, Hawes Discuss Open Skies Conference

LD1003223290

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1130 GMT on 10 March in its "Planeta" program broadcasts interviews with Viktor Karpov and John Hawes, roving ambassador and U.S. negotiator to the Open Skies conference, by Maksim Tkachenko. Tkachenko conducts the interview with Hawes, who is in Washington D.C., via satellite. The interview with Karpov is held in Moscow. This program is entitled: "Will the Sky Become Open?"

Maksim Tkachenko begins by asking Hawes whether a section of the public on both sides will not have difficulty in accepting the idea of having foreign planes flying over their heads. Hawes agrees it is an idea people will need to get used to, but it is a timely proposal and there is nothing to fear. The aircraft would be checked before takeoff.

In Moscow, Karpov tells Tkachenko that the Soviet approach to open skies won "serious support" at the

Ottawa conference, whereas the U.S. proposals, providing for fewer safeguards and incomplete sharing of information, did not, because secrecy will give rise to suspicion.

Hawes is asked why the Soviet idea of extending the open skies idea to other spheres has had a cool reception there. He replies that the seas are already open; as for land, that is an interesting, but separate topic. [U.S. Secretary of State] Baker is against lumping land, sea, and space together.

Karpov says the United States is reluctant, in general, to discuss anything that could lead to reduction of naval forces or to contemplate any limitation or banning of SDI. On land, however, there are matters that could be agreed on, such as giving diplomats access to closed zones. It is not true that the Soviet suggestions regarding land, sea, and space complicate the issue; they are meant to be dealt with at a later stage.

Germany was also discussed at the Open Skies conference. On the two-plus-four formula, Karpov says: "Well, in the first place, that formula envisages a special responsibility on the part of those four powers for the destiny of Germany, or at least for the foreign political aspects of the German problem. We think that consultations should now begin, in the very near future, among all six participants in this two-plus-four formula, at experts level, in order to prepare for further work by the ministers in this framework. We think the development of the processes of European cooperation with the aim of creating a general European security system ought to outstrip the processes of German unification. And it is this that will be the pledge that international, general European guarantees will be created for Germany's neighbors, for their security."

Hawes says the interest of countries outside two-plus-four in the German question is "obvious and fully legitimate." He denies that a unified Germany in NATO would upset the balance or pose any threat.

How inevitable is it that a future Germany will be a member of NATO? Karpov replies: "Well, we rule out a unified Germany as a member of NATO if it's a question of the GDR being swallowed up and included in it. We think that a unified Germany must be a neutral state which will not participate in any blocs. The movement toward this may be gradual, via cooperation between the two military alliances, or the creation of a new security structure, which will no longer be a confrontation between the two military alliances but rather a new association of European security, as it were, in which both German states can—and if they also move toward reunification—participate in a new capacity and cooperate with the aim of creating this association of European security and its new structure."

To the suggestion that it probably won't be possible to keep a unified Germany out of NATO, Karpov says: "Well, you know, one can't really give up a principled stand just because the states that think it isn't so happen to be in a majority of two. We have to press our idea, establish it, argue for it, and show that a general European solution must be the guarantee of Europe's security and not the inclusion of a unified Germany in NATO." The video shows interviews; clips illustrating history of open skies idea; pictures of Ottawa conference.

Chervov Cited on Vienna Agreements, Differences

LD1203095490 Moscow TASS in English 0941 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 12 TASS—"We have reached agreement at the Vienna talks to reduce primarily the armed personnel and also five classes of conventional armaments: aircraft, helicopters, tanks, armoured cars and heavy artillery," Colonel General Nilolai Chervov, department chief of the Soviet General Staff, told TASS today in connection with the regular round of talks on conventional armaments in Europe, which will open in Vienna on March 15.

The general believes progress has also been made in determining the ceilings of these weapons: "Each alliance will have not more than 20,000 tanks, 28,000-30,000 armoured cars, 20,000 artillery systems (NATO suggests 16,5000), 4,700 combat aircraft and 1,900 combat helicopters."

"At the same time," Chervov stressed, "there are differences on a whole line of basically important issues."

The general believes the Soviet side has displayed flexibility and constructiveness when it agreed to postpone its proposal to restrict the numerical strength of Warsaw Treaty and NATO troops to 1,350,000 men each to the next phase of the negotiations.

Chervov noted that the talks would now focus on the problem of cutting the troops deployed beyond national territories. Noting the particular importance of Central Europe (Warsaw Treaty—Poland, the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, NATO—FRG, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg), Chervov said it was important to reduce the numerical strength of the two alliances precisely in this area.

The general said the Soviet side had agreed with the American proposal to cut the numerical strength of Soviet and American troops in Central Europe to 195,000 men each and fix a ceiling for U.S. forces in the rest of Europe at 30,000 men. Chervov believes this issue was, in fact, settled on the basis of asymmetry in the light of changes in Eastern European [as received]. "This is proof of our constructive approach to the search for solutions to deadlocked issue at the Vienna talks," Chervov stressed.

U.S., USSR Face Military Conversion Problems

LD1103121690 Moscow in English to North America 0000 GMT 11 Mar 90

[Text] Recently the NEW YORK TIMES displayed a rather critical attitude to a statement by Vice President Dan Quayle, who said that the Americans should not expect to receive great peace dividends from the improvement in relations with the USSR. According to the NEW YORK TIMES observer, the vice president made that statement at somebody else's prompting. It's not hard to guess whose prompting it was; it came from the circles which abhor cuts in military production. The news media have openly discussed their viewpoint.

Speaking in a CBS television program, prominent military expert (Herbert Frazer), for one, tried to prove that the corporations filling most of the defense orders allegedly won't survive the large cuts in military spending. The aerospace and defense industries, he said, will have to reduce their production by about one third in the next five years. This would be a blow to them, said (Herbert Frazer).

The former head of the U.S. Naval Forces, John Lehman, spoke even more categorically. In the process of conversion, he said, at least 80 big defense plants must come under the hammer. There is no doubt that to reorient plants and even whole industries from military to civilian production is a hard and painful process.

We in the Soviet Union are facing this problem now. We also have people who take no delight in cuts in military spending, even though we have no groups of citizens deriving billions in profit from arms production; the Soviet defense industry is state-owned. Nevertheless, the problem of conversion exists both in the United States and in the USSR. With all the differences connected with the social system and organization of production, the two countries have many things in common. Both the Soviet people and the Americans are interested in making their resources now used to manufacture weaponry serve civilian needs. To waste enormous sums of money on arms which do not increase national wealth defies commonsense. Both Soviet and American societies suffer from this. Cuts in military production and the rechannelling of funds to civilian needs will makde it possible to use the taxpayers' money in the efforts to resolve pressing social problems, even though this is fraught with some temporary difficulties.

I think that those U.S. politicians who are not inclined to gain peace dividends by means of reducing military expenditure place the interests of military-industrial corporations above the interests of society.

German Experts Discuss Reunification Procedures

LD0903164590 Moscow TASS in English 1611 GMT 9 Mar 90

[By TASS correspondent Sergei Ryabikin]

[Text] Berlin March 9 TASS—the first meeting of experts from the GDR and West Germany lasted for two hours and a half today. They discussed external aspects of Germany's reunification and the ensurance of security of neighbouring countries.

Ernst Krabatsch, GDR deputy foreign minister, and Dieter Kastrup, head of the second political department of the West German Foreign Ministry and ministerial director, said at a meeting with journalists here today that the sides discussed the procedure of the forthcoming talks between the two German states.

Agreement was reached on the confidential character of the talks and on continuing the talks at the planned time after the elections to the People's Chamber of the GDR Parliament.

A meeting of experts according to the "two plus four" formula, on which agreement was reached in Ottawa, will be held in Bonn on Wednesday next week. It will be attended by representatives of the GDR, West Germany, as well as Britain, the USSR, the U.S. and France - winners in the Second World War.

During the present meeting of experts the sides exchanged views about the talks of the six countries.

Falin Calls For Essential German Peace Treaty

LD1203105890 Moscow TASS in English 1034 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 12 TASS—A solution to the German question should round off the Second World War, maintains Valentin Falin, Doctor of Science (History), who has been for years actively participating in shaping Soviet policy in Central European affairs.

"It is necessary to do away with the state of legal uncertainty and to furnish a clear-cut legal basis for a new phase of post-war development," namely, a peaceful phase, a peaceful future of Europe, he points out in PRAVDA today.

Consequently, it is essential to conclude a German peace treaty, Falin believes.

Such a treaty "should seal certain values and determine principles, particularly and primarily those concerning the inviolability of borders," he maintains.

"This is a vital issue to both Poland, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and all other neighbors of Germany, both in the west, north and south. There should be utter clarity concerning the issue. There should be no toying with it."

Until a peace treaty is concluded, no one and nothing will be able to cancel the rights and duties of the four powers and their responsibility for Germany and those settlements during the war and postwar periods that are part of international law and are recorded in the U.N. charter.

"We should now not just speak of a common European home. We all live under the same roof, under the same sky and in many respects share common concerns.

"If we bring in all kind of junk to the common European home with its glass walls, there will be neither comfort nor peace for anyone in the home. We should deterine what we shall leave outside the home and decide upon this without delay, for the hour of truth has struck," Falin emphasizes.

Both North Atlantic and Warsaw Treaty organizations will probably remain intact for some time, although they are to turn from predominantly military organizations into mainly political ones. A period of adaptation to the new situation will be needed, he believes.

"It is not easy to effect a troop withdrawal, but it is much more complex to refashion military thinking. Defense industry conversion is a laborious task. The conversion of thinking is far more complex. Asymmetry in weapons is very dangerous but asymmetry in military doctrines is hundreds of times more dangerous. It is by asymmetries in approaches and goals that the peoples will judge who just speaks about new thinking and who just speaks about new thinking and who practises it," Falin concludes.

Weekly 'International Observers Roundtable' Aired

LD0903210590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 9 Mar 90

["International Observers Roundtable" program, presented by Viktor Nikolayevich Levin, all-union radio commentator; with Aleksandr Yevgeniyevich Bovin, IZVESTIYA political observer; and Nikolay Vladimirovich Shishlin, political observer]

[Text] [Levin] The German problem has been in the focus of international life for several weeks now. This week, the discussions around this problem received a new impulse during the visit to Moscow by a very representative government delegation of the German Democratic Republic. In this delegation were representatives of virtually all parties and organizations represented at the roundtable. During the talks with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov, there was discussion of issues concerning the resolution of the German problem as a whole and problems of our bilateral relations including from the point of view of what will happen to them in the very near future after the elections to the People's Chamber.

You have, most likely, acquainted yourselves with the official materials and attentively read the interviews

which Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev gave to a TASS correspondent and also to West German and GDR television which clearly expressed the idea of the necessity of implementing the process of unification stage by stage and in such a way that this proceeds in close harmony with the pan-European process and should be....

[Bovin—interrupting] Incidentlly, I do not quite understand it. I am all the time trying to comprehend what "pan-European process" means. Well, we have the creation of a European security system which, at some point in the future, will replace both blocs. Here we have this idea of a common European home. And this process, all in all, should continue for a fairly long time. As for German unification, then, no matter how you look at it, what is taking shape now is a much more rapid process. Incidentally, I do not know, but what is at present not so much frightening me, as giving rise to all manner of thoughts is that this process is, in my view, beginning to get out of control. That is to say, it is acquiring a rapidity no one of us could even conceive of only a month ago. Kohl is pressing on with forcing the issue through, understandably, in view of his own internal political interests. He is, as it were, trying very hard to rush it all through faster. There are some forces in the GDR which, all in all, are also, as it were, in agreement with it. And, so, what you get, generally speaking, is that, all in all, the thrust is, in my view, almost out of control. Well, as for stages, these will be taking place, but, after all, a stage can last a year or, if you will excuse this, it can be over and done with in 30 minutes, this stage. If two parliaments assemble and if they start tackling this unification, can there be a question of being any stages there? What stages are to follow that? There will be none.

And, so, I now recall that this formula of two plus four was arrived at during that meeting in Ottawa, you remember. Thatcher, or her representatives, allegedly opposed it at the time. She wanted four plus two. That is to say that the Germans reach agreement to begin with, subsequently the treaty will be put on the conference table of the four (? and it will be thrashed out there). And Thatcher, this wise woman, said: It is better to do it the other way round. Let it be us who will reach an agreement to begin with [words indistinct] and then.... Well, this was rejected. Well, it is not quite democratic. Well, from time to time I now think that if the time has not run out then may be it is, as it were, already high time for the four to get going, too, so that we are not made to face accomplished facts we can no longer do anything about. These are the sort of obscure fears I am prone to.

[Shishlin] I understand your thoughts but I cannot say I wholeheartedly share them. It is, undoubtedly, correct that the process of movement of both German states, in itself, and their subsequent unification, grew faster. It is, of course, correct, that stages can be very limited timewise. But, at the same time, and despite everything, while setting out Bonn's position it seems to me that one should say that the current government coalition in Bonn is also aware of the problems that arise in connection with this rapid unification of Germany.

[Bovin] Well, a coalition is one thing, but still Kohl and Genscher took up very different positions on at least some of these issues. There have been compromises, but that's another question.

[Shishlin] No, but in this instance I would still like to draw attention, without diverting from our main subject, to the fact that Bonn has its own ideas regarding the timescale and sequence of the unification of the two German states. And if we assume that in our relations with the west it is political attitudes which, on the whole, currently dominate, and that development is proceeding in an accelerated manner precisely in the political direction, as far as the two German states are concerned, it seems to me that Bonn would be interested initially in seeking certain approaches to the economic unification of the two German states, and then thinking about new political structures.

[Bovin] I doubt this very much, very much, honestly. This is just what is being said. But I am very—the dispute began with Article 23 of the Basic Law which says that this Constitution is for (?all) Germans. Well, just imagine the situation: The new GDR Parliament assembles and (?very soon) consent is reached on the Basic Law. And that's it.

[Levin] In the GDR they have been stating very clearly—well it was stated literally at the People's Chamber session which was held on 7 March that this article does not apply to them, and it will not be adopted.

[Bovin] And after 18 March there will be another one.

[Levin] Yes, but this was stated in parliament arising from the visit of the parliamentary delegation to Moscow. This parliamentary delegation comprised those who would, after the 18th....

[Bovin—interrupting] Pray God that this will be so. That would be fine, but still the 18 March elections could qualitatively alter the situation. That's what we must bear in mind, in my opinion.

[Shishlin] I, of course, agree with Aleksandr that after 18 March the political scene in the German Democratic Republic will look fundamentally different from what it is today. And one can guess in which direction developments will go....

[Bovin] What the future has in store for us is very difficult to say.

[Shishlin] Yes, and here again new questions and new problems arise to which everyone is giving his own answer. In particular, what will this new unified Germany be like? We believed that, proceeding from common European interests, it would be sensible if this unified Germany were neutral. This would, of course, to the best possible extent conform to the interests of maintaining the political balance in Europe.

[Bovin] Nikolay Vladimirovich, I understand perfectly well what you are saying, I understand your logic and your psychology, but this question occurs to me: Fine, let's assume that we've got what we wanted, a neutral Germany, a huge machine in the center of Europe. It's no Switzerland and no Austria. I am absolutely convinced that a struggle will start up, within Europe itself and on both sides of this Germany. Because the pointer of German interests has moved to both one side and the other. A tug-of-war will start, and in my view, the opposite will happen—instead of a source of stability in the center of Europe there will emerge a source of permanent mistrust and suspicion, because—and I repeat this—this tug-of-war will find its own direction.

[Shishlin] I want simply to raise this thought now: Namely, who will pull whom? The Europeans, that unified Germany, or the Americans?

[Bovin] The Americans with the Europeans, and us.

[Shishlin] Of course.

[Levin] The European process must also participate in this, and this is within the framework of the European process. Therefore, here....

[Bovin—interrupting] Sure, but this is, in general, a very complex process. Yes, we shall build this home, we shall hold all these conferences, and everybody will vow and swear that his is not thinking at all of inclining that same Germany in one direction or the other. Territorial policy is territorial policy. This is a hypothesis, of course, I understand, but, in general, it fits into reality. We have already seen one neutral Germany, after World War I, incidentally, say, and we have also seen a demilitarized Germany.

[Shishlin] But in the given case, such an ideology....

[Bovin—interrupting] Of course, yes, I understand, but I could not restrain myself.

[Shishlin] It is not a very precise one.

[Bovin] I agree.

[Shishlin] But I feel that our listeners might get the impression that not only is there confusion in policy, there is also confusion in our discussion. And that, I must admit, does reflect to some degree the real state of affairs, because the political equation which is being created in European affairs today is an equation with many unknown factors: The speed, form, and nature of the unification of Germany; further, that united Germany's place in the bloc structure and the European structure in general; third, the position of this united Germany within the world economy; fourth, the interests not only of the victorious powers but also of the powers which were harmed by World War II and which have their own interests.

[Shishlin and Bovin simultaneously] Poland, Czechoslovakia....

[Bovin]...And not only these but also Belgium, Greece....

[Text] [Levin—interrupting] There is virtually no country which does not have an interest. Genscher threw in a phrase when the Italians said that they would also like to take part in the work of the two-plus-four conference. Genscher threw in the phrase: Italy is not a participant in this game. Excuse me, it is a participant in the pan-European process and this, such a phrase, also, incidentally, puts one on one's guard.

[Shishlin] This is what (Aleksandr Yevgeniyevich Baranyukh) said in passing with regard to difficulties and cooperation within the framework of the most current governmental coalition and about the small crisis which flared up recently within this governmental coalition, this is a reflection of those difficulties which face the politicians both in Bonn and in other European capitals. The lack of coincidence in the positions of Genscher and Kohl is really a reflection of the fact that the issues are so complex that different answers are being given. As they say, there are variants.

[Bovin] Bargaining with the Poles has already started: If you renounce reparations—this issue has, after all, been dragging on from those times—then [word indistinct] the borders. Posing the question in that way makes no sense at all, because borders are the absolute condition that cannot be transgressed at the present time, and reparation is a different matter entirely.

[Levin] Incidentally, Kohl said in this connection that they don't want a peace treaty. That I don't understand. If—let us put it like this, figuratively—the process of creating a unified German state is now approaching the finishing line, then evidently a peace treaty must also have something to say in that process.

[Bovin] Of course. That is the finishing point. There is already a Germany, (?so there's) a peace treaty. No doubt that is so.

[Levin] Or perhaps with two Germanies.

[Bovin] Why are they being unified?

[Levin] There are two issues. There is the issue that arises out of the results of World War II, and there's the issue that concerns the unity of the German state.

[Shishlin] But all the same, I'd be inclined to say that in that sense, against the background of this German problem, our line—the Soviet foreign policy line in European affairs—becomes clearer: It is aimed at accelerating all that we describe as the general European process. I mean the Vienna talks and the convening, before this year is out, of Helsinki-2; I mean other steps to establish really widespread cooperation in Europe. Among the problems to which there is as yet no answer—we have not yet touched on this large topic, though the answer probably does exist—is the question of where a unified Germany will stand economically? Evidently it will be part of the European Common Market which is now being created, in 1992.

[Levin] Evidently, evidently.

[Bovin] If we consider that the GDR has already been, for many years, a little bit of a member of that community, as it were, then if they unite, then yes, of course.

[Levin] Aleksandr Yevgeniyevich....

[Bovin—interrupting] Although there are....

[Levin—interrupting] Here, too, there are nuances. They say in the GDR, why? We, by ourselves, without German unification, could become members of the EEC, and we are entering.... This is also a very interesting question. But I think what is agitating our listeners most of all today is the question of where a united Germany will stand militarily and politically. Here our viewpoint, our official viewpoint expressed by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, that a unified Germany must on no account be a member of NATO, meets with widespread understanding among our public, since we very much do not want the lessons of history, tragic lessons, to be left out of account, causing us difficulties.

[Bovin] Well, perhaps my intellectual capacities are insufficient, but I just can't understand that. I try. Let's suppose. NATO's territory now passes along the frontier between the FRG and GDR. That's where it ends. So that little bit of land—not very large....

[Levin—interrupting] One hundred thousand square kilometers....

[Bovin—interrupting] One hundred thousand square kilometers, would be added to the territory of NATO. I ask myself: What would that change, as regards the security of the Soviet Union? What?

[Levin] Well, it would be strengthened at least.

[Bovin] Yes, good. But what difference would it make? I think, none. And then, in general, when you said the lessons of the past—I myself made the same mistake. In the nuclear age, what can we say now? 1914, 1939, 1941? None of those analogies have any point in the new era. The strategic laws have changed. That is one aspect of the matter. Another is this: As far as the Warsaw Pact and NATO are concerned, preserving the balance.

What I think to myself is this: What is this all about? The balance is already being disturbed. It is being disturbed by the fact that—like it or not—the members of the Warsaw Pact, the former fraternal states, no longer fit that lable. The members of the Warsaw Pact are no longer states occupying the same ideological platform. A fndamentally quite different situation has now arisen. And so we have a Polish paper writing that...sorry, but we won't be fighting on the side of the Soviet Union.

[Levin] In what case?

[Bovin] Whatever the case. We just won't. We shall be in the Warsaw Pact but we shan't be your allies. It's a paradox.

[Levin] Well, that's what one Polish paper says, but Mazowiecki's statements are quite different again.

[Bovin] Then the Hungarian foreign minister, look what he's saying: Why not be a member of the Warsaw Pact and then in parallel join the political stucture of NATO? What about that? That's also a rather curious attitude. The Czechoslovak foreign minister is already off visiting NATO Headquarters and talking to Woerner, and being offered 60 NATO grants for Czechoslovak students to study at European universities. So if one looks at the balance of prospects, those 60 grants count for much more than, say, 60 missiles. That's how it is, if one looks at the prospects. In other words, the balance between the Warsaw Pact and NATO is changing now not because of whether the GDR is in or out but because of the process which is underway in East Europe.

But we have to get away from seeing East Europe in the categories of old political thinking. We simply do not like to tell ourselves such things. We do not like to tell the hard truth about ourselves. We are always trying to [word indistinct] sidestep reality for some nice illusions. But the reality of East Europe now is a hard one; it is not always amicable to us. If we want to conduct a carefuly weighed policy, to calculate our capabilities—what we can and want to get out of it—then we have to look at things as they really are and not continue to live in the kind of sentimental fancies that belong to 10 or 15 years ago.

[Shishlin] Well, in my view that's frankly meaningless; it's just words. To call what went on 10 or 15 years ago sentimental.

[Bovin] Are you saying it wasn't?

[Shishlin] Sentimental it certainly was not. Things were firmly defined. Naturally, it was the Soviet Union which was dominant, and there was nothing sentimental about that. If what you have in mind were effusive meetings with leaders exchanging embraces and kisses, this was not what expressed the essence of the relations between us and our neigbors to the west.

[Bovin] What I'm talking about is public consciousness. One constantly hears: What's happened? What's going on? If you visit any enterprise the audience will ask: What's happened to the brother Slavs? What's happened to the hundreds of thousands of our sons who went to their graves for the sake of your victory? What's happened to so many years of cooperation, friendship, and all the rest of it? And now look what it's all come to. Well, what's going on here is perfectly clear, the internal (?motives) for such comments. That is what I am afraid I mean by sentimentality over these relations.

[Shishlin] Perhaps, but what I simply wanted to say in this connection is that to some extent we are the victims of our own propaganda.

[Bovin] Exactly, exactly.

[Shishlin] Of our own refusal to take account of reality, of our own refusal to make a hard assessment of reality as it was, as it is, and as it will still be. Even so, I should not like our listeners to run away wit the impression that, let's say Warsaw and Budapest and Prague—all of them—see things only in those categories, of parting company with Moscow and turning their face to the west. That is not the whole question.

[Bovin] It's much more complicated, of course.

[Shishlin] For the series of meetings that has taken place in Moscow shows that there really are some deep-seated and fundamental interests which not only dictate the preservation of links between the East European countries and the Soviet Union but to an even greater extent dictate a need to accelerate the all-European process, a need to create a truly united Europe. True, that will take time. As a goal it is still some way off and will require efforts made on many levels and in many directions. So what is it actually that is causing us concern and alarm today? Not these processes as such.

We are concerned to see that these processes, which are essentially beneficial to the peoples' interests and beneficial to the interests of Europe, do not switch to the reverse side of the coin, the shady side of the coin, and create obstacles to the expansion of such a constructive and really businesslike dialogue within Europe, which for such long decades has been divided into two opposed blocs.

[Bovin] All these concerns are understandable, but I just want to stress once again that the more realistically we appraise the situation, the better we can act within a realistic environment. That's how I would formulate my thought, in part.

[Shishlin] But it could be more elegantly formulated so as to say that politics is the art of the possible.

[Bovin] Well, of course, you could say that, too.

[Levin] Incidentally, we have already touched on the Polish problem, and, even at the latest plenum of the party's Central Committee, one very senior comrade said something like: That's what things have come to. We're receiving various Mazowieckis.

[Bovin—interrupting] But that's....

[Levin—interrupting] But that's already boorishness.

[Bovin] Excuse me, that's not boorishness.

[Levin] I agree with that absolutely. But I want to return to the actual talks with Tadeusz Mazowiecki. And I have the conviction that our state relations, as a result of the processes that are taking place in Poland, by cleansing themselves of the ideological accretions, by cleansing themselves of what is alien, are returning to the essence, to interstate interests, and we can see that these interests very largely coincide. For that reason, their quality will be completely different. I am deeply convinced that, for example, our relations with Poland will be sounder than they were because they really will be based on the genuine interests, mutual interests, of both Poland and the Soviet Union. After all, just look. Again returning to the German problem: All Kohl's zigzags, to put it mildly, as regards recognizing the Oder-Neisse border gave rise to a very sharp, very painful reaction among the Poles. Who supported them categorically, firmly, and unconditionally? The Soviet Union. And the Poles are not the sort of people to fail to understand or value that. Moreover, even if some Polish paper declares: We won't fight for you; well, firstly, there are many papers in Poland, and, secondly....

[Shishlin—interrupting] And then we won't do anything.

[Levin] Yes. And the question of war doesn't seem to me to arise at the moment. But, even so—incidentally, Aleksandr Yevgeniyevich, you have already mentioned Thatcher in connection with her position in Ottawa. I've kept a pronouncement made by her—the prime minister of Great Britain—in February. She was speaking at the Young Conservatives' conference in Torquay, and voiced the concern that the events in East Europe might, through instability, heighten the threat of confrontation. According to her, nuclear restraint is important now than ever before to the maintenance of peace, and it was to this that she pegged the German problem, too. You know, honestly, although I realize perfectly well that our task....

[Shishlin—interrupting] When did she say that?

[Levin] In February—a month ago. So our noble task is to eliminate nuclear weapons by the year 2000. Today, to be quite honest, I would incline more actively toward Thatcher's position, toward nuclear weapons, which do, to some extent, guarantee peace.

[Bovin] What they call minimim restraint?

[Levin] Yes. Yes. I'm following the development of events in the German states. Naturally, I'm interested primarily in the position of governing figures in the FRG. The way Kohl behaved—again, I repeat—over the question of the Oder-Neisse border prompts one to be wary. Moreover, he's already behaving in this way before the unification of Germany, when that state's power is not so great yet. It would, at least, be unpleasant for me to see that state entirely on the side of NATO.

[Shishlin] It would be unpleasant for everyone, but the unpleasant or pleasant category is not the main category in politics.

[Levin] But, even so, when discussing politics, European politics, and the prospects for the development of events in Europe, it seems to me that we must mention yet another well-known factor, namely perestroyka in the USSR.

[Shishlin] Very much will depend on how things go in our country. Very much will depend on the extent to

which we are able to overcome the deep crisis phenomena that are developing here. I mean both the political, economic and, if you like, the moral sphere.

[Bovin] In other words, the main question in Europe now is not the German, but the Soviet one. I would even put it like that.

[Shishlin] I absolutely agree with this. These are the key issues. And the responsibility that is being placed upon us is measured not only by the considered nature and the precision of our moves in foreign policy but even more so by the prudence, boldness, and effectiveness of our actions within the country. But if our domestic affairs proceed well and smoothly without any dramatic interruptions, then surely our foreign policy will only gain from this and our foreign policy will acquire new possibilities. And the greater our success on the path of perestroyka inside the country, the greater the prestige of our foreign policy will be.

[Levin] In this respect, it seems to me, it is worth mentioning that Hungarian Foreign Minister Horn is coming on Saturday. The question of Soviet troop withdrawal from Hungary will be discussed. I would not even want to connect this with the German question in any measure. I quite agree, however, that this question can be linked with perestroyka. This has a direct relation to perestroyka inside the country and to the perestroyka of our relations with socialist countries.

[Shishlin] But I would also like to defend Gyula Horn, the Hungarian foreign minister. For his statement regarding the hypothetical option of Hungary entering NATO has been given very lively coverage. If one examines carefully Horn's own statements, they are quite considered. And he did not pose this problem on any practical plane but simply discussed it with regard to some distant possibilities.

It is another matter that in fact, behind the horizon, there is another problem which has not been posed for the first time in European politics. Indeed it involves the creation of the pan-European home. And, generally, the threads which will make up the fabric, the foundation, as it were, of this pan-European home are already in existence. These include activities toward the reduction of conventional arms and armed forces. Whatever you might say, the possibility of reaching a major agreement already this year is real. And the levels of arms reduction have been agreed. Much has been done. These threads also involve the opportunities which are opening up as the ideological frenzy in economic relations among European states is abating. This also applies to the political sphere, where not only Moscow or Bonn politicians but also those in Paris and London and in all other European capitals must show maximum imagination in order for the potential dangers of destabilization of the situation in Europe, which are emerging in connection with the turbulent shocks being experienced by our western neighbors, for these potential dangers to be overcome and removed, and for the good that has emerged in international and European affairs in recent years to be further developed.

[Levin] As you can see, our conversation was by no means round although we held it at a roundtable. But I think that today all of us have things to think about, and we are submitting all our doubts to public judgement. And that will provide you, esteemed friends, with food for thought.

With this I wish to conclude this program. You have listened to the program International Observers at the Roundtable. Those taking part were Aleksandr Yevgenyevich Bovin, IZVESTIYA political observer; political observer Nikolay Vladimirovich Shishlin; and Viktor Nikolayevich Levin, an all-union radio commentator.

Shevardnadze Interviewed on Caucasus Conflict

PM0903130990 Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 16 Feb 90 p 20

[Unattributed APN interview with USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in Moscow; date not given]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Interviewer] As a minister and as a man of the Caucasus, what concerns do you feel about the disturbances in Transcaucasia and Tajikistan and their possible influence on the USSR's relations with the Islamic world?

[Shevardnadze] The conflict in Transcaucasia, which has developed as a result of the territorial dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh, is of an ethnic—not religious—nature.

Our government is acting there solely for humanitarian reasons—to end terrorist actions, avert civil war between two peoples, and stop the bloodshed.

The developments in that region have no political or "anti-Islamic" undertones. As a minister, as a man of the Caucasus, and simply as a citizen of our multinational country, I understand the misfortune which has befallen the Armenian and Azerbaijani peoples—especially those who have found themselves involved in the conflict.

[Interviewer] What, in your opinion, is the solution to the ethnic problems in the USSR?

[Shevardnadze] The solution must be found within the framework of a renewed federation and on the basis of perestroyka. There are no objective reasons for the developments in the southern USSR to influence adversely relations with the Islamic world. It would be a political mistake to attribute religious overtones to the conflict in Transcaucasia: Such claims serve nobody's interests.

[Interviewer] What will be the main threat to world peace and stability in the nineties?

[Shevardnadze] Why do we now look to the future more optimistically than we used to? We are encouraged by an increasing awareness of belonging to a single human

civilization, shared destinies, acceptance of shared values, and the realization that we are all human beings.

The most terrible thing would be to lose our common aim in the current stage, separate, and each go our own sweet way—not so much under the influence of specific ideologies and social struggles as for want of ethical scruples.

The main threat to world peace and stability lies in losing sight of our common and globally shared destiny, duty, and responsibility.

[Interviewer] The PLO mission in Moscow recently acquired embassy status. Can we hope for the restoration of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Israel?

[Shevardnadze] We would be prepared for that as soon as a Near East negotiations process begins. As for raising the Palestinian mission's status, there are no grounds for drawing a parallel in either form or substance.

[Interviewer] What is the state of relations between the USSR and Israel?

[Shevardnadze] The lack of diplomatic relations does not mean that we reject political dialogue with Israel. In the first place, they must tackle the problems of a Near East settlement. Some aspects of bilateral relations imply the need to maintain contacts. Our conviction is that in the present-day world many things can be achieved by political and diplomatic means.

In the case of the Near East, the aim above all is to humanize relations between the peoples of that region, overcoming enmity and hatred. This problem is a priority in the dialogue with Israeli representatives.

We urge them to make an appropriate response to the clear readiness of the Palestinians and of the Arabs in general to negotiate agreements to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Supreme Soviet, Europarliament Continue Meeting

LD1402234990 Moscow TASS in English 1556 GMT 14 Feb 90

[by TASS correspondent Aleksandr Sorokin]

[Text] Strasbourg February 14 TASS—The second interparliamentary meeting of the delegations of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the European Parliament continues at the Palace of Europe. The first working meeting was devoted to analysing the current political reforms in the Soviet Union.

Valentin Falin, the head of the Soviet delegation and member of the USSR Supreme Soviet committee on international affairs, called attention of meeting participants to the great importance of the platform of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee for the 28th Party Congress.

He said that this platform made public a few days ago is very important for the development of Soviet society. The provision about the CPSU's renunciation of monopoly on power, the formation of new parties and political organisations in the Soviet Union on the basis of an appropriate law (which will be passed) and the formation of a multiparty system will transform the all-union and republican parliaments and will lend new colouring to questions they discuss.

The forthcoming party congress will discuss alternatives for the development of the federation and its component parts. The new platform is based on the attitude to man who is a specific living person with all his down-to-earth problems and not an abstract individual.

Falin expressed hope that the platform's focus on human problems would make Europarliament members think seriously about the state to which perestroyka brought the Soviet Union and what changes it made in Soviet society.

He said that the platform would help them understand why innovative ideas are so difficult to translate into life.

The discussion showed the interest of Europarliament members in preserving political stability and democratic development in the USSR.

They expressed concern over a prospect that the inroduction of a multiparty system in the multinational Soviet state where the CPSU (in the opinion of many Europarliament deputies) plays a role of a cementing element, may aggravate ethnic problems and destabilise the situation.

The Soviet side noted that a multiparty system is not introduced by a decree in any state, including the Soviet Union. Parties emerge as a result of changes in society.

Soviet legislators spelled out the Soviet Parliament's view on how to settle political and ethnic problems in the Soviet Union.

Belorussia's Chernobyl Appeal Conveyed to UN

LD0803122490 Moscow TASS in English 1212 GMT 8 Mar 90

[Text] United Nations March 8 TASS—By TASS correspondent Nikolay Maslov:

Permanent representative of the Belorussian Republic to the United Nations Lev Maximov conveyed on Wednesday an appeal of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers to parliaments, governments, international organisations, fellow countrymen and all goodwill people.

The appeal calls for giving all-round assistance to Belorussia in its efforts to do away with the aftermaths of the Chernobyl disaster.

The Chernobyl disaster which struck on April 26, 1986, had an ecological effect both on the national and international scale. It was a calamity for the Belorussian people, the appeal says.

The document expresses deep concern over the health of people, above all children, who were afflicted by radiation.

A considerable part of the republic's territory with a population of over 2.2 million was polluted by radiation to some or other extent. The republic lost about 20 per cent of its agricultural lands.

Dozens of cities and villages turned into ghost towns. Their residents were evacuated to safe areas.

The government has done much to do away with the tragedy's consequences and to restore people's health. But the scale of the Chernobyl disaster has proved to be much more serious than many people, including leading scientists and specialists believed.

The appeal stresses that joint efforts are needed to overcome the consequences of this calamity. Any assistance will be met with profound gratitude by the Belorussian people.

Perez de Cuellar expressed sympathy with the Belorussian people and said that he would hold consulatations with U.N. specialists concerning possible measures which can be taken by the international community to give international assistance to the Belorussian Republic.

Jaruzelski, Mazowiecki Arrive For Talks in Paris

LD0903154590 Moscow TASS in English 1441 GMT 9 Mar 90

[Text] Paris March 9 TASS—President Wojciech Jaruzleski of Poland and Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki arrived in Paris today for talks with President Francois Mitterrand in the Elysee Palace.

Taking part in the talks are French Prime Minister Michel Rocard and the two countries' foreign ministers Roland Dumas and Krzysztof Skubiszewski.

The French press reports that the talks will focus on German unification and its possible consequences for European countries, including Poland.

The fact that the Polish delegation includes both the president and the prime minister, analysts note, indicates that Poland attaches great importance to the trip.

Poland is seeking French support concerning Bonn's recognition of the European post-war borders, including the Oder-Neise border.

The talks today will be held in three rounds and end late at night.

Zagladin Assesses European Security Conference

LD1003221190 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 10 Mar 90

[Text] Prominent public figures and politicians from 21 European countries, the United States, and Canada, have taken part in an international meeting in Brussels where prospects for building a security system on the European continent were discussed. We've asked one of the participants, Professor Zagladin, to assess the results of the Brussels meeting. Vadim Zagladin is the chairman of the Soviet Committee on European Security and Cooperation and also an adviser to the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on international affairs. Vadim Zagladin:

[Begin Zagladin recording in Russian with superimposed English translation] Professor Zagladin describes the meeting in Brussels as interesting. The main thing is that it was convened at a time when questions of security, cooperation, and Europe's future came into the foreground everywhere in view of the latest developments on the continent. A possible unification of two German states, changes in East and also West Europe, particularly in view of the establishment of a single market there; all this makes it necessary to speed up the process launched in Helsinki.

Now, in what way? As fas as security is concerned, quick steps should be taken towards building an all-European system with the participation of the Soviet Union and the United States. As it was pointed out at the meeting, this system should replace the situation when two military alliances oppose each other in Europe. Some speakers at the meeting pointed out that a new system of European security would be based on a gradual rapprochement and then merging of the two alliances. Other speakers said the boundaries of the two alliances were too narrow and the participation of all the European states was required. In that case the alliances should play the role of a kind of a backbone around which a new system of security would be developed. In any event, the situation should be conducive to taking steps to overcome the system of alliances and build a system of security covering all the European countries, the United States, and Canada. The common aim was expressed in the following words: The security of everyone is the security of all, and the security of all is the security of everyone.

The question was discussed of course, Professor Zagladin goes on, about the place of a united Germany in a new system of security. NATO officials whom I spoke to claim that within the framework of their alliance, it would be much easier to control a united Germany and prevent the development of militaristic and revenge-seeking tendencies there. Other participants in the conference pointed out that the best variant would be an all-European security structure with the participation in it, in keeping with certain rules, of a united Germany. I share in this opinion, Professor Zagladin said in conclusion. [end recording]

According to Vadim Zagladin, it was stressed at the Brussels meeting that the top level conference of 35 countries, contributors to the Helsinki process, suggested by the Soviet Union, would play a major role in the work of building a system of all-European security and cooperation. It will apparently be held in the second half of this year.

OPEC Official Praises USSR Readiness

LD1003104190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1800 GMT 9 Mar 90

[Text] Vienna, 3 Mar (TASS)—The development of a constructive, multilateral dialogue between the OPEC countries, other producer countries, and consumers of this type of raw material is a guarantee for the retention of stability on the world oil market. This view was expressed by Subroto, the OPEC secretary general at a news conference held today at the Vienna International Center, in connection with the expanded session of the market monitoring committee, which opens in Vienna on 16 March. Representatives of the organization's 13 member states will be participating in the meeting. Subroto stressed that in view of the rapid economic growth taking place in a number of developing countries and also processes occurring in Europe, including East Europe, an increased demand and stabilization of market prices for crude oil could be expected during the next decade.

Asked by a TASS correspondent about the prospects for development of cooperation between OPEC and the Soviet Union, Subroto praised the fact that productive contacts between the two sides had taken place. In particular, he recalled Soviet observers are taking part in the meetings of experts from OPEC and other oil producing countries. He added that last year the Soviet Union was represented for the first time at the OPEC conference. The doors of our organization are closed to no one and we highly appreciate the USSR's readiness to develop mutually advantageous cooperation, the secretary general stressed.

United States & Canada

Baker, Shevardandze To Meet in Washington

LD0903171590 Moscow TASS in English 1704 GMT 9 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 9 TASS—Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze will meet U.S. Secretary of State James Baker on April 4-6 in Washington in accordance with an agreement reached.

Solton on Upcoming Talks

LD1203050990 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 11 Mar 90

[Yuriy Solton commentary]

[Text] As it has been officially announced, the Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and the American Secretary of State James Baker will hold three days of talks in Washington beginning on the 4th April. Yuriy Solton has this comment and this is what he writes.

Talks between the foreign ministers is another very important stage in the preparations for the Soviet-American summit due in Washington in June. There is very little time left. The public expects from this summit not simply declarations but practical decisions, in the field of disarmament, above all, for this is in the interests of many countries, if not all of them. Much has already been achieved in this respect. An agreement on the elimination of a considerable part of chemical weapon stocks of the two countries is practically ready. Work has been completed on the whole over additional protocols on measures of control over the treaties on limiting the capacity of underground nuclear tests and on nuclear tests for peaceful purposes. Eighty percent of the treaty on cutting strategic offensive weapons of the two countries by one-half has been agreed upon. Noticeable progress has been made at the talks on reducing conventional armed forces in Europe. The agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States on the level of their troops remaining in central Europe has largely contributed to that.

I doubt that the last two out of the listed documents will be finalized by June, but I think that the forthcoming talks between the two ministers will help push the matter forward and the two agreements will be signed already this year.

The coordinated approach of the two countries, members of the anti-Hitler coalition, to European affairs is no less important. Here, too, some coincidence of views has been reached. For example, the United States has accepted Mikhail Gorbachev's idea to convene an all-European top level conference this year with the participation of the United States and Canada. There are some differences in certain approaches of the two countries. For example, Washington stands for the entry of a united Germany into NATO while Moscow is utterly against this move. There are also major differences as far as international issues are concerned. But the main thing is that relations between the two countries are characterized more and more by mutual understanding, cooperation, and a search of mutually acceptable solutions that would not damage third countries. I am certain that this will be the spirit of the forthcoming negotiations between Eduard Shevardnadze and James Baker in Washington, concludes Yuriy Solton.

Cheney, Powell Cited on U.S. Force Levels

PM0603160990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Mar 90 First Edition p 5

[TASS dispatch: "'We Remain a Superpower.' Statements in Congress by Leaders of the U.S. Defense Department"]

[Text] Washington, 2 Mar—In view of the "phenomenal" changes which have taken place in the Warsaw Pact countries over the past year, a substantial reduction of Soviet forces in East Europe will soon take place, and it is becoming "increasingly unlikely" that the Warsaw Pact will remain a major force threatening West Europe. This was stated by R. Cheney, U.S. secretary of defense, at hearings of the U.S. Congress House of Representatives Foreign Relations Committee.

He admitted that the changes in the military-political situation in the world dictate changes in the makeup of the defense budget. However, Cheney stated bluntly that the United States will embark on cuts in defense spending only provided that the current trends in East Europe and in relations between the USSR and the United States are maintained and that the treaties on strategic offensive arms and conventional forces in Europe are concluded. If this is not the case, the Pentagon will abandon the spending cuts program.

In Cheney's own words, U.S. military appropriations in 1995, taking account of all military expenditure including the Pentagon's financial reserves and expenditure by the Department of Energy, which is in charge of the development and production of nuclear weapons, will total $325 billion.

Cheney stated bluntly that the United States has no intention of abandoning its strategic forces modernization program or the SDI program.

General C. Powell, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, who spoke at the same hearings, stressed: "The Soviet Union, restructured, reformed, less menacing, and seeking to enter the world system, will always remain the only power on earth capable of destroying the United States. We must never forget this."

General Powell made it clear that the Pentagon, or at least its present leadership, does not regard radical cuts in U.S. troops deployed abroad as feasible. "Even if the entire Soviet Army leaves East Europe and even if all the armies of East Europe vanish or come to present no danger as a result of being maintained purely for purposes of national security, we will nonetheless remain a superpower in the

world arena," he said. "We head two great alliances in the Atlantic and the Pacific.... We must remain strong."

Abolition of U.S. Rapid Deployment Forces Urged

LD2802175290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1610 GMT 28 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 28 Feb (TASS)—A TASS diplomatic correspondent writes:

The formation of the "rapid deployment force" [RDF] ten years ago (1 March 1990) was a sort of symbol of the U.S. military presence in parts declared by Washington to be "vitally important" for the United States, and frequently also of direct armed interference in the internal affairs of other states.

It is no coincidence that it [the RDF] appeared in the composition of the United States' Armed Forces precisely at the beginning of the 1980s—in a period of tension in the international situation and of invigoration of the U.S. strong-arm policy in the world arena. Parts of Southeast Asia and North Africa, the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea were declared the "zone of responsibility" of the RDF Command (Centcom). It embraces the territory of 19 states. On two occasions, paratroop units from the composition of the RDF participated in direct acts of U.S. aggression in the countries of Central America and the Caribbean Basin—in October 1983 in Grenada and in December 1989 in Panama.

The changes which have taken place in the world in recent years show convincingly that the use of such forces leads only to further aggravation of conflicts. The most effective way of achieving a settlement, as is recognized today practically throughout the world, is constructive dialogue based on a balance of the legitimate interests of the sides.

During the meeting which took place 2-3 December off the shores of Malta, Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush stated: The cold war is a thing of the past. At the current time, the world community faces the task of total dismantlement of the instruments of the policy of the cold war times. The U.S. "rapid deployment" corps, and the very idea of using force to resolve contentious issues belong among such instruments. People in the Soviet Union hope that the positive development of the Soviet-American dialogue and the growth in trust in relations between the great powers will promote the solution of international problems exclusively by peaceful, political means.

General Krylov Cited on West Point Cadet's Visit

LD0903212690 Moscow TASS in English 1406 GMT 9 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 9 TASS—General Yevgeny Krylov, deputy commander-in-chief of the Soviet Ground Forces, called the forthcoming visit by a delegation from the U.S. West Point Academy to the Soviet Union "people's diplomacy in action".

He was interviewed by TASS today in connection with an eight-day visit by an American delegation consisting of two commissioned officers and 10 cadets, beginning on Saturday.

This is a return visit by American cadets to the Soviet Union, noted the general. In mid-February the United States was visited by officers and cadets of the Moscow Military School named after the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation.

According to Krylov, it is expected that American cadets will live according to a timetable of Soviet cadets.

They will attend lectures, participate in training sessions at a tank training ground and a shooting range. They will also take part in sport competitions, joint discussions on political and moral topics and visit Leningrad.

Soviet-U.S. Meeting on Information Exchange Ends

LD0103221390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0320 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Excerpts] Washington, 1 Mar (TASS)—TASS correspondent Oleg Polyakovskiy reports:

Here the third Soviet-U.S. meeting on information exchanges has ended which took place in a constructive atmosphere of mutual understanding and businesslike cooperation. [passage omitted]

"The importance of this meeting," stressed V.F. Petrovskiy, head of the Soviet delegation, "is that it was held after the meeting between Presidents Gorbachev and Bush off the coast of Malta and before the summit in Washington. Our leaders have become the initiators of a new approach to Soviet-U.S. relations, having demonstrated how matters relating to them need to be tackled. I cannot say that all differences have been overcome. They do exist, but we can talk about them very honestly and constructively. Our consultations have shown that the Soviet-U.S. agreement on exchanges provides for broad opportunities which open the way for better mutual understanding between our countries. I believe that it is very important that we have thoroughly discussed the matter of opening cultural centers of the United States and the USSR in Moscow and Washington respectively. An understanding has been reached on the possibility of signing the relevant agreement during the forthcoming summit in Washington." [passage omitted]

The participants in the meeting pointed out that, despite the significant improvement in Soviet-U.S. relations, the conditions of work for correspondents remain unsatisfactory and various restrictions remain which hamper journalists from carrying out their duty of informing the public about what is happening in the country in which they are posted. [passage omitted]

Northeast Asia

Moscow TV Reports Democracy Rally in Ulaanbaatar

LD0903193190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 9 Mar 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] A rally of democratic parties has been held in the Mongolian capital. Here is a report from our correspondent.

[T. Lordkipanidze—identified by screen caption] The square which on one side has the Lenin Museum building and the Yalalt cinema on the other was unable to accommodate all the demonstrators. Blocking the traffic, thousands and thousands of people crammed into the streets and side-streets adjoining the square. [video show a mass of people with banners filling square]

This time the rally was initiated along with the Mongolian Democratic Union for the first time by the Movement of Social Democrats, the New Progressive Union, and the Union of Mongolian Students—public organizations that have come into being this year.

Perhaps this determined the largely new character of the slogans that the demonstrators had brought along and the content of the speeches heard on the square.

The people does not have any debts, was an inscription that was frequently repeated on the banners of the Union of Students. Others read: win democracy by struggle, and: Unite, a fire needs more than one log. Occasionally the passions went too far. Our country was accused of buying up Mongolian raw materials output for a song, and it was said that the joint enterprises are ruining Mongolia and therefore they should be immediately eliminated. There were even demands that the agreed timeframe for the final withdrawal of Soviet troops, which just recently, it seemed, was to everyone's liking, be reduced to September this year. [video shows close-ups of banners and speakers at rally]

What specific proposals are the informal movements making to the country's leadership? A joint statement by the four organizations that was read out at the rally spoke of the need to convene before the end of March an extraordinary congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, make changes to the membership of the party central committee, and demarcate the functions of party and state bodies. The demand was put forward that a Provisional People's Hural be set up also during the month of March with the participation on an equal footing of all social forces and that it approve a new constitution for the country and the procedure for the holding of democratic elections.

Hunger Strike Ends After Batmonh Speech

LD0903184490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1609 GMT 9 Mar 90

[Report by TASS Correspondents Kim Boldokhonov and Dugar Sanzhiyev]

[Excerpt] Ulaanbaatar, 9 Mar (TASS)—[Passage omitted]

Today, Jambyn Batmonh, general secretary of the MPRP [Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party] Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the People's Great Hural of the MPR [Mongolian People's Republic], addressed the country's people. This evening on national radio and television, Batmonh announced that it had been decided to include in the agenda of the MPRP Central Committee Plenum, opening on 12 March, questions concerning the retirement of the MPRP Central Committee Politburo and the convening of an extraordinary party congress. The Monogolian leader also said that a nationwide referendum would be held, and the people itself would determine whether to express confidence in the Great Hural or to register a vote of no confidence.

This evening, some members of the Mongolian Democratic Union and other informal public movements ended their hunger strike in connection with the fulfilment of their demands.

Mongolian 'Prodemocracy Association' Meets

LD1003212190 Moscow TASS in English 1915 GMT 10 Mar 90

[By TASS correspondent Dugar Sanzhiev]

[Text] Ulaanbaatar March 10 TASS—Dialogue and mutual understanding between political forces and public organizations in the country and the alliance with all parties, unofficial associations and movements will be high on the agenda of the Mongolian Patriotic Unity Front, the organizational meeting of the new prodemocracy association was told here today.

Participants in the meeting, representing practically all layers of the Mongolian population, approved the front's platform and rules. They will be finalized and endorsed by the Front Congress in April.

According; to the founders, the front's aim is to pool the efforts of all public movements which favor restructuring begun by the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party in order to strengthen national unity.

Support for the party's policy of democratisation and renewal was also expressed by participants in the relly held today in the capital Palace of Science, Engineering and Culture.

Speakers proposed a number of measures capable of helping the party's self-renewal. One was to submit to the consideration of the Party Central Committee plenary

meeting, which opens on March 12, the proposal for the procedure of electing delegates to the party's extraordinary congress. Speakers insisted that the elections should be held in constituencies and be contested.

Mongolian Party Plenum Opens in Ulaanbaatar

LD1203040390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0300 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, 12 March, (TASS)—The 8th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party [MPRP] began work here today.

Issues relating to the resignation of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the MPRP and the convocation of an extraordinary party congress are being put forward for examination by the participants.

Jambyn Batmonh, general secretary of the Central Committee of the MPRP and chairman of the Presidium of the People's Great Hural of the Mongolian People's Republic, is delivering a report to the plenum.

Batmonh Speech at Plenum Reported

LD1203090790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0653 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, 12 Mar (TASS)—The eighth plenum of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party [MPRP] Central Committee opened today.

As was already reported three days ago in the speech given by Jambyn Batmonh, general secretary of the MPRP Central Committee, on national television, the issues of the resignation of the current composition of the Politburo of the MPRP Central Committee and the convocation of an extraordinary party plenum in the first half of April are submitted for examination by participants in the plenum.

Members and candidate members of the Politburo, and secretaries of the MPRP Central Committee have decided to resign en bloc, said Jambyn Batmonh, general secretary of the MPRP Central Committee and chairman of the presidium of the Great People's Hural, at the plenum which is underway in Ulaanbaatar. He made a 40-minute report in which he gave an evaluation of the political situation in the country.

In his words, the situation in the country is now complex, but this does not mean that Mongolian society is in a deep political, economic, and spiritual crisis. To prevent this from happening, the party must, on the basis of renewal beginning with a change of leadership, justify the hopes of the working people and prove by technical deeds, in the name of fundamental interests of the people, its vanguard role in society, he stressed.

J. Batmonh proposed that an extraordinary congress of the MPRP should be convened on 10 April. This would not contradict the party statute currently in force.

J. Batmonh's report was broadcast on national television and radio. In the evening, as was announced, a reportage on the work of the plenum of the MPRP Central Committee will be shown. Nevertheless, several hundred people demanding a continuation of the direct relay from the conference hall of the plenum gathered in front of the House of Government.

Advisers Possible in MPR After Troop Withdrawal

OW1103071090 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1200 GMT 10 Mar 90

[Text] As a result of Soviet-Mongolian talks held in Ulaanbaatar, an accord was reached on the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolia. As has been stated in official reports, the complete withdrawal will be concluded in 1992. Concerning the details of the talks, Korolev, Radio Moscow correspondent in Mongolia, has filed the following report:

Thanks to the new thinking in the processes of restructuring, which is increasingly gaining strength not only in the Soviet Union but also in Mongolia, the decision was reached on withdrawing Soviet troops from Mongolia. This was the view expressed by General (Jadamba), chief of staff of the Mongolian troops, who participated in the talks, to Mongolian papers and journals.

And while pointing out that no conditions for the possible reintroduction of Soviet troops into Mongolia were stated in the accord that had been just worked out, General (Jadamba) also stated that there would be no reason to reject the idea of inviting Soviet advisers, even after the Soviet troop withdrawal.

Mongolian leader Batmonh, chairman of the Presidium of the People's Great Hural, has also stated his satisfaction with the results of the recent talks. While speaking highly of cooperation in defense between the two nations, Chairman Batmonh stated that the two nations would continued to cooperate in the future, and pointed out that the decision made would certainly be instrumental to fostering trust and also to strengthening the atmosphere of mutual understanding in the Asia-Pacific region.

Concerning this decision, observers also point out that various initiatives on guaranteeing the regional security by political measures which were originally proposed by the leaderships of both nations. For example, Mongolia once proposed that talks should be held to work out a treaty on not resorting to arms in dealing with issues connected with the relations between Asian-Pacific nations. The Mongolian Government has indicated the idea of forming a permanent mechanism for negotiations among the nations in the northeastern part of the Asia-Pacific region.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union has also taken large-scale initiatives in line with the idea of turning the

Asia-Pacific region into a region of peace and good-neighborliness. Included in these initiatives is the proposal for reducing troop strength in Asia.

No's Overture for Kim Il-song Meeting Viewed

SK0403121090 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 3 Mar 90

[Commentary by station commentator Igor Levezev from the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] Speaking to a commemorative meeting in Seoul on the 71st anniversary of the 1 March resistance struggle against the Japanese imperialists' colonial rule, ROK President No Tae-u again expressed his intention to meet with DPRK President Kim Il-song to discuss the issue of achieving reunification on the Korean peninsula. Our station commentator Igor Levezev comments on this:

[Words indistinct] this overture by Seoul is a significant change. The ROK Government has not once or twice declared that it would develop wide-ranging political and cultural relations with the DPRK. [Words indistinct], for example, have even mapped out a plan to build an international resort around the scenic Mt. Kumgang in the DPRK. Also, [words indistinct] enter third countries together with DPRK industrial enterprises. ROK business companies can also (?join in) the DPRK's activities to establish joint ventures with third countries. Seoul also has a plan to establish a special fund to financially assist cultural, scientific, and human exchanges.

I would like to point out that even though these plans have been mapped out, they still remain a castle in the air. These plans which remain a castle in the air [words indistinct]. Even though I do not know who is responsible, [passage indistinct].

North-South talks have not brought about successes. Even though South Korea and North Korea have respectively advanced proposals to normalize their relations, these proposals which each side has advanced [words indistinct]. However, if both sides make compromises and try to understand each other's positions, normalizing relations between the two Koreas and consolidating peace and security on the Korean peninsula will not be a matter of a distant future but that of an immediate future.

No Tae-u only declared that the ROK is willing to realize negotiations between representatives of the two countries on economic cooperation, trade, tourism, [word indistinct], the development of land and resources, and the construction of industrial enterprises.

'Importance' of South Korean Political Merger

SK2502042790 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Station commentator on the political merger of the ruling party and two opposition parties in Korea, from the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] The ruling Democratic Justice Party [DJP] and two opposition parties, the Reunification Democratic Party and the New Republican Democratic Party, adopted a joint platform and regulations and formed the Democratic Liberal Party [DLP].

The new party issued a statement of appeal to the people and decided to hold its first convention in April.

The three-man leadership composed of the former party presidents will lead the DLP until the convention.

This event can be viewed as being of importance in every way in South Korea. This is because the political forces of the country have been realigned. Though the ruling party controls two thirds of the deputies in the National Assembly, it will be faced with confrontation with the isolated Party for Peace and Democracy.

Kim Tae-chung and his supporters will not be able to overcome numerical supremacy. The founding of the powerful party must have greatly shocked opposition organizations.

Kim Tae-chung called former antigovernment opposition leaders traitors. He added that their merger is an antipeople and antidemocratic coup d'etat.

No Tae-u, DJP president and Korean president, has adopted a series of large-scale democratic measures in his domestic and foreign policy over the past one and a half years in power. No Tae-u has stated that the merger of neutral, democratic, and national forces will help to finally achieve political stability and make it possible to easily deal with reforms in the world and on the Korean peninsula.

The new party will seek Korean reunification. It plans to form about 20 specialized committees and to deal with the question of multifaceted cooperation with the DPRK. With the help of the committees, the party will expand relations with foreign countries, [words indistinct] democratic forces, and solve the problem of guaranteeing human rights at home.

Seoul, Kwangju Mass Demonstrations Examined

SK0203023390 Moscow International Service in Korean 0900 GMT 28 Feb 90

[Igor Yevedev commentary]

[Text] The situation in South Korea is unstable. College students staged mass demonstrations in Seoul and other large cities in South Korea. They also staged a very fierce anti-U.S. demonstration in Kwangju. (?Ink bottles and

stones) were thrown into the [word indistinct] of [name indistinct], director of the U.S. [word indistinct] in Kwangju last Sunday [25 March]. A special police unit had to use teargas canisters to disperse the demonstrators.

What caused this difficult situation to become as grave as this? College students demand an end to the stationing of U.S. troops in South Korea, and denounce the United States for its alleged involvement in the repression of the Kwangju residents' uprising for democracy.

This May will mark the 10th anniversary of the Kwangju residents' uprising for democracy. Official statistics say about 200 people were killed during the popular uprising in Kwangju, but according to data supplied by dissidents some 2,000 people died.

The South Korean people demand that the militaristic alliance between Seoul and Washington be [?abolished]. Student organization leaders note that the party responsible for the Korean national division is the United States. We can appreciate the South Korean people's feelings. They want to control their sovereign territory and everything going on in it. [sentence indistinct] Anyway, Seoul and Washington are thinking of moving military facilities from metropolitan areas in South Korea to the Taejon area.

While an anti-U.S. demonstration was going on in the streets of Kwangju, students, dissidents, and their supporters held spirited demonstrations in many other cities in South Korea. They called for the disbanding of the new conservative political party, which was formed through the merger of the ruling Democratic Justice Party and two opposition parties, the Reunification Democratic Party and the New Democratic Republican Party.

The opposition party is critical, saying that President No Tae-u is trying to strengthen the position of conservative forces, and is consistently refusing to implement people-oriented, democratic (?reform). There is a reason for this. The new party, which is called the Democratic Liberal Party, now holds an overwhelming majority in the National Assembly, and can easily block all legislative initiatives by dissident forces to develop democratic (?reforms) in South Korea.

Kim Yong-sam's Visit to Moscow Discussed

SK0203055390 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Article by station commentator Andrey Ilynin from the program "Focus on Asia"]

[Text] Some time ago, many people may have regarded the report on an unofficial visit to the Soviet Union by a cochairman of the Korean ruling party merely as a joke.

However, the times are changing.

Kim Yong-sam, a leader of the recently founded Democratic Liberal Party, is to arrive in Moscow at the invitation of the Institute for World Economy and International Relations.

It should be noted that this visit is the second one to Moscow by the Korean politician. He visited Moscow last year as an opposition party leader.

The formation of nongovernmental-level mutual relations between the Soviet Union and Korea proceeds from the well-known speech of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Krasnoyarsk.

Since the Seoul Olympics, these relations have been expanded even into the exchange of trade missions and the establishment of consular departments.

Trade and economic relations have also vigorously developed. In 1989, the trade volume reached $600 million. Mutual visits between political activists and scholars have been frequently made, and views on wide-scope international issues, including the Korean issue, have been exchanged.

Watching a series of affirmative steps, including the decision to withdraw 200,000 Soviet troops from the Asian continent and perestroyka in our country, Seoul has taken measures to expand economic relations with Moscow. These measures include the decision to lift the limitation of capital investment into the Soviet Union.

Some time ago Kim Yong-sam stated that he actively supports the lines of improving relations with the Soviet Union, because these lines can result in removing strain on the Korean peninsula.

Through Soviet publications, some scholars have also expressed the same opinions.

Some Korean commentators predict that during his forthcoming visit, Kim Yong-sam is likely to unofficially meet with some Soviet leaders. They contend that these meetings will play a significant role in contacts between the two countries.

Not 'Much Cause for Optimism' From Cheney Tour

PM0203103190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Mar 90 First Edition p 3

[A. Golts "Observer's Column": "The Old Recipes"]

[Text] Is the ice of confrontation, which has been present for many years even in the warmest waters of the Pacific Ocean, beginning to thaw? At first glance, the results of U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney's tour of a number of East Asian countries would suggest precisely that. Indeed, during the conversations with the leaders of Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines the head of the U.S. military department discussed various options relating to the reduction of the U.S. military presence in those countries. Judging by R. Cheney's statements, the

Pentagon seriously intends to reduce its grouping of 120,000 Americans in East Asia by 10 percent.

Of course, in terms of its scale this future action in no way matches the cuts in our Armed Forces in the eastern part of the USSR, which are already under way. I would remind you that the grouping of Soviet forces is being reduced here by 200,000 servicemen. Nevertheless, I do not think that the significance of the Pentagon's intentions should be belittled. Let us not forget that for a number of years cuts in U.S. Armed Forces in Asia and the Pacific have been out of the question. In particular, there are purely psychological reasons for this as far as the U.S. military is concerned. Comparatively recently I had a conversation with several officers of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and I was amazed how acute their memory was of the destruction of the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor and of the grim war in the Pacific. I suppose they have the same memory as us of the tragic summer of 1941. So the fact that the Pentagon has started at least to talk about cuts should be welcomed.

But when you consider the motives you immediately start to wonder whether Washington is sincere when it says that it is motivated by a determination to strengthen peace in the region. After all, Cheney himself said that the warming of the international climate and improvement of American-Soviet relations are no reason at all for resolutely reducing U.S. forward-based forces. You have only to withdraw them, the Pentagon chief believes, and... "a destabilizing regional arms race will start, tension will increase, and conflicts may begin." In short, without strict American supervision, the Asian countries will come to blows, I'm afraid. What we have here is the old U.S. claim to the role of policeman, responsible for order in the region.

But whereas this approach can be put down to stereotypoes hanging over from the past, there is something else that is quite impossible to understand. Namely the refusal to talk with the USSR on military detente in Asia and the Pacific. A refusal that has been elevated to the status of a principle. "Asia," R. Cheney said, "is above all a theater of naval actions, in which there are no overlapping allied structures at all. The United States is a kind of balancing element in the region. That is why the USSR's attempts to limit the free movement of fleets are not in the interests of peace and stability. That is why we will continue to resist naval arms control."

One can only guess what kind of threat to peace the Pentagon chief discerned in the USSR's proposal to limit naval activity, disperse navies, and thereby forestall any potential incidents. The only explanation is that the Pentagon chief is trying to justify his having opted to preserve the vast superiority in naval armaments.

It is an interesting fact, too, that the potential cuts in U.S. Armed Forces will not lead to a general reduction of the level of military confrontation in the region. In fact, Washington is directly linking them to a parallel increase in the military preparations of its closest allies—Japan and South Korea. Essentially, the U.S. strategists are intending to transfer some of the combat tasks U.S. forces are currently implementing to the Japanese and South Korean Armed Forces.

So the results of R. Cheney's trip do not give much cause for optimism. In fact, the vacuum of political will to strengthen security in the region is much more dangerous than the mythical strategic vacuum the U.S. secretary talked about.

WEU Assembly President Arrives in Moscow

PM0503122890 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 6

[TASS report under general heading "Official Announcements"]

[Text] Sh. Gerens [name as transliterated], president of the Western European Union Assembly, arrived in Moscow 1 March for a working visit, at the invitation of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Near East & South Asia

Reportage on Aftermath of Afghan Coup Attempt

Defense Minister Queried on Situation

LD1003183390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 10 Mar 90

[Interview with Afghan Defense Minister M.A. Watanjar, by Aleksandr Shkirando in Kabul; date not given; from the "Vremya" newscast—recorded; Watanjar speaks in Dari or Pashto with superimposed Russian translation]

[Text] [Shkirando] What is the general situation after the failed conspiracy? How many units are still continuing to resist government troops?

[Watanjar] At present, all units and subunits are on the side of the government. The military units which, as a result of incitement, initially joined the conspirators, have given up fighting. On the whole, a normal situation is being maintained in the country.

[Shkirando] And what can be said about the losses sustained by both sides?

[Watanjar] It is difficult to give a precise figure yet, but I think that the overall number of killed and wounded is approximately 200 people.

[Shkirando] Can you confirm that Shahnawaz Tanay and his accomplices are in Pakistan? And if this is so, how did they manage to cross the border and what further actions can one expect from them?

[Watanjar] Yes, indeed, on 7 March, at 1220 Kabul time, Shahnawaz Tanay and his closest allies crossed the Afghan-Pakistani border on a military transport aircraft

flying at a very low altitude. The aircraft landed on the airfield of the town of Parachinar. Now, together with Western and Pakistani special services, they are drawing up another anti-Afghan plan. According to information available to us, Pakistan's military intelligence will try to use the Gulbuddin-Tanay alliance to seize Khowst. But we are prepared to defend our country's integrity.

Watanjar Views Predecessor's Role

LD1003210390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1730 GMT 10 Mar 90

[Report by Aleksandr Shkirando in Kabul]

[Excerpt] Life is gradually returning to normal both in the capital and in the country as a whole, after the unsuccessful coup d'etat. Kabul's central streets and squares, which suffered badly from the explosion of bombs dropped by aircraft, are being restored. Restoration work has also begun in state institutions. And brisk trading is already under way at the bazaars.

Yet if one listens to the voices of Western radio, which is, incidentally, represented by a miserly number of correspondents, one hears that the Najibullah regime is on the verge of collapse, while the president himself is hiding in one of the foreign embassies in Kabul. This does not correspond to reality, of course. So in order to clarify the true situation in Afghanistan, I interviewed Army General Mohammad Aslam Watanjar, defense minister of the Republic of Afghanistan.

I asked Watanjar: Do you think that former Defense Minister Shahnawaz Tanay, who played the main role in the recent plot, was really very closely linked with Gulbuddin Hikmatyar? Watanjar said: It is now, unfortunately, reliably known that Shahnawaz Tanay had contacts with Gulboddin Hikmatyar, leader of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan.

Events in December, when the (Shefa) underground, subversive, terrorist organization was uncovered and rendered harmless, operating within the framework of the opposition Islamic Party of Afghanistan, were a sort of preface of the attempted coup d'etat. During the investigation it became apparent, continued Watanjar, that some military servicemen, from the lowest ranks to generals, were also connected with this group. Major General (Wali Shah), commander in chief of the air defense troops, turned out to be one of them. During the preliminary investigation he admitted that he was a member of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan and had maintained contact with the above terrorist organization on the instructions of Shahnawaz Tanay.

Tanay perceived the arrest of his closest accomplices in December and the start of their trial in early March as a mortal danger to himself. On his orders, operations with the aim of effecting a coup d'etat began on 6 March, according to a plan developed in conjunction with the Islamic Party of Afghanistan, stated Army General Watanjar. [passage omitted]

Post-Coup Activities Noted

LD1103175590 Moscow TASS in English 1450 GMT 11 Mar 90

[Text] Kabul, March 11 (TASS)—President Najibullah of Afghanistan has addressed a message to Afghan political and public leaders abroad to inform them about the abortive military coup in the country. It stresses, among other things, that the putschists wanted to overthrow the government and to establish a bloody dictatorship. The Afghan president urged fellow countrymen to return home and discuss jointly the ways and means to restore peace and security in the country.

A meeting of the Afghan Council of Ministers, held in Kabul, heard reports by special government commissions on the losses and damage caused by the coup. It was noted that 95 civilians were killed during the fighting, 172 people were wounded, the presidential palace, Defense Ministry and Puli-Heshti Mosque were heavily damaged. As many as 230 private shops and 55 dwelling houses were completely destroyed.

Sultan 'Ali Keshtmand, chairman of the Council of Ministers executive committee, received the heads of diplomatic missions accredited in Kabul. He informed them about the coup attempt and about the Afghan Government's request to render aid to victims of putshist air raids and shellings.

A presidential amnesty decree was published here. It says that members of the opposition, who have stopped fighting the government and surrended their weapons to the authorities, as well as servicemen who had deserted and joined the opposition, would not be prosecuted if they gave themselves up.

The BAKHTAR news service reports that a 500-men rebel detachment has gone over to the government's side in Jowzjan Province. Two thousand members of their families have returned to peaceful life together with them.

'Peace and Calm' Noted in Kabul

LD1003132390 Moscow TASS in English 1245 GMT 10 Mar 90

[Text] Kabul March 10 TASS—Peace and calm are returning to Kabul after the attempted military coup. State institutions, factories and plants are operating and shops are open. Teams of builders began dealing with the consequences of the crushed mutiny.

Telegrams are coming in to President Najibullah from all parts of the country. Troop units, party and public organisations denounce the plotters' criminal actions, express support for the course pursued by the Afghan leadership and readiness to defend their homeland.

The Afghan Foreign Ministry sent a note to U.N. observers in Kabul, which points to Pakistan's direct involvement in the coup attempt. The note says that the

Pakistani authorities engineered the conspiracy against the sovereign country, that caused loss of life and heavy damage to property.

The note accused the Pakistani authorities of violating the standards and provisions of international law and the Geneva agreements.

The note says that Afghan Government has irrefutable evidence that the Pakistani military intelligence service was behind the Tanay-Hikmatyar rebellions. It provided refuge to the plot's leaders in Pakistan.

Another two detachments of the armed opposition switched to the side of the government in Laghman and Balkh Province.

Return to 'Normal Life' Reported

LD0903200990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 9 Mar 90

[Report from Kabul by correspondent Vladimir Pasko]

[Text] Everything is quiet in Kabul. The city is living its normal life. All the country's airports are working, including nearby Bagram, whose pilots the insurrectionists were counting on. I was shown a report by correspondents in provinces. The situation there is the same. In some of them clashes with warriors of the irreconcilables are taking place, but this is normal. After the failure of the coup attempt Tanay fled to Pakistan. There the Pakistani military met and talked with him. This information confirms the statement by the Afghan leader about Pakistan's involvement in the conspiracy, despite Pakistan's denying this.

If one is to talk about where Tanay is currently to be found, there is no reliable information about that. Many people I talked to here do not exclude the possibility that Tanay may (?regroup) near Khowst. After the defeat near Jalalabad and Qandahar the irreconcilables centered their efforts on seizing precisely this small administrative center located just 35 km from the border, in order to (?form) their new government there. The majority of the Afghans never recognized the emigre mudjahidin government, whose term of office has ended. This is why the irreconcilables do not cease to announce the formation of a new cabinet on the territory of the country.

The fact remains that the attempts to overthrow by force the existing republican regime of Afghanistan—despite foreign help—have had no success. The attempt to blow it up from the inside has also failed.

Commentary Examines Coup Attempt

NC0803170190 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Persian to Iran 1530 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Station commentary]

[Text] The Soviet public heard with great concern of the attempted overthrow of the legal Government of Afghanistan by force. As President Najibullah said to the nation, the armed coup attempt was carried out by extremist elements within the party in collaboration with traitors and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Our commentator writes on this:

The coup attempt took place while the process of national reconciliation is accelerating and the outlook of a political solution to the Afghanistan problem is becoming clearer. For one year the United States and Pakistan did not indicate that they were ready for a solution to the Afghanistan problem. They hoped that they could use the withdrawal of the Soviet Army to overthrow Dr. Najibullah's government and then use the armed opposition to install the regime they wanted.

But the year that passed showed the impossibility of solving the problem militarily. The situation was changing. Reports spoke about the intention of the White House to change its policy of definite support for the Afghan opposition. Afghan opposition circles increasingly understood the need for a solution to Afghanistan's domestic problems through talks with the participation of all of Afghanistan's political forces. Meanwhile, the issue is one of a vast range of opposition—from the field commanders to the leaders of the Seven- and Nine-Party Alliances in Pakistan and Iran. These elements weakened the positions of the unreconciling opponents of national reconciliation and of those opposing the creation of a vast coalition government.

Those who were unable to achieve success in their efforts to overthrow the Afghan regime through direct armed conflicts decided to inflict blows on it from within. The involvement of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of the Hezb-e Islami-ye Afghanistan, in the coup plot was not incidental. His warmongering and unreconciling attitude separated him from the process of political solution. He was deprived of considerable assistance by his American mentors and forced to leave the so-called interim government in Peshawar. His lack of flexibility and goodwill led him into isolation.

Thus, his participation in the intensification of the effort for an armed coup in Kabul can only be considered as the helpless attempt by a bankrupt politician. But one should not underestimate the threats of such acts. Had the plotters succeeded, the country could have been plunged into years of chaos, violence, and bloodshed without any hopes for peace and stability. The situation in the region could have been exacerbated even more than it is now.

At this complicated time, it is necessary that all the patriotic forces of Afghanistan unite to defend the national interests of Afghanistan and to carry out decisive steps to prevent tragic consequences.

The Soviet people cannot be indifferent to the incidents taking place in Afghanistan. They are sincerely interested in the welfare of the Afghan people and want the bloodshed and destruction to end.

Afghan Defense Official Cited on Soviet Role

PM0903120190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Mar 90 First Edition p 5

[TASS correspondent Yu. Tyssovskiy report for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "Long Path in Tunnel"]

[Text] I am sitting with my TASS colleague A. Semenov in the spacious office of Colonel General N.'Azimi [name as transliterated], first deputy defense minister of the Republic of Afghanistan and chief of the Kabul garrison. Our question did not beat about the bush, as they say: "In the past year in the Soviet press and in various statements the idea has appeared that the Soviet troops' presence on Afghan soil did not help to increase the combat readiness of the Afghan Amed Forces, that it merely brought negative results. What is your opinion?"

"The facts attest to the opposite," the general replied, smiling. "Our ability to defend the country independently against opposition attacks can be explained by a whole complex of factors. I shall dwell on the purely military ones. First of all the country's leadership headed by President Najibullah, supreme commander in chief of the Afghan Armed Forces, has succeeded in ensuring the firm unity of the Army, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of State Security troops, the self-defense groups, and the tribal militias. Second, the enormous experience accumulated over 10 years of war which the Afghan armed forces acquired during both independent operations and joint operations with Soviet units and subunits. That also includes the setbacks we suffered, although as a whole we were accompanied by success. The errors and shortcomings perpetrated were painstakingly analyzed and eliminated. The planning of subsequent operations was structured with these errors in mind. Priceless experience was acquired during joint battles when united task forces were created to control the troops and their multifaceted collaboration was ensured.

"Third, the victories achieved were to an enormous degree predetermined by the attention which throughout the postrevolutionary years was paid to the Armed Forces by the party and state leadership. In practice a considerable proportion of the command personnel from regiment level upward received military education in USSR educational establishments, and the commanders are successfully applying the knowledge they acquired on the battlefields at all times of day and on every kind of terrain.

"The equipping of the Afghan Armed Forces with modern weapons delivered from the USSR on the basis of treaties and agreements should also be considered far from the least factor. They include excellent combat equipment, communications facilities, and transport. Missile weapons and fighter aircraft have been highly effective in repelling formations of the armed opposition."

That is his opinion. In my view a considered one in all respects.

I recently visited the posts guarding the new metaled road from Kabul to Bagram. Veteran "Afghans" understand its importance. This highway was laid on open terrain to bypass the old road, with its sinister "greenery" directly adjacent to the roadway making this quite large sector of the "lifeline" extremely vulnerable to subversive rebel attacks.

Today the highway has been equipped from the defensive viewpoint and, as I was able to see for myself, it is virtually invulnerable to enemy attack. All along the 70km arc carved into the steppe a network of posts has been created, skillfully chosen as regards terrain, well equipped in the engineering respect, and provided with powerful combat equipment, posts which cover all approaches to the road from the West—from that "greenery"—and from the East—from the Kukhi-Safi [name as transliterated] mountain ridge shining white with snow. Trucks carrying grain and rice and other essential foods and tank trucks carrying fuel proceed constantly from the north to Kabul without any additional guard.

Colonel Karim [name as transliterated], commander of the division guarding the highway, told me that many posts have been created along it. In the two months the road has been in operation there has not been a single direct attack or a single vehicle damaged, he says. Attempts have been made to shell some of its sectors from mountain areas. But the practice of driving in convoys has long been abandoned; that is first. The vehicles proceed one by one, and shooting at targets like that is simply a waste of missiles. And, second, each such attempt costs the dushmans dear.

There are straightforward people in the Army. For them the rebels, in contrast to the diplomats who operate in smooth terms like "armed opposition," are nothing but dushmans, that is enemies.

Officers and men alike talk about them with contempt. The commander of one post, a Pushtun, a senior lieutenant, put it briefly: "They can do nothing against us in open combat. The Americans know it, and that is why they supply them with missiles to fire at cities and kill civilians."

Incidentally, I did not ask him the questions. That was mainly done by two Pakistani journalists from our group. They were received in a friendly fashion but given no quarter. "In your opinion, when will peace come to Afghanistan?" asked Shakhid Kardar [name as transliterated] from the journal VIEWPOINT. "It could even be tomorrow," Lashkar broke in. "As soon as Pakistan and the United States stop sending assassins to our country and supplying them with weapons we will sit down at the conference table. But in the meantime we shall fight them, for as long as it takes for reason to return to their heads."

[Questioner] "Do you not find it boring, sitting here for months?"

[Laskar] "We would be pleased to live in our own garrison, but for the time being people are imposing war on us from outside and we must do our duty."

[Questioner] "What do you think of the Russians?"

[Laskar] "I think well of them, and I thank them for this." Lashkar pointed to the shelters in which formidable combat equipment was concealed.

I want to cite one more talk, with an officer of the Afghan Defense Ministry guard, a young man who has studied in the USSR. Unfortunately, I have forgotten his name. "When will there be peace?" I asked in my turn. He thought for a little and said: "I believe it will not be soon. They will not be able to do anything with us, but they will annoy us a great deal yet."

I believe he is right. Peshawar, Islamabad, and Washington are continuing to play the same tune, recognizing only one option as a "political settlement"—the withdrawal of Najibullah and the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan from the political stage, and until that—no talks, only war. Neither the CIA nor the State Department nor the U.S. Congress is willing to see the realities of the military-political balance of forces in Afghanistan. It is true that recently some signs have appeared that the U.S. legislators are beginning to think about the problem. But there is an enormous distance from thoughts, even when they are sometimes voiced aloud, to deeds. The gamble on force remains dominant for the time being. U.S. weapons are flooding into Afghanistan from Pakistan. Since the withdrawal of the Soviet troops alone the CIA has transferred 18 sophisticated types of arms to the rebel gangs through its own channels.

Despite the visible successes of the national conciliation policy pursued by the Afghan leadership, the prospects of peace for Afghanistan are still very remote. Light can be seen at the end of the tunnel, but there is a long, tortuous journey toward it. I am sure that the Afghan people will make that journey.

Commentary Urges Shamir to Accept Baker Proposals

TA0303083790 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Hebrew 1600 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Station commentary]

[Text] The policy of absolute rejectionism conducted by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir has been dealt another blow with the secession of five Likud Knesset members, led by Minister Yitzhaq Moda'i, who announced the establishment of a new movement. In a news conference in Tel Aviv, one of the five, Avraham Sharir, said that the prime minister is guilty of entertaining dictatorial presumptions, adding that the decision to break away from the Likud came because the Likud is not functioning in any event.

The blows are falling on Shamir's head from the left and from the right. The U.S. Administration has stepped up its pressure, demanding that Israel accept negotiations with a Palestinian delegation that will include representatives from East Jerusalem and the Palestinian diaspora. Furthermore, John Kelly, the U.S. assistant secretary of state, said yesterday that every Palestinian delegation will regard the PLO as its chief representative. The Alignment ministers passed a resolution threatening to break away from the coalition government if Shamir fails to respond favorably to the U.S. proposals. The rightist faction of the Likud, led by former Minister Sharon and Minister Levi, plans to summon an emergency session of the party's Central Committee to force the prime minister to take an even more extremist stand, after which the government will have absolutely no chance of survival. Even the coalition of the three rightist opposition parties—Tehiya, Tzomet, and Moledet—decided to demand that the prime minister resign.

So far Shamir, by employing various foot-dragging measures, has succeeded in holding on to the reins of government; however, the withdrawal of the five Liberals from the Likud has deprived him of that tactic as well, because the Likud no longer enjoys the status of the largest Knesset bloc. This means that if the Knesset votes no confidence in the government, the president will entrust not Shamir but Alignment leader Shim'on Peres with the task of forming a new government. [Words indistinct] the current balance of power, it is not inconceivable that Peres will indeed succeed in setting up a government coalition without the Likud, even if this is but a temporary solution meant only to give momentum to the political process.

Time is running out. On Sunday Shamir must convene the forum of four—the prime minister and the ministers of foreign affairs, defense, and finance; two from the Likud and two from the Alignment—to discuss the Cabinet's response to the proposal regarding an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. On Wednesday the draft response, as per the forum of four's decision, will be raised in the Inner Cabinet for a vote. That body includes six ministers from each of the blocs. In other words, Wednesday is the deadline. Does Shamir stand a chance? I believe so. But in order to survive, the prime minister will have to make a decision that will be painful for him and his Likud followers: He will have to accept the Alignment's demand and provide a positive response to the proposals raised by James Baker. Incidentally, in our opinion it would also coincide with Israel's national strategic interests.

Vorontsov on Ties With Israel, Emigration

JN0103155490 Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 28 Feb 90 p 19

[By Ahmad al-Nu'man]

[Text] Moscow—Yuliy Vorontsov, Soviet first deputy foreign minister, has stated to AL-WATAN that "allegations that the USSR intends to restore its diplomatic

relations with Israel in March are baseless." The Soviet official added that Moscow still maintains its opinion that restoration of diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv will only take place with the launching of the international conference on the Middle East.

Asked by AL-WATAN whether the USSR intends to grant Jewish emigrants to Israel the right to hold two citizenships—Israeli and Soviet—Vorontsov said: "This is also an allegation designed to tarnish the USSR's position." The Soviet Foreign Ministry official said: "The USSR withdraws Soviet citizenship from any Soviet citizen who obtains another citizenship. And this is firm."

Obstacles to Soviet-Israeli Ties Analyzed

LD2802164290 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 28 Feb 90

[Excerpts] [Announcer] Poland has restored diplomatic relations with Israel after an interval of 23 years. Earlier Hungary and Czechoslovakia normalized their ties with Israel. Why is the Soviet Union refraining from doing so? This question was discussed on Tuesday at a meeting between the Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, and president of the World Jewish Congress Edgar Bronfman. Aleksandr Pogodin of our staff comments:

[passage omitted]

The promises of changes in the situation and in prospects for an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue led to certain onward movement, even if insignificant, in Soviet-Israeli ties. For instance, the two countries established consular, trade, and economic contacts. There is more talk, largely in Israel, about the probability of an imminent restoration of diplomatic relations. Still there is an impression that Israeli authorities themselves are seeking to create the greatest possible number of obstacles on this road. Witness the persistent refusal to hold any negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organization, without whose participation a settlement in the Middle East is out of the question. Witness the plans to settle immigrants from the USSR on the occupied lands, which actually signify endeavors to turn them into participants in the total colonization of those territories. Under the circumstances it's hard to speak even about an approximate time for normalizing Soviet- Israeli relations.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Shevardnadze Holds Talks With Ethiopia's Dinka

LD0803140590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1840 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 7 March. (TASS)—Talks were held today between Eduard Shevardnadze, Politburo member and USSR minister of foreign affairs, and Tesfaye Dinka, candidate member of the Ethiopian Workers Party, People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia [PDRE] deputy prime minister, and minister of foreign affairs, who is in Moscow on a short working visit.

In the course of the talks, the ministers discussed the most topical issues of Soviet-Ethiopian relations and confirmed intentions of the governments of the Soviet Union and Ethiopia to strengthen and improve interaction and cooperation, in the fundamental interests of both countries.

A detailed exchange of opinions regarding the present situation in and around Ethopia took place. The Ethiopian minister talked about the aggaravation of the military-political situation in the north of his country as a result of the major advance undertaken by the armed groups of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). He noted that the military activities launched by the EPLF seriously damage the efforts undertaken for approaching the political settlement of the Eritrean problem.

In connection with this, E. Shevardvadze confirmed the USSR position, which was outlined in the Soviet Government statement of 14 February this year. The pressing necessity for achieving a rapid agreement on a mutual cease-fire in order to end the new bloodshed and deaths, and reopening the talks with the aim of finding mutually acceptable forms of the national reconcilliation were stressed. The intention of striving for peace and the dialogue with the opposition forces expressed by the Ethiopian minister of foreign affairs on behalf of his government was noted with satisfaction. The Soviet Union, stated E. Shevardnadze, is ready to offer the utmost assistance for the progress along exactly such a route, for the search of political solutions at the negotiating table and not on the battlefield.

The discussion of the situation in the north of Ethiopia touched on issues regarding international food aid to the population threatened with famine. Both sides agreed that assistance in the solution of this humanitarian task under the present conditions with regard to the delivery and distribution of such aid into the regions involved in military activity could be offered by the specialized UN institutions and other donors using the corridors established for this purpose by the Ethiopian Government. The position of the PDRE is that the initiatives of any states and international nongovernmental organizations in offering food aid to Ethiopia should not infringe on the legitimate rights of its government or be undertaken behind its back.

Military Advisers' Role in Ethiopia Explained

PM0103113190

[Editorial Report] Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian on 24 February 1990 carries in its Morning Edition on page 6 under the headline "Shot Hopes? The War Is Impeding International Aid to the Victims of the Drought in Ethiopia" a 1,500-word "Report from Addis Ababa" by IZVESTIYA own correspondent G. Ustinov. After

describing the general situation in Ethiopia it goes onto describe the change in the role of Soviet military advisers as follows:

"Everyone who is concerned about Ethiopia's future has advocated in alarm and concern the most speedy cessation of the new outbreak of hostilities in Eritrea. A Soviet Government statement stressed once again that the entire history of the armed conflict in this region, which has lasted almost 30 years, shows that it cannot be resolved by force. The elaboration of compromise political solutions is the only real means of settling the Eritrean problem.

"Here in Ethiopia we can confirm this position of ours in practice. Soviet participation in the current events is zero. Whereas two years ago our armed advisers were frequently to be found on the Eritrean front during combat operations alongside their Ethiopian colleagues, as soon as the negotiating process began they were withdrawn from there and from other northern areas to Addis Ababa. Their numbers are falling. Whereas aircraft from the Soviet air detachment, which is in Ethiopia to aid the victims of the drought, used to ferry fresh consignments of servicemen and munitions to outlying airports from the center from time to time in the past, this is now categorically forbidden. The local authorities have no enthusiasm for such a measure.

"Soviet-Ethiopian cooperation in the military sphere is designed to promote the building of the Ethiopian armed forces with a view to repulsing external aggression. Involvement in domestic conflicts does not come within the remit of Soviet specialists and advisers. We now comply very strictly with this principle, which is in line with bilateral agreements."

Eritrean Rebel Siege of Mitsiwa Reported

EA2602162990 Moscow International Service in Swahili 1730 GMT 25 Feb 90

[Text] There are conflicting reports coming from Ethiopia on the fighting going on in the country. The war which is raging in the north between the rebel Eritrean People's Liberation Front [EPLF] forces and the government armies has claimed thousands of people dead, wounded, and taken prisoner. The situation is decidedly critical at the Red Sea port of Mitsiwa. The EPLF command has announced that the (Ndini) area is under its control.

I happen to have visited this town on several occasions. Fifteen years ago, writes NOVOSTI political researcher Eduard Babazadeh, I found the town very prosperous. I saw it also in 1978, after the months-long siege by the Eritrean rebel forces had been broken. Even then, this sea town looked gloomy. Its old island quarters of (Tawlud) were spared. However, in the mainland quarters of (Adada), almost all the houses are destroyed save for the Church of Holy Mikhael.

I still remember my last visit to Mitsiwa in May, 1987. It seemed as though the town was back to normal, likewise the port. But today, as it was 12 years ago, the town and its outskirts are desolate. Thousands of people have had to flee either to other parts of Eritrea or to the neighboring country, Sudan. Truly speaking, peaceful areas in Eritrea can no longer be found. The refugees, escaping from bullets and shells, have had to face another frightful plight, that of starvation.

According to reports by independent experts, the outcome of the current famine in northern Ethiopia will be even harsher than it was five years ago, when the (?migrants) numbered 800,000. Due to drought and war, the crops this season are almost non-existent in Eritrea and the neighboring region of Tigray. The starvation scourge is now menacing 4,000,000 people.

It is as if the EPLF rebels, who declared a fierce war against the Addis Ababa Government, do not want to halt beligerent acts at all. The rebel EPLF broke the non-official agreements on a cease-fire, around mid-February. The outcome is that the vague dream of finding a peaceful solution to the 28-year-old war in Eritrea has further diminished.

As can be recalled, the dream surfaced due to the preliminary contact between the government and the EPLF secessionists in Atlanta, the United States, and in Nairobi, Kenya, last year. How can it be possible now to have proper talks between Addis Ababa and the EPLF take place in March? Such a question is mind-boggling in Ethiopia and even outside.

In a recent statement on the issue, the USSR Government appealed to the warring factions to halt the military campaigns, so as to have a chance of starting peace talks as soon as possible. The whole history of the longest and bloodiest dispute in Africa shows that it is impossible to solve the Eritrean problem militarily. A solution in Eritrea will be reached by peaceful means only.

President de Klerk Kinshasa Trip Previewed

LD2802160790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Dispatch by own correspondent B. Pilyatskin: "Changes in Government, Changes in Communist Party"]

[Text] Maputo—RSA [Republic of South Africa] radio has declared that on Saturday President Frederik de Klerk flies to Kinshasa, where a conference of leaders of a number of African countries will take place. The sensational nature of the news lies in the fact that this will be the first regional summit meeting in Africa with the RSA's participation.

The agenda has not been announced in advance, but on Friday it became known that the participants in the forum will be Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi, Chad, the Central African Republic, and possibly Gabon, and Togo. The participants in the meeting will discuss the question

of the speediest initiation of talks between the RSA Government and the African National Congress (ANC).

Meanwhile Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda has urged the ANC to suspend the armed struggle so that after F. de Klerk has repealed the state of emergency and released all political prisoners a path can be opened to talks. It is notable that the Zambian leader made his statement on the eve of the meeting of the foreign ministers of the OAU countries.

In an interview shown on South African television, ANC leadership member Thobo Mbeki noted that although there are still many obstacles on the path of talks real opportunities have now opened up for a peaceful settlement.

Within the mainstream of the changes which are being implemented in the RSA, Nelson Mandela and his wife Winnie have received passports for foreign travel. In the very near future they will go to Lusaka, where the ANC headquarters are situated. Indeed, to all appearances, the transfer home of the headquarters themselves is not far off.

In connection with the legalization of the ANC and the South African Communist Party [SACP] observers' attention has been attracted by an issue of the London bulletin SOUTHSCAN which cites extracts from the brochure "Has Socialism Failed?" written by SACP General Secretary Joe Slovo. The author points out that it is precisely merciless criticism of past errors which persuades us that socialism has a future. Joe Slovo recognizes the SACP's responsibility for "the dissemination of the cult of Stalin and the mechanical approval of Soviet domestic and foreign policy even in those cases where the very cause of socialism was discredited." However, he says, "even before Gorbachev" the SACP had taken important steps away from the old dogmatism toward socialism. "We have before us sufficient experience of one-party rule in various parts of the world to conclude that implementing democracy within the framework of a one-party system is not only difficult but ultimately impossible," the leader of the South African communists writes. At the same time he expresses regret in connection with the fact that, in his opinion, the mass media in the socialist countries are now "leveling little criticism against capitalism and imperialism."

East Europe

Treaty Signed on Troop Withdrawal From Hungary

Obstacles to Treaty 'Resolved'

AU0803215690 Paris AFP in English 2056 GMT 8 Mar 90

[Text] Budapest, March 8 (AFP)—The Soviet Union will begin pulling out its troops from Hungary on Monday after an agreement on a total withdrawal by mid-1991 was reached, Soviet sources said here Thursday.

Hungarian Defence Minister Ferenc Karpati said in The Hague on Wednesday that Hungary and the Soviet Union had resolved the remaining problems standing in the way of the troop withdrawal and a formal agreement is expected to be signed in Moscow on Saturday.

53,000 Soviet troops are stationed in the country, according to the minister.

Soviet sources said here that a first motorised infantry battalion will leave the town of Hajmasker, 150 kilometers (90 miles) west of here, by train on Monday at 1000 GMT.

Informed Hungarian sources confirmed the report.

A ceremony has been scheduled and journalists were invited, according to the sources.

The total number of soldiers and family members to return to the Soviet Union add up to 100,000 people.

More than 27,000 vehicles and armoured carriers, 100,000 metric tons of petrol and 730,000 tons of ammunition will also to be taken back.

Soviet sources said all troops and equipment would return to the Soviet Union by the end of August next year.

Hungarian officials have insisted that the dateline be brought forward by two months.

10,000 Soviet troops left Hungary last year.

Moscow started pulling out its 80,000 troops from Czechoslovakia late last month.

Aboimov, Somogyi Initial Agreement

LD0903183190 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1730 GMT 9 Mar 90

[Text] An agreement was reached this afternoon in Moscow. On Monday, 12 March, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from our homeland's territory will commence. The agreement was initialed by Foreign Affairs State Secretary Ferenc Somogyi and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Ivan Aboimov a short while ago.

Tamas Frey reports from Moscow where he asked State Secretary Ferenc Somogyi to the microphone first.

[Begin recording] [Somogyi] The agreement's text prepared for signature and its attachment, which is the withdrawal schedule, contains 31 June 1991 as the final date for the full withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Hungary.

[Frey] This means that the Hungarian Government's stance prevailed and not the Soviet Government's on the date of 31 August?

[Somogyi] Yes, this means that Soviet Government representatives accepted the Hungarian Government's

stance and they have agreed that the final withdrawal date should be the one which we requested.

[Frey] As the leader of the negotiations, what do you think is the reason for the consent?

[Somogyi] The reason for the consent is that the Soviet party, via our cooperation, found the solution which is that by leaving behind certain materials which can be utilized by Hungarian organs in Hungary, the quantity of materials and equipment to be transported is reduced and thus, it considers the execution of this transport deadline realistic.

[Frey] Does this mean that after 31 June 1991, no Soviet soldier, ammunition, equipments, or civilian employee will remain in Hungary, only the memory of the Soviet soldiers?

[Somogyi] It means this exactly.

[Frey] Incidentally, no details are known for the time being about the schedule of the pull-out. What is clear is that the first Soviet soldiers will leave our country on Monday, 12 March. The complete withdrawal will require 2,029 train carriages, according to plans, the entire land force will leave Hungary by next February. After that only part of the air force will remain. [end recording]

At today's negotiations, representatives of the 12 parties which put up national lists were also present as observers; they are Gabor Demszky, Lajos Kosa, and Erno Raffay. The accord will be signed in the Moscow guest house of the Soviet Foreign Affairs Ministry tomorrow at 1400 by the two countries' foreign ministers, Gyula Horn and Eduard Shevardnadze.

Shevardnadze, Horn Sign Agreement

LD1003115190 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1100 GMT 10 Mar 90

[Report From Moscow by correspondent Jozsef Barath]

[Text] Hungarian and Soviet Foreign Ministers Gyula Horn and Eduard Shevardnadze signed the long-awaited agreement of historical significance which contains the timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, a few minutes before the start of this program.

The Hungarian side managed to have the stance it took earlier accepted. Thus, by 31 June 1991 [date as heard], the last Soviet soldier will cross the border. The Soviet negotiating delegation had still been insisting on the date of 31 August 1991 at the talks in Budapest.

The troop withdrawal will commence next week, on 12 March. First of all, the land-based forces will leave the country, and the departure of the aerial forces will conclude the long procession of 2,029 train cars, over two-thirds of which will leave our homeland this year already.

At the talks, Gabor Demszky of the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats], Lajos Kosa for FIDESZ [Federation of Young Democrats], and Ernoe Raffay for the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] represented the 12 Hungarian parties which were able to put up a national list. Thus in this case, the opposition politicians undertook the representation of the HSP [Hungarian Socialist Party] and the MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party] too.

All the same, the three party delegates did not participate in the signing ceremony, demonstrating with this too, the conviction that the government could also have achieved better conditions. Demszky, Kosa, and Raffay are of the opinion that after the elections, the agreement must be renegotiated. However, according to the representatives of the Foreign Ministry, it is impossible to extract an earlier time limit from Moscow.

Treaty 'Liberates' Relations

LD1003133290 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1300 GMT 10 Mar 90

[Text] In Moscow, the Hungarian and Soviet foreign ministers have signed the agreement relating to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. Following this, Eduard Shevarnadze said the agreement liberates Hungarian-Soviet relations from the burdens of the past, and that a qualitatively new relationship can develop between the two countries built on the principles of good-neighborliness, and alliance commitments.

The leader of Soviet diplomacy met the three Hungarian opposition observers at the signing of the agreement. He told them the Soviet decision did not wish to support any one political force in Hungary, but fits into Moscow's general policy, the aim of which is the recall of every Soviet military force stationed abroad [as heard].

Gyula Horn and Eduard Shevardnadze had private talks before the agreement signing. During this time, Ferenc Somogyi, state secretary for foreign affairs, told the press they managed to bring the final date of effect of the Soviet troop withdrawal ahead by two months, through Hungary purchasing 260 trainloads worth of fuel and lubricants from the departing troops.

Horn Holds News Conference

LD1003171490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1558 GMT 10 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 10 March (TASS)—"Hungary is not currently considering leaving the Warsaw Pact," Gyula Horn, the foreign minister of the Hungarian Republic, said here today. Speaking at a news conference in the Soviet capital, he also said he was certain that this issue would not be considered in the foreseeable future and that the prospects of the Warsaw Pact depended on the processes taking place in both Eastern and Central Europe and throughout the continent as a whole.

Gyula Horn described as the main purpose of his visit to the USSR the signing of an agreement on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, which, he said, "opened a fresh page in Hungary's history," contributed to an increase in the country's authority, represented a strengthening of its sovereignty, and expressed the aspirations of the Hungarian people. The minister noted that the timetable for the troop withdrawal envisaged by the agreement—30 June 1991—is realistic.

He pointed out that it is essential to modernize cooperation within the framework of the Warsaw Pact. In particular, the Hungarian foreign minister said, the Warsaw Pact should be transformed into a primarily consultative body in which national armies would play the determining role.

In response to a question about the unification of Germany, Gyula Horn expressed the opinion that means to ensure a future place for Germany in the European security system should be found not only at the talks on the "two-plus-four" formula, but also by involving other parties. In all aspects of the issue of German unification, he said, it was necessary to proceed from the right of Germans to self- determination.

Gyula Horn noted the need to lay a new foundation for Soviet- Hungarian relations, saying that the treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance between the two countries had become outdated and that, in its place, a joint declaration or statement should be prepared which would reflect the changes which had taken place in the international arena. He said it is also necessary to dot the "i's" with regard to the events of 1956.

Further on News Conference

PM1203100690 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Report by own correspondent G. Stepanov from USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center on 10 March news conference given by Hungarian Foreign Minister G. Horn, under the general heading "Soviet-Hungarian Talks"]

[Text] At the end of the Soviet-Hungarian talks the foreign minister of the Hungarian Republic addressed journalists at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center. He stressed that the agreement on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary was his main reason for coming to Moscow. In my opinion, the minister said, the document, which is the end result of regular intergovernmental contacts over the last two years, opens a new chapter in the republic's history and embodies the strengthening of its sovereignty. The Soviet leadership has demonstrated in practice its respect for the nations' right to self-determination. In this connection relations between our countries are to be developed on a new basis. We should totally deideologize them.

G. Horn went on to note that the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance that was once concluded between the USSR and Hungary has now become obsolete. To replace it, a joint declaration must be drawn up, reflecting present-day realities. The declaration could, for instance, include a new assessment of the events of 1956 in Hungary, and of the Soviet Union's role in those events. All present-day aspects of Soviet-Hungarian ties should be reflected in this document. We attach particular significance, the minister stressed, to the reform of bilateral trade and economic cooperation, in which one of the main components should be the transition to settling accounts in convertible currency. We should also urgently settle the problems that have arisen as a result of the expansion of border exchanges. Thus in 1989 some 6 million Soviet citizens visited the regions of Hungary that border on the Soviet Union alone, and that led to numerous difficulties.

A correspondent for the Hungarian newspaper MAGYAR HIRLAP put this question: What is the minister's view of the realism and validity of the time scale for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary? Answering this qesution, G. Horn observed that the Hungarian side's position has always been unequivocal, and was that the withdrawal of troops should be carried out in the shortest possible time. However, in view of the complexity of the operation, it should be recognized that the target date of 30 June 1991 is realistic.

G. Horn expressed his view on the future of the Warsaw Pact Organization: It should be transformed in such a way that, first, it becomes more of a consultative body, and, second, that the decisive role in the Warsaw Pact's military structure is played by national armies. It seems to me, the minister said, that the Warsaw Pact's future could be made directly dependent on the processes of change that are currently being seen in Europe. As for our participation in the Warsaw Pact, we are not now considering the question of withdrawing from it.

Answering a question from MTI on the effect that the expected unification of Germany could have on various regions of Europe, G. Horn noted that unification will lead to a kind of convergence between the two military-political alliances—the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The basis for the division of Europe into two opposing blocs will disappear, and close political and military cooperation could be established between them. At the same time the idea of simultaneous disbandment of the two blocs, which occupies many people's minds today, is an illusion.

Reservations About Treaty Noted

LD1003183590 Budapest MTI in English 1634 GMT 10 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, March 10 (MTI)—The accord on the full withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed in Hungary, has been signed at midday on Saturday, in Moscow, by Gyula Horn, Hungarian and Eduard Shevardnadze, Soviet foreign ministers.

Under the accord, the pullout is to commence on March 12, 1990 and will be completed by June 30, 1991. This involves the complete Army Staff, including Soviet civilian personnel, arms, military engineering and other equipment. The schedule of the withdrawals is included in the supplement of the accord. During the period of the pullout the activity of the Soviet troops—related to training and flights—is to be restricted.

The accord also sets down the way of settling disputes between the sides. The accord does not concern the obligations assumed through the Warsaw Treaty membership and other bi- or multilateral obligations.

"The decision reached is in full accordance with law provisions, but possibly somewhat belated," it was reported after the signing ceremony by Mr Shevardnadze, who was speaking to Hungarian journalists. I think it would have been even better if this accord were concluded earlier. During our today's talks I have expounded that the present accord also serves to relieve our links from past burdens.

This is the dawning of a new phase in our relations, among conditions of democratisation in the Soviet Union and the favorable developments in Hungary. These relations are founded on the principle of full confidence, good-neighbourliness and alliance obligations, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze stressed.

The presence at the talks of also the three Hungarian opposition party observers was termed as fully appropriate by the Soviet foreign minister. (As a gesture of their dissatisfaction over the June 30 deadline set for the pullout, the three observers: Gabor Demszky, Lajos Kosa and Erno Raffay refused to attend the signing ceremony, since they hold this date to be much too late. Mr Demszky informed that the new government to be formed after the elections, should in his view renegotiate this deadline.)

In Mr Shevardnadze's opinion, the decision over the withdrawals is not only made by governments but societies as well. There are many, both [in] the Hungarian and the Soviet society who either support or dispute the decision.

Hungarian journalists reminded the Soviet foreign minister about the opposition's criticism of the Hungarian Government's related stand over the deadline set for the pullout, including the general view that the present signing of the accord comes as a gesture of Soviet support for the Hungarian Socialist Party, in the run-up for the March elections.

In response, Mr Shevardnadze told the three observers' that the idea of supporting anyone has never been considered by the Soviet Union in its deliberations over troop withdrawals or disarmament. These measures are in step with the general trend of Soviet politics, and their purpose is to create a situation in which no Soviet troops would be stationed in any foreign land.

Commenting on the reservations by the three opposition delegates, Ferenc Somogyi, under-secretary of state for foreign affairs, told MTI's correspondent that further straining of the deadline and schedule of the pullout would not be a responsible deed, it would disrupt the balance of the early and regulated withdrawal. In the last phase of the discussions the Hungarian side was successful in bringing the deadline ahead by two months, since the original deadline set by the Soviet side was August 31, 1991.

The two months were whittled down by Hungary by way of offering to buy 260 wagonloads of fuel and lubricants, and consented to allowing the Soviet side to sell their containers in Hungary.

In an interview given by Mr Demszky to MTI's Moscow correspondent he said: With the starting of the pullout on March 12, a long cherished dream of the Hungarians will come true, the accord is a significant step towards national sovereignty. According to impressions and information gained as observers, Hungarian interests were adequately represented by the official Hungarian delegation, comprising representatives of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministries as well as the chief of staff.

At the same time their belated involvement did not enable them to take part in setting the conditions. They were only able to ascertain that they have been successful in attaining all the results achieved previously—concerning the Soviet pullout—by the Czechoslovak representatives, Mr Demszky continued.

"As observers we had no means available to really take a stand for the interests of the Hungarian people, or to achieve the best possible conditions", Mr Demszky said.

Official Statement on Talks

LD1003195790 Moscow TASS in English 1852 GMT 10 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 10 TASS—Follows the official statement on the Soviet-Hungarian talks released here today:

"Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Hungarian Republic Gyula Horn paid a working visit to the Soviet Union on March 10, 1990.

Talks took place between Member of the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Eduard Shevardnadze and Gyula Horn, during which pressing issues of Soviet-Hungarian relations and of the world situation were examined.

It was noted that under the conditions of deep transformations in the two countries, good-neighbourly cooperation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Hungarian Republic is developing on the basis of principles of mutual respect for the sovereignty, equality,

non-intervention in internal affairs of each other, freedom of choice and mutual trust.

Within the framework of renewal of Soviet-Hungarian relations at a practical level, some questions of perfecting trade and economic cooperation and the use of its new forms, including the establishment of joint ventures with the participation of third countries, were discussed.

The ministers favoured speeding up the resolution to problems connected with expanding cross-border exchanges and simplifying terms for mutual exchanges and trips between citizens of the Soviet Union and Hungary.

Eduard Shevardnadze and Gyula Horn noted the identity or close proximity of their views on the basic international issues. It was stressed that the development of constructive East-West dialogue and the strengthening of positive tendencies in European and world affairs facilitate the construction of a more civilized and secure world.

The sides reiterated the two countries' commitment to the European process, their desire to contribute to its further progress along all lines and to seek the speedy productive conclusion of Vienna talks on conventional armed forces and confidence-building in Europe. The Soviet Union and Hungary will direct their efforts towards making an effective contribution to the preparation for, and the holding of, the summit meeting of the member-countires of the Conference on Security and cooperation in Europe at the end of 1990.

The ministers exchanged opinions on the German issue. It was noted that progress towards German unification must fit organically the emerging new security structure on the continent.

The sides stressed the important role the Warsaw Treaty has to play in ensuring security and stability on the continent and the need to impart a greater political thrust to its activity. They favoured the development of contacts and interaction between the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

On the same day, Eduard Shevardnadze and Gyula Horn signed a Soviet-Hungarian inter-governmental agreement on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungarian territory.

'168 Hours' Reports Troop Withdrawal

LD1003194590 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1500 GMT 10 Mar 90

[Report by Jozsef Barath in Moscow on 10 March on the signing of a Hungarian-Soviet agreement on Soviet troop withdrawals, including interviews with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and Hungarian Foreign Minister Gyula Horn, for the "168 Hours" program—recorded, Shevardnadze speaks in Russian with superimposed translation by Barath]

[Text] [Barath] Eduard Amvrosiyevich, permit me to ask you a question on behalf of Hungarian Radio. How do you evaluate the agreement?

The Soviet side made certain concessions to the Hungarians.

[Shevardnadze] I think that our decision was inevitable. What is more, I can also say that we delayed with it.

[Barath] Were you late with it?

[Shevardnadze] Yes, perhpas, we were late. I, for example, consider that if we would have decided earlier, it would have been better all around. I said again during the talks today that signing the agreement on the Soviet troop withdrawal from Hungary eliminates the layers and deposits of the past which are unecessary today and which will liberate our relations from a heavy burden. Among the new conditions, the conditions of democratization of Soviet society and the deepening of the processes taking place in Hungary, we can open a new period of relations between our countries.

With our neighboring countries, we can develop a qualitatively different relation than hitherto. These relations will be founded on full confidence, good-neighborliness and on federal obligations. This indeed will represent a new quality.

[Barath] How do you evaluate the fact that representatives of the Hungarian opposition also participated in the negotiations? This has never happened before.

[Shevardnadze] I personally think that this is a perfectly natural thing. Our opinion, incidentally, is that it is not enough for a decision as importance as the Soviet troop withdrawal from Hungary to be brought about only by the government, it is better if the entire society participates in it, the Soviet and Hungarian society alike. And society consists not only of the forces agreeing with the government, but also of forces which argue with it.

Regarding the case of the troop withdrawal, there probably could not have been any particular disagreement between the stance of the Hungarian Government and that of the opposition. I do not believe that there could have been.

[Barath] Together with reporters of NEPSZABADSAG who were present, we had to disappoint Shevardnadze. In Hungary, regarding the case of the troop withdrawal, agreement is by no means as unanimous as he considers. What is more, the opposition wishes to start new negotiations regarding the dates. At this moment the dialogue has taken an unexpected turn.

[Shevardnadze] What do you disagree on, after all? And where are you? Come here.

[Barath] Gabor, [Gabor Demszky, Alliance of Free Democrats, SZDSZ, representative] come here!

[Shevardnadze] So, you want to restart the negotiations from the beginning?

[Demszky] We consider that the new government, if it can, has to obtain more favorable conditions regarding the date of the troop withdrawal.

[Shevardnadze] We have signed everything now, and I think that this is the most suitable variant of the accord both for the Soviet Union and Hungary. I did not think that the Hungarian opposition has a separate stand on this. However, I have just received a question asking whether it is true that by signing this agreement, we are trying to support the Hungarian Socialist Party.

I replied that when we reduced the number of our soldiers by 500,000, when we made the decision to reduce the number of our tanks by 8,000 and the number of planes by 800, when we decided to reduce our military presence in middle Europe by half, when we decided to withdraw our troops from Mongolia, were we considering the interests of the Hungarian Socialist Party?

This is the main line of our present politics. I think that this agreement corresponds to the interests of the Soviet Union and also those of Hungary. We made a wise, sensible and good resolution indeed.

[Barath] Gabor Demszky did not wish to continue the process of convincing Shevardnadze on this point. Yet, before the agreement was signed, he and his associates spoke for the sake of the listeners of "168 Hours". I asked the SZDSZ politician how he judged the significance of this being the first occasion that the Hungarian opposition has taken part in international talks.

[Demszky] The justification for our presence is that this was a very significant event from a national viewpoint. It appears that a long-standing wish of the Hungarian people is being realized; we have now moved one step closer to national sovereignty.

At the same time, we have to say that it is 10 days before the elections [as heard; elections are scheduled for 25 March]. Therefore there were propaganda reasons, as well, for this step. The Hungarian Government is in a quandary regarding time; it has altered its foreign policy line in the past two months, primarily under the impact of the events in Czechoslovakia and the Czechoslovak-Soviet talks, and having accelerated the talks conducted with the Soviet Union on the troop withdrawals, our foreign minister has signed, before the elections, the agreement on withdrawal. Our concern here is that the conditions of this agreement, the scheduling of the troop withdrawal, perhaps reflect the haste. We are not certain whether more favorable conditions might not be attainable, whether the day of final withdrawal might not be drawn closer.

[Barath] Your parties in the end opposed the government's signing an agreement with these deadlines, that is next year's deadlines. However, now here you are, and if you like, by virtue of your presence you are accepting this date—it is possible to interpret it thusly. Lajos Kosa, of FIDESZ [Federation of Young Democrats].

[Kosa] It is true that we are here at the talks, but this does not mean whatsoever that our parties, or the 12 parties on whose behalf we are here, might accept this agreement. This also explains why we shall not be present when the agreement is signed; this unequivocally demonstrates that we wish to avoid the legitimizing force our presence at the signing of the agreement would ensure for the Hungarian Government. The reason for this is not at all that we might not wish for the Soviet troops to leave Hungary; we feel that this is a basic national interest, and it was precisely the opposition parties who were the earliest to demand this withdrawal.

The speed of the Socialist Party's government has surprised us, since Foreign Minister Gyula Horn still contended last summer that the matter of the Soviet troops withdrawal, the raising of this issue, was untimely, and it reflected churlishness on the part of the political parties.

[Barath] You now are acquainted with the stand, arguments, and negotiating attitude of the Soviet side. Do you consider it realistic that more favorable deadlines might be attained from this side? There figure here certain technical aspects which the Soviet Union mentions, beginning from the railroads, through the housing to be provided for the officers and the nurseries to be provided for their children, to the very grave domestic political aspects here. [Erno Raffay, Hungarian Democratic Forum representative] Yes. We feel that we have esablished the thread of talks. At the same time, the new National Assembly will have to examine this agreement, and it will have to charge the government with attaining more favorable conditions. These can be attained, since 90 percent of the troops will be withdrawn from Hungary by the end of February 1991. We think that every soldier can be withdrawn from Hungary by 15 March, our greatest national holiday, next year—therefore within one year. This is technically possible. The Soviet side has also said that the presence of Soviet troops is not justified by political or military viewpoints, reasons. We think that it will be possible, and necessary, to modify this agreement.

[Barath] That was Erno Raffay, from MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum]. Along with the technical conditions of withdrawal, allow me to mention a political viewpoint, and this is Soviet internal politics. What I am thinking of is that according to the agreement to be signed today, the Russians must leave Hungary by the end of June, 1991. Well, this is one and a quarter years. Great changes are expected in the Soviet Union during this one and a quarter years. I shall raise just one thing: What will happen if Gorbachev falls, if Gorbachev is swept aside, by let us say, leftist forces, and if these leftist forces which perhaps replace Gorbachev in power still have one or one-and-a-half divisions, that is a very considerable, well-equipped, military force in Hungary? Consequently, in this connection, possible changes in a bad direction within the Soviet Union could very much

put at a disadvantage Hungary's future, the situation of the new government, its scope for maneuver, its possibilities of engaging in politics.

[Barath] Gyula Horn spoke to "168 Hours" before his international news conference.

Mr. Minister, you have now signed a historical agreement which has been awaited, overtly and covertly, by the majority of Hungarians for a long time. How do you judge this agreement?

[Horn] I believe that we can safely say that the majority of Hungarians were awaiting, overtly too, for this agreement. Our friend and my counterpart Shevardnadze has said that the signing is a historical event. I am of the view that in the course of the hitherto experts' talks, which led to the signing of the agreement, both sides took maximum efforts so that all the Soviet forces should be withdrawn from Hungary within a date which is possible technically. Everything possible has been attempted to shorten this, but I believe that, taking into account the enormous difficulties, this date of 30 June, 1991 can be regarded as ideal.

As Shevardnadze emphasized, Gorbachev followed this issue with great attention, and in the end the highest Soviet leadership decided that further efforts must be taken so that this withdrawal is realizable not by August, next August, but by 30 June.

[Barath] Did Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze mention your statement, which you made in connection with establishing relations with NATO?

[Horn] Of course, there was mention of this. We talked about this at the plenary session and at our bilateral discussion. (?He sees) a lot of possibilities in this idea. Properly speaking, the new way of foreign policy thinking which now characterizes the Soviet leadership is also trying to seek a path in this same direction, because as he said, he agrees with the statement that the demand which was worded over earlier decades, for a simultaneous dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, is an illusion. It is necessary to transcend this. This is unacceptable for the West. So we should seek new possibilities and solutions, and in this he felt it was by all means of great importance that a very vigorous process of rapprochement should take place between the two military alliance systems, which would be expressed not only in cooperation. Rather, if in the end a unified, and primarily democratic, Europe were to come about, he does not preclude whatsoever that there might be some kind of fusion [egybeolvadas] of these two alliance systems.

Well, I also consider it very important that every such, and similar, points are examined constructively, because Europe is facing new challenges. Europe to a certain extent is in a quandary over how to reply to these challenges, and every way of thinking along these lines takes us closer to the new Europe.

Hungary's HSP Experiences Interest CPSU

LD0703111990 Budapest MTI in English 0702 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, March 7 (MTI)—The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), preparing for a congress, is interested in the experience of the Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP). In the spirit of this interest, Georgiy Razumovskiy, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee's political committee and secretary of the Central Committee, held talks with Jeno Kovacs, member of the HSP presidium, in Moscow on Tuesday.

Mr Kovacs told the Moscow correspondent of MTI that the CPSU showed interest in the HSP's experience since the current Soviet preparations raised, in many aspects, similar issues than the ones the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (of that time) had to face before its congress last October.

Hungarian Parties Discuss Security Measures

PM0803141590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Mar 90 Second Edition p 4

[Own correspondent V. Gerasimov dispatch: "Complications Between Parties Marked 'Topical'"]

[Text] Budapest, 7 Mar—"If you do not withdraw your candidacy, we will beat you up!"—a registered candidate deputy in Pest County received a message bearing these words. Telephone threats were also made. That is why the police have put the candidate under their protection and begun an investigation.

"There are forces for whom the peaceful transition to parliamentary democracy was an onerous burden," R. Nyers, chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], said. "There are few extreme parties in Hungary but extreme forces do exist."

These words were heard at a two-day meeting of representatives of the 12 leading parties in the election campaign. The election of new parliamentary deputies will take place 25 March. Since passions are running high, these leading parties (the MSZP "rates" in third place, while the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP] is seventh) have tried to reach an agreement on security measures. "Representatives of the 12 parties consider it desirable for all political forces involved in the election campaign to refrain from any steps or actions that may pose a threat to peaceful transition," says the agreement on the meeting [as published] which was published today.

Of course, the discussion of various topics was not accompanied by unity of views. For instance, it is reported that the explanations given by Prime Minister M. Nemeth and the leaders of the Internal Affairs Ministry regarding the letter received by the prime minister about an alleged plot last November in one region of the country against the new ways were greeted with "caution." In this case an accusation was leveled at

the "old" MSZMP. At the same time state security did not confirm that there had been an attempted "putsch."

The leaders of the renewed MSZMP described this letter that M. Nemeth told the parliament about as an election stunt. It is reported today that the MSZMP demanded that the chairman of the Hungarian State Assembly begin a judicial inquiry and, if it is confirmed that the statement concerning the "putsch" is not true, that the premier be reprimanded for slander.

PRAVDA Interviews GDR's Gregor Gysi

PM0803160990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Mar 90 Second Edition p 5

[Interview with Gregor Gysi, chairman of the Party of Democratic Socialism, by own correspondents S. Baygarov and M. Podklyuchnikov: "Responsibility for the Future"—first paragraph is editorial introduction; date not specified]

[Text] Berlin—The times are changing and, with them, the conditions in which this interview is being conducted. Previously in the GDR if the leader of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED] had agreed to voice his thoughts in this way, it would have invariably meant sending written questions via the Central Committee apparatus. And the answers, too, would have been sent via the Central Committee apparatus in written form, translated into Russian and edited in advance. Plus the note: Not a single word may be changed without the author's consent. Now, however, for a conversation with Gregor Gysi, chairman of the Party of Democratic Socialism [PDS], now however, we had to set off with him before dawn on an election tour of the country—elections to the GDR's People's Chamber are due 18 March. And he was able to find time to talk only when he switched from his blue Lada to our Volga en route from Riesa, where we visited the rolled metal pipe combine, to Leipzig. We recorded our questions and his answers on the dictaphone.

[Correspondents] You have a particularly large amount of work nowadays. What is an ordinary day like for you?

[Gysi] During the election campaign there are no ordinary days. Yesterday my working day began at 0700. I didn't return home until 0300. I have been on my feet since 0600 today. That is the kind of routine that you have to get used to. You have little time at home. It cannot be otherwise—the election struggle takes everything you've got.

[Correspondents] The PDS recently held its first congress. The SED no longer exists. It is about 2 months since its extraordinary congress. How would you characterize the period between these two congresses?

[Gysi] In the past 2 months the party has been thoroughly renewed. Essentially it reformed itself from top to bottom. We are consistently abandoning the spirit and methods of the administrative-bureaucratic state party and Stalinism. The new Program and Rules of the PDS have been elaborated and adopted. At the same time the period between the two congresses was very complex for us. We went through a critical phase in which a number of features became artificially aggravated.

The enormous political mistakes of the former SED leadership created an extremely difficult situation for the party. The PDS met a wave of hatred such as the SED never knew. It was also directed against individual party members. As a result many people handed in their party cards. Some party workers even committed suicide.

The party's ranks diminished. Prior to the extraordinary congress the SED had 1.7 million members. Now we have approximately 650,000-700,000. We shall know the precise figure when we distribute our party cards. Those who remain, though, are really committed party supporters. To be a member of the PDS in the GDR now you need boldness, civic courage, and unconditional faith in socialist ideals. I want to stress that as some were leaving the party, other people, particularly the young, were joining. The PDS has a future. It is still the largest party in the GDR.

[Correspondents] Is it true to say that we see a completely new party in the PDS?

[Gysi] We do not deny that we are descended from the SED. We do not repudiate its history—either the heroic episodes of the antifascist struggle or the subsequent period of building the new society, or the dubious episodes later on, when an erroneous policy led to political and economic crisis. But it can be said that we have achieved a high degree of renewal. The PDS' appearance now is determined by the new structures at grass-roots level and the new, democratically elected boards. We did not capitulate in the face of external pressure. The discussions on the disbandment of the party have ended. The stabilization of its ranks has begun.

The most important thing in the renewal process is to change yourself, overcome the old stereotypes, and acquire new thinking. That is also the most difficult.

[Correspondents] Now the party has a new program and rules. Could you characterize these documents for us?

[Gysi] The new PDS Program was prepared in a few weeks. That wasn't much time to prepare such an important document. The program still needs to be "polished." We plan to attach to the party board a new commission whose permanent job will be to clarify and further elaborate the program's provisions. In our view the most important thing is not to create a "model" to which the development of society would be adapted, but to give the party a clear course.

The PDS Program has already had a beneficial influence on the state of affairs in the party. Its draft, which was discussed among party organizations, gave the congress clear guidelines and enabled it to be conducted at a good

level. The program defined our objective—democratic socialism—and also answered specific vital questions, including the question of the unification of the two German states.

The PDS Rules adopted by the congress are of great significance. They are very democratic. They give great opportunities to primary party organizations, unlike the old rules where everything was decided from the center. Now, within the framework of internal party democracy, every party member has the opportunity to form and express his opinion and actively participate in determining party policy.

[Correspondents] Action groups play an important role in the life of the PDS. Could you describe this unconventional form of party work?

[Gysi] Action groups have done much to stabilize the PDS. When party organization leaders in a number of regions and districts resigned and those organizations faced the threat of collapse, groups of party members spontaneously took matters into their own hands. They convened party conferences, which elected new boards, and spearheaded the process of renewal. Thanks to them the party did not leave the political scene. Leaving is easy, returning is difficult.

[Correspondents] The old SED was the ruling party and effectively monopolized power. But what place does the PDS occupy in the GDR's political life?

[Gysi] The PDS is one of many new parties in the GDR now. It is open to all who support social justice and first and foremost the workers' interests. It does not claim a monopoly in any sphere.

[Correspondents] In this connection major changes were clearly inevitable in the methods of party work, weren't they?

[Gysi] Yes, of course. Now the center of our work has shifted from enterprises and institutions to party organizations in local neighborhoods. That is where the election campaign is being waged. We have a lot to relearn here.

The PDS party apparatus has been substantially reduced. There are now about 360 political workers on the party board—approximately 40 percent of the figure of the old SED Central Committee. It is also important that the board's apparatus contains many fresh forces. The apparatus of bezirk boards has been cut to 10-25 percent of its former size. Regional poliitcal boards have 5-15 political workers working for them.

[Correspondents] It isn't long until the elections to the GDR People's Chamber. At the congress you said that the PDS, by all accounts, will end up in the opposition. How will it be able to influence the solution of important questions affecting the GDR?

[Gysi] We will have considerable opportunities. As an opposition party we will submit for discussion all the questions which worry people, demand solutions from the government, and propose our suggestions for that. Our party has many experienced people who can elaborate a competent concept on various questions, and I hope that neither the other parties nor the government will reject useful experience. We are ready to cooperate with other left-wing parties and forces and with the Social Democrats. Ibrahim Boehme, chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (GDR), is now stating that he does not intend to establish ties with us. But history will have the last word.

[Correspondents] The election struggle is centered on the question of uniting the two German states. What is the position of the PDS here?

[Gysi] The process of unifying the two German states is an historic process. It may be artificially slowed down or accelerated but it cannot be reversed. And that means that it must be managed in such a way that it proceeds gradually, step by step. German unification requires caution. It must be implemented in such a way that it is acceptable to citizens of the GDR and FRG and does not upset neighboring states.

The process of unification is complex because for 40 years the two states have lived apart and created completely different political, economic, and social structures. The same applies to culture and ethics. We are too different. And that means that the creation of a single state must be carried out gradually, in a process of fusion. It must also proceed within the framework of the all-European process and be accompanied by the creation of all-European structures and security. Anyone who tries to do otherwise and welds the two German states together hastily must realize that he is upsetting stability in Europe.

In our opinion, a confederation could be an interim step on the path toward a single state. The GDR and the FRG could surrender some of their sovereign rights to it. But they would remain independent from the viewpoint of international law. They would also continue meeting their commitments toward their allies in the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Then there should be gradual progress along the path of demilitarization. Perhaps even to the point of disbanding the two military-political blocs. If they are not disbanded the two German states should leave them simultaneously. After all, the participation of a united Germany in the Warsaw Pact is as unrealistic as its membership of NATO.

The economic aspect is an important side to the unification of the GDR and the FRG. There are no simple solutions here. The rapid creation of a currency union, that is, the introduction of the FRG Mark as the official unit of currency in the GDR, would lead to the closure of many enterprises here. They could not survive the competition from FRG enterprises. There would be mass unemployment which the social "safety net" could not tolerate, not only in the GDR but in the FRG, too.

The PDS will resolutely struggle to ensure that unification with the FRG does not make our people poorer or bring them disaster. We categorically oppose the dismantling of the GDR's social system.

[Correspondents] How do you view the West German parties' interference in the GDR election campaign?

[Gysi] It would be acceptable if it was only a question of one-shot material help. Many parties in our country came into being not long before the elections. Obviously they do not have a material base. Therefore, the law on elections designed to give them equal opportunities allowed such help. We agreed with that. But what we cannot accept is this massive interference by West German politicians in the GDR's election struggle. They are conducting their own election campaign on our territory. Consequently it is hard to recognize the political face of this or that party—it is overshadowed by its "partner" from the FRG. That applies primarily to the Christian Democratic Union, "Democratic Breakthrough," and the German Social Union here. The same may also be said about the Social Democratic Party.

[Correspondents] Is this not a violation of GDR sovereignty?

[Gysi] Quite definitely. The federal chancellor comes without an invitation from the GDR Government and ventures to deliver speeches to our population. I believe that this is absolutely inadmissible from the viewpoint of international law. The "roundtable" involving 16 parties and public groupings came out against the participation of West German politicians in our election struggle. But they pay no attention to its decision.

[Correspondents] How do you understand the GDR's development against the background of the changes in East European countries?

[Gysi] This is a single process—with national features, of course. It signifies the end of the Stalinist system in socialism. The question is this: Will there be a return to capitalism or will we succeed in asserting a chance for democratic socialism in Europe? This question is topical for the Soviet Union, too. I believe that democratic socialism has a future thanks to perestroyka in the USSR.

The present crisis in the GDR would not exist if the former party and state leadership had taken the correct course in 1985. But it proved incapable of adopting an important political decision and took an arrogant view of perestroyka. Despite more favorable preconditions than in the Soviet Union—the small size of the country, no interethnic problems, a better economic level—the opportunities were missed. And yet it would have been easier on that basis to implement a policy of perestroyka and glasnost and to give democratic socialism a good prospect.

[Correspondents] How do you see the future of relations between the PDS and the CPSU, between the present GDR and the USSR, and also between a united Germany and the Soviet Union?

[Gysi] Relations between the PDS and the CPSU are already very close. And I believe that they will continue to remain so. Convincing evidence of this is provided by my trip to Moscow and my meeting with Comrade M.S. Gorbachev. Our relations have once again been filled with warmth and cordiality. We have done a good deal to increase contacts at all levels. I hope that even in a united Germany there will be a strong PDS, which will have good relations with the CPSU.

As for interstate relations, they must remain close if only because of our active economic cooperation. The USSR accounts for approximately 40 percent of the GDR's foreign trade. The FRG, too, must reckon with this fact. I see close economic ties as a sound basis for good relations between the USSR and the future united Germany. At any rate, with a confederative Germany. [Gysi ends]

While we were transcribing from the dictaphone, translating, and preparing the text for transmission to the editorial office on our return to Berlin, the PDS chairman was continuing his election tour. In Gera he addressed a rally in the large, packed hall of the cultural and information center. In conclusion his collection of symbolic gifts, which includes a broom to rid the party of everything that is chronic and that impedes and boxing gloves in order to parry more successfully the attacks of political opponents, was augmented by one more gift. A local railroad worker presented him with a cap with a red top and the green staff of the station duty officer inscribed: "Clear the way for the PDS." However hard things have been for the party in recent months, it remains optimistic.

FRG Politicians Active in GDR Election Rallies

PM0603113390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Mar 90 Second Edition p 6

[TASS report: "Passions Getting Heated"]

[Text] Berlin, 5 Mar—Over the weekend the GDR election struggle was again characterized by the broad participation of leading West German politicians.

W. Brandt, honorary chairman of the SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany], addressed rallies in Weimar and Gera, while O. Lambsdorff, chairman of the Free Democratic Party (FRG), was the main speaker at forums of the association of free democrats in Dresden and Cottbus. Defense Minister G. Stoltenberg (Christian Democratic Union) featured on the list of guests of the conservative "Union for Germany" bloc invited from the FRG. Despite differences in their political views, these speakers' speeches contained appeals to GDR citizens not to leave the country. The topicality of this appeal is associated with the fact that the flow of people moving from the GDR to the West is, unfortunately, not ceasing.

W. Brandt's speech in Gera is noteworthy in this respect. He advocated a quick transition, following the 18 March elections, to the implementation of measures in the economic, currency, and social spheres aimed at achieving unity. The social democrats in both parts of Germany advocate that, as far as possible, no one should fall beneath the wheels of the moving "train of German unity"—neither pensioners, nor investors in savings banks, nor those seeking work, he said.

Western political leaders were absent only from the preelection measures of the PDS [Party of Democratic Socialism]. At a rally in Birkenwerder near Berlin PDS Chairman G. Gysi emphasized the need to give priority to social protection. For this it is necessary to enhance production efficiency and place emphasis on the development of people's ownership.

When paying out social subsidies, the interests of pensioners, students, and apprentices in production must be taken into account above all, he pointed out.

Negative features previously unknown in the GDR have also been manifested during the election campaign—clashes with political opponents, for example. At a "Union for Germany" rally held a few days ago, which was addressed by FRG Chancellor H. Kohl, its radically inclined participants fell upon the social democrats who tried to organize a counterdemonstration. At an SPD rally in Neubrandenburg, where SPD (FRG) Chairman H.-J. Vogel was a speaker, the social democrats themselves resorted to violence. A statement by the "Carnations" party emphasizes that rally participants surrounded and beat up on young democrats of an antifascist association, the "Carnations" party, and the "united left." Fifty people were not afraid to turn up at the SPD rally with GDR flags. Those who rose up to defend the ideals of the 1989 revolution were kicked. The police preferred to passively observe what was happening.

Commentary Urges Gradual German Unification

LD1203011390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 2300 GMT 11 Mar 90

["Mayak" commentary by Konstantin Patsyuk]

[Text] [Announcer] Willy Brandt, president of the Socialist International and honorary chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, has said that Poland is not a country on wheels which one can arbitrarily move back and forth between the East and West. The borders are inviolable, he commented, and in an all-European home this should be a rule both for the Poles and the Germans. A Mayak commentary—over to Konstantin Patsyuk.

[Patsyuk] When I learned of this report, I recalled the last statement in the Bundestag by FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl, perhaps because it was restrained and in something of a different mood. In his view, one had only to work out the mechanism for the unification of Germany provided in Article 23 of the FRG Constitution, and everything would proceed in the best possible manner.

This mechanism, I shall remind you, envisages the swallowing up, in practical terms, of the GDR by the FRG. But what is involved now is something different—that, by the chancellor's assurance, the go-ahead has been given toward the unification of Germany and that there are no of obstacles to this. Is that how things stand?

The resolution of the German question contains both external and internal aspects. But in different countries there is no identical approach to either the former or the latter.

Thus, Kohl, for example, as I have already said, places his trust in Article 23 of the West German Constitution. But if one considers this in detail, then it is an attempt to leap across the step-by- step movement toward unification, to interfere in the internal political life of the GDR and ignore its own special social, economic, cultural, and spiritual features, and the achievements in the years of the people's power.

I think this is impermissible in relations between two sovereign states. Unification between them is possible only through coming closer together, and that is something that is not done in one day or one month.

Now, as for the external aspects of the German problem. One of these, and Brandt in fact spoke of it in his speech, is the recognition of the inviolability of the European postwar borders, including those of Poland. A balanced view, but unfortunately not everyone in the FRG holds to it.

Hitherto, the Bonn cabinets and their heads have taken up an insufficiently clear position on this matter. They also have their own attitude towards the bloc-membership of a future Germany. The FRG, as, incidentally, the U.S. also, feels that a united Germany should become a member of NATO.

In this way the interests of the GDR, the USSR, and other countries, and the military-political balance of forces that has emerged today in Europe is not considered. The concern of many countries as to whether or not a united Germany would take as the basis of its policy the slogan that war will never again emanate from German soil is not removed.

And, after all, only by taking into account the interests of all countries and development of the process of German unification, together with the process of building the All-European home, can the desired results be produced.

As is said of the chancellor's policy in German affairs, it is not worth behaving like a bull in a china shop and breaking the porcelain.

For myself, I shall add that at present the outlines of an all-European home, in which there is also room for a united Germany, are only just appearing, and for the time being they, too, are fragile.

Further Commentary on German Unification Issues

LD0503142290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1030 GMT 5 Mar 90

[Gennadiy Vedenapyin commentary from the "International Diary" program presented by Andrey Ptashnikov]

[Excerpts] [Ptashnikov] Polish Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki has granted an interview to the West German newspaper, DIE WELT. In it he stated that Poland will not enter into any talks on its western Oder-Neisse border. Asked if Poland fears the unification of Germany, Tadeusz Mazowiecki stressed that it does not, because Poland hopes that the European balance will not be destroyed. Earlier in an interview to the West German television company, ZDF, the Polish premier expressed suprise at the recent statement by FRG Chancellor Kohl which contained the attempt to link the question of Poland's western border with the renunciation by Poland of war reparations. Asked if he would like to meet with Helmut Kohl again, Mazowiecki replied that he has nothing against this. But he would very much like that before this meeting the FRG leadership would adopt a clearer stance. I have asked my colleague, commentator Gennadiy Vedenyapin, to comment on these statements:

[Vedenyapin] Unfortunately the West German Government has not yet adopted this clear position. Moreover in the government coalition camp itself certain differences of principle on this account have arisen. The allies of the CDU-CSU [Christian Democratic Union-Christian Social Union], the Free Democrats, insistently demand that the Bonn cabinet clearly and unambigiously express a final recognition of Poland's western border and oppose linking this question with its renunciation of reparations, but Chancellor Kohl himself continues to submit streamlined formulations which create at least an ambiguous impression. In his words only a united joint German parliament, to be created after the GDR elections planned for 18 March, can make a statement on the final recognition of the Oder-Neisse border. So in essence he is rejecting Mazowiecki's call to work out an agreeemnt before the unification of Germany which would fix absolutely precisely the inviolability of the present European borders, including Poland's western border in the first instance.

Chancellor Kohl rejects equally categorically the possible neutrality of a future united Germany. [passage omitted]

Such a concept by no means suits many including, in the first place, our country. I believe that our stance needs no further clarification but that it only confirms once more that the German unification process cannot be solved in a hurry. An extremely balanced approach is needed here, taking into account all the realities of the present common European process.

The border question is undoubtedly the key question of German reunification, but it is not the only one. The uniting of the economic infrastructures is no less complicated. Now, as is well known, this is a matter of creating a single currency union between the FRG and the GDR, and many consider, including the GDR, that this will be virtually manna from heaven. But taking into consideration that the realistic exchange rate of the FRG mark to the GDR mark is about one to five, then what can be expected? Mass bankruptcies of major and minor enterprises and growth in unemployment to 2.5 million can be expected. There are many other questions which, however, they prefer not to advertise at present. Well, let's say, what will happen to the land which at present is the property of agricultural cooperatives in the GDR? Will compensation, probably large, not have to be paid to the former owners of property which were historically on their territory, and so forth?

In any event almost all are agreed that despite the expected aid from Bonn, which even now is much less than expected, the integration of the GDR economy into the West German economic structure threatens East Germans with a considerable fall in living standards and many hardships. By the way, in the FRG itself the majority of enterprise managers and financiers, as the latest opinion polls shows, are far from delighted at the coming creation of a currency union with the GDR. They consider that for West Germany as well this will result in serious economic losses, price rises, loss of stability for the West German mark, increased taxes, loss of income for the population, and as a result widespread dissatisfaction. This is understandable. [passage omitted]

Well, there's no question about it: the process of unification of the two German states is proceeding; it is proceeding at an ever greater pace. This is an objective reality, but this is an even greater warning against excessive haste, haste which may prove to bring unpredictable consequences.

Latin America & Caribbean

Aylwin Elected New Chilean President

LD1103235790 Moscow TASS in English 1300 GMT 11 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 11 TASS—By TASS political analyst Gennadiy Petrov:

After staying in power for 16 years, General Augusto Pinochet was finally compelled to leave the La Moneda presidential palace, which he captured during the military coup of September 11, 1973.

Lawyer Patricio Aylwin, 71, leader of the Christian Democratic Party, became its new master today. He scored a sweeping victory during December's general elections with the support of all the opposition parties, including communists.

The restoration of democracy in Chile will by no means be easy. Bomb explosions shook the capital on the eve of the inauguration ceremony as militants reminded the public of their presence.

According to Aylwin, it is important for the government to overcome the deep political division of Chilean society. "Only this," Aylwin believes, "will allow Chile to do away with vestiges of the totalitarian system and eventually expand parliament's powers, to amend the constitution and the unfair electoral system and to legalise banned parties.

Analysts believe the revival of Chile, which has long-standing democratic traditions, will be held back by the fact that, according to the constitution in force, Pinochet will remain commander-in-chief of the Ground Forces for eight more years. This substantially curtails the president's rights as supreme commander of the country's Armed Forces. Furthermore, before stepping down, the former ruler has ensured himself an obedient majority in the Senate, the Chilean parliament's upper chamber.

In the international arena the new government will have to overcome the isolation that resulted from the years of dictatorship, when human rights were grossly violated and thousands of freedom fighters were ruthlessly persecuted or eliminated. This task is facilitated by the fact that relaxation processes are gaining momentum in the world and East-West cooperation is on the upswing.

Numerous foreign guests, including a Soviet delegation, arrived for the inauguration ceremony and the transfer of power to a civilian government. An agreement is expected to be signed these days on the restoration of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Chile and on the opening of their respective embassies in Moscow and Santiago.

Presidium Sends Congratulations

PM1402133190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading "Exchange of Telegrams"]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has sent a congratulatory telegram to Patricio Aylwin Asocara on his election as President of the Republic of Chile. The democratic elections which were held in Santiago are regarded as a crucial event in Chile's political history, and confidence is expressed that the restoration of good relations between our countries would meet the interests of the Soviet and Chilean peoples and the strengthening of peace and international cooperation.

In a reply message, P. Aylwin expressed gratitude for the congratulations and confirmed his intention to develop relations of friendship and cooperation with all states on the basis of mutual benefit.

Delegation Leaves for Chile

LD0803144890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1248 GMT 8 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 8 Mar (TASS)—Today a USSR delegation headed by Vadim Zagladin, adviser to the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet on international issues, departed from Moscow for Chile. It will take part in the procedures for the handing over of power to a civilian government.

Shevardnadze Supports Restoring Ties With Chile

LD0803175690 Moscow World Service in English 1600 GMT 8 Mar 90

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze has said this country is considering restoring full diplomatic relations with Chile, which, he said, is something the new Chilean Administration has an interest in, too.

Mr. Shevardnadze said the Soviet delegation may be expected to have talks on the issue.

Relations Restored 11 Mar

LD1103181390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1630 GMT 11 Mar 90

[Text] Concerning the restoration of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Chile: The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Chile, governed by the mutual desire to develop relations of friendship and cooperation on the basis of sovereignty, equality of rights, and noninterference in internal affairs, have agreed to restore diplomatic relations at embassy level as of 11 March, 1990. The embassies will open soon.

Lacalle Inaugurated as Uruguayan President

Soviet Delegation To Attend

PM0203104790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under general headline: "Official Reports"]

[Text] A USSR delegation headed by N.D. Pivovarov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Soviet of People's Deputies and Management and Self-Management Development Committee, left Moscow for Uruguay 25 February to take part in the presidential inauguration ceremony.

Visits General Assembly

LD0303164690 Moscow TASS in English 1018 GMT 3 Mar 90

[Text] Montevideo March 3 TASS—A Soviet delegation led by Nikolay Pivovarov, member of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet (parliament), who attended

activities marking the inauguration of new president of Uraguay Luis Alberto Lacalle, visited the general assembly (parliament) of this South American country on Friday.

The Soviet guests were warmly greeted by Martin Sturla, president of the House of Representatives. There was an exchange of views on prospects for further development and deepening of inter-parliamentary contacts between the Uraguay and the Soviet Union.

On behalf of the Soviet parliament Pivovarov invited an Uraguayan parliamentary delegation to pay an official visit to the Soviet Union.

Later in the day the Soviet delegation was received by Uraguayan Foreign Minister Hector Gros Espiell. The two sides expressed common views on the main problems of the present-day international situation, pointing out that the Soviet Union and Uraguay maintain traditionally friendly relations which create good prerequisites for their development and deepening of both in the field of socio-political contacts and in the sphere of trade and economic relations.

The Soviet parliamentary delegation's visit will become yet another step in strengthening Uraguayan-Soviet relations, Hector Gros Espiell said.

On the same day the Soviet delegation met Tabare Vasquéz, the mayor of the Uraguayan capital.

Gorbachev Sends Message

PM0203112990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Mar 90 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Message Delivered"]

[Text] Montevideo, 1 Mar—On Wednesday Uruguay's new president Luis Alberto Lancalle received a Soviet delegation headed by N.D. Pivovarov, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, which is here to participate in the transfer of power ceremony.

The president was given a personal message from M.S. Gorbachev. The head of the Uruguayan state voiced a high opinion of the points made in it and stressed that he fully shares the concept of Soviet-Uruguayan relations set out in this document. He expressed agreement with the Soviet side's opinion that cooperation between the two countries possesses all the conditions for more in-depth, equal, and mutually beneficial development.

The conversation which then took place passed in a warm and benevolent atmosphere.

Delegation Returns

PM0903144990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading "Official Reports"]

[Text] A USSR delegation led by N.D. Pivovarov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of the Work of Soviets of People's Deputies and of the Development of Management and Self-Management, returned to Moscow on 6 March from Montevideo. The delegation took part in events to mark the inauguration of the country's new president.

Pavlov Comments on Events in Central America

LD1602160190 Moscow TASS in English 1539 GMT 16 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 16 TASS—By TASS diplomatic correspondent.

Breaking the Central American deadlock, the February 25 general elections in NIcaragua, the U.S. intervention in Panama and the war in Salvador are all in the spotlight of world public opinion today. Central American conflicts were discussed during the recent Moscow meeting between Eduard Shevardandze and James Baker. TASS asked Yuriy Pavlov, chief of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Latin American Department, to comment on this subject.

Pavlov stressed primarily the importance of the forthcoming elections in Nicaragua. He noted that both sides believe free and fair elections will play an important role in the peaceful settlement of the Nicaraguan conflict. The Americans stress that the United States is prepared to recognise the results of the elections if they are "honest". The Soviet side believes the presence of hundreds of U.N. and OAS observers, including representatives of more than 50 states, should guarantee the requirement.

Pavlov also noted that the Moscow meeting confirmed the positive "common stand" of the United States and the USSR on the agreements reached by Central American presidents, known as the San Isidoro de Coronado declaration.

Referring to the conflict in Salvador, Pavlov noted that both sides backed efforts of the U.N. secretary-general to start a dialogue between the governments of President Cristiani and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). Although the United States has supported this dialogue, we believe that, in addition to statements, the U.S. Administration should exert pressure on top Salvadoran brasshats and rightwingers, who have a lot of influence on the government.

We agree with the U.S. stand that both sides—the government and the FMLN—must start negotiations and continue them until concrete results are achieved.

The Panamanian problem was a focus of the talks. "The Soviet side," Pavlov noted, "told the Americans it could not accept U.S. arguments in favour of its armed intervention in Panama. We believe U.S. actions aggravated the situation not only in Panama but in the region as a whole. This military action has put in question the sincerity of administration's statements that the U.S. has renounced force as a means of solving Central American problems."

"On the whole," Yuriy Pavlov said, "the exchange of views has allowed us to understand each other's positions better. Soviet and U.S. positions are now closer as regards ways to settle the regional conflicts politically."

"The very fact that we have changed from confrontation in the region to attempts to promote interaction exerts a favourable impact on the situation in Central America," he said.

Supreme Soviet Session

Gorbachev Chairs Supreme Soviet Presidium Session

LD1003170590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1646 GMT 10 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 10 Mar (TASS)—A session of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium took place today in the Kremlin under the chairmanship of Mikhail Gorbachev.

The session examined issues relating to organizing the work of the Extraordinary Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

The results of the work of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium commission for preparing the Congress were summarized. Anatoliy Lukyanov, first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet and chairman of the commission, read a report on this issue. The Presidium approved the commission's proposals on the agenda and working procedure of the Congress and on the makeup of its working bodies.
Some other issues of state life were examined.

Committee Discusses Delimitation of Powers

LD1103232290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1715 GMT 11 Mar 90

["At the Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet" program; video report by Vladislav Flyarkovskiy]

[Text] The last day before the extraordinary Congress of USSR People's Deputies, it could be said the last hours. Pre-Congress work gave deputies the opportunity to gather as usual in the committees and commissions. But on the fourth floor of the building on Kalininskiy Prospekt, house No. 4, familiar animation prevailed. The members of the committee on issues of legislation, legality and law and order spent several hours working on three draft laws. [Video shows committee at work] The first was the USSR draft law on entry and exit from the USSR. You may recall it was considered by the parliament in its first reading, was approved and handed over to the committee for additional work. The range of issues which arose during the first reading were defined long ago. So the discussion passed quickly and laconically. As before, you may imagine, it was difficult to resolve the problem of the resources, hard currency ones primarily, which are needed by citizens going abroad. The situation is familiar: The unconvertible ruble is an as yet immovable obstacle on the path toward resolving many social and political problems. Work was finished on the draft law and it will probably be adopted in its second reading at the next session.

The second item on the agenda was the reform of criminal legislation and several aspects of judicial reform. The new clause on admitting lawyers to a case from the beginning of the investigation, and in general the right of citizens to protection within juridical practice is, as before, clashing with the problems of the shortage of cadres in the Soviet legal profession. It is well-known that the number of lawyers in the country is fully comparable with the number of them in several of the world's major cities. The obstacle is a serious one and it is not the only one—but this is not a reason for not including fundamental principles of jurisprudence and human rights in the law.

But deputies devoted most attention to the third item on the agenda, which could be termed a pre-Congress one. [Video shows Flyarkovskiy speaking to camera with the committee discussions continuing in the background]

The main topic of the Congress, the introduction of the institution of the Presidency, has, as is well-known, given rise to the need to draw up a whole series of legislative acts which were meant to comprise, as it were, a crown for this institution, a crown of the correct form. One of these is the law on the delimitation of the powers of the Soviet Union from the union republics. The law is not a large one: The number of articles in the draft does not exceed the number of union republics. But its significance is great. Basically, the conversation revolved around two articles in the draft law: The seventh which relates to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Soviet Union, and the ninth, relating to the sphere of the combined jurisdiction of the union and the republics. [Video shows Flyarkovskiy interviewing a deputy]

[Begin video interview] [Flyarkovskiy] Andris Adamovich, the formula for the delimitation of power proposes, as I understand it, a balance of interests. It is quite natural to suppose that one republic will agree to delegate to the union, whereas another will not agree. Is some degree of variance allowed for in this law, in this delimitation of power?

[A.A. Plotnieks] Well, you have correctly perceived the essence of the question. A choice is needed. And in order to choose there must be several variations and several models. And we came to an agreement in the working group on 30 July that in the future different variants for the links between the republics and the union must be set out in the constitution and in the laws. Unfortunately, there is none of this in this law. For this reason it remains only to proclaim the principle that the republics have given something up, and to understand that this is not a solution to the problem.

[Flyarkovskiy] All of this will probably be included in the new union contract we will, after all, have to adopt as before.

[Plotnieks] I think that we are now moving toward the new union being represented as a state which is organized and functions on contractual principles in so much as, let us say, it is simply not possible to select one and the same model for everyone. This means that there will then be a contract here as well, depending to some degree or other on what the republic chooses, what appeals to it. But while we have been recognizing the necessity we have, as you see, been progressing very slowly with legislation. We speak about the restructuring of the federation but we ourselves mark time.

[Flyarkovskiy] But will this law not even partially act as a substitute for the new union contract. It is a routine working document, how can it be defined?

[Plotnieks] This law grew out of the third section of the USSR Constitution —at least as we imagine it to exist today. For this reason it in some part duplicates the latter and I would even think that it would be much more important and expedient to work intensely on the Constitution now and not make an endless number of laws which often act as substitutes for one another. [Video switches to a further shot of the committee in discussion] [end video interview]

Fundamentals of USSR Land Legislation

PM0903103090 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Mar 90 Morning Edition pp 1-2

["Fundamentals of Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics on Land" —IZVESTIYA headline]

[Text] The present Fundamentals regulate land relations and are aimed at creating the conditions for the rational utilization and conservation of land, the regeneration of soil fertility, the preservation and improvement of the natural environment, and the equal development of all forms of economic management.

Section I. General Provisions

Article 1. Land legislation of the USSR and union and autonomous republics

Land relations in the USSR are regulated by the present Fundamentals and by other legislation of the USSR and union and autonomous republics promulgated in accordance with them.

Mining, forestry, and water resources relations and relations concerning the utilization and conservation of the plant and animal world and the atmospheric air are governed by special legislation of the USSR and union and autonomous republics.

Article 2. Composition of the USSR's land

According to its designated purpose, all land in the USSR is subdivided into:
1) agricultural land;
2) settlement land (for cities, urban settlements, and rural settlements);
3) land for industrial, transportation, communications, defense, and other purposes;
4) land designated for nature conservation, rest and recuperation, recreational, and historical and cultural purposes;
5) forestry land;
6) water resources land;
7) reserve land.

In localities inhabited and used for economic activity by small peoples and ethnic groups, a special regime for the utilization of the land categories indicated may be established by the legislation of union and autonomous republics.

Article 3. Land—the people's property

Land is the property of the peoples inhabiting a given territory.

Every citizen of the USSR has the right to a plot of land; the conditions and procedure for granting it are defined by the present Fundamentals and the legislation of union and autonomous republics.

Article 4. The powers of soviets of people's deputies in disposing of land

Soviets of people's deputies grant land plots for tenure [vladeniye] and use [polzovaniye] to USSR citizens, kolkhozes [collective farms], sovkhozes [state farms], and other state, cooperative, and social enterprises, institutions, and organizations, and, in circumstances stipulated by legislation, to other organizations and persons.

Soviets of people's deputies withdraw land plots in accordance with the present Fundamentals and the legislation of union and autonomous republics.

In localities inhabited and used for economic activity by small peoples and ethnic groups, the granting and withdrawal of land for purposes not related to their economic activity may take place on the basis of the results of a referendum among the said peoples and ethnic groups with the consent of the relevant soviets of people's deputies.

Article 5. Holding of land

Land is granted to USSR citizens for heritable life tenure for the purposes stipulated in Article 20 of the present Fundamentals.

Limits on the size of land plots to be granted are set by the legislation of union and autonomous republics.

Land is granted for permanent tenure to kolkhozes, sovkhozes, other state, cooperative, and social enterprises, institutions, and organizations, and religious organizations for the purposes of agriculture and forestry.

Article 6. Land use

Land is granted on the basis of permanent or temporary tenure:

to USSR citizens for the purposes indicated in Articles 21 and 22 of the present Fundamentals;

to industrial, transportation, and other nonagricultural state, cooperative, and social enterprises, institutions, and organizations;

for defense needs, to the organizations indicated in Article 31 of the present Fundamentals;

to religious organizations;

to joint enterprises and international associations and organizations with the participation of Soviet and foreign legal entities.

The duration of temporary land use is stipulated by the legislation of union and autonomous republics.

In circumstances stipulated in legislation of the USSR and union and autonomous republics, land is granted to other organizations and persons for their use.

Article 7. Land leasing

Land is granted for temporary use on leaseholding terms to USSR citizens, kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and other state, cooperative, and social enterprises, institutions, and organizations, joint enterprises, and international associations and organizations with the participation of Soviet and foreign legal entities, and also to foreign states, international organizations, and foreign legal entities and citizens.

The land lessors are the relevant soviets of people's deputies.

Leaseholding terms are set by agreement between the parties and enshrined in a contract. The leaseholder has a preferential right to renew the land lease contract on expiry of the term of its operation.

Leased plots of agricultural land may, by agreement between the parties, be handed over to the leaseholder for tenure.

Kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and other state and cooperative agricultural enterprises may assign land to individual workers and lease collectives by way of intrafarm land management.

Land leasing relations are governed by the present Fundamentals, the Fundamentals of Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics on the Lease System, and the legislation of union and autonomous republics.

Article 8. The granting of land

The granting of land plots for tenure and use takes place on the basis of allocation [otvod].

The granting of a land plot which is under tenure or use to another landholder or land user takes place only after the withdrawal of the said plot in accordance with the procedure stipulated by Articles 11 and 24 of the present Fundamentals.

Land suitable for agricultural needs should be granted primarily for agricultural purposes.

The right of tenure and the right of permanent use of land is authenticated by a State Deed.

The form of the State Deed and the procedure for its registration and issuing are defined by the legislation of union republics. The form and procedure for registration of land lease contracts and other contracts for the temporary use of land are defined by the legislation of union and autonomous republics.

Article 9. Termination of the right of tenure and right of land use

The right of tenure and the right of use of all or part of a land plot is terminated by the soviet of people's deputies in the following circumstances:
1) voluntary renunciation of the land plot;
2) expiry of the term for which the land plot was granted;
3) termination of the activity of the enterprise, institution, organization, or peasant farm;
4) utilization of the land for a purpose other than that designated;
5) termination of the labor relations in connection with which a grant of land for the duration of service [sluzhebnyy nadel] was made, unless legislation of the USSR and union and autonomous republics stipulates otherwise;
6) nonrational utilization of the land plot, manifested, for agricultural land, in a yield lower than the normative (based on the land survey valuation);
7) utilization of the land plot by methods leading to a reduction in soil fertility, chemical or radioactive contamination of the soil, or deterioration in the ecological situation;
8) systematic failure to pay land tax within the period set by the legislation of union and autonomous republics, or rent within the period stipulated in the lease contract;
9) nonutilization for one year of a land plot granted for agricultural production, or for two years if the plot is granted for nonagricultural production;
10) withdrawal of land in circumstances stipulated by the present Fundamentals.

Points 6 and 9 of Part 1 of the present article do not apply to the land tenure rights of citizens engaging in peasant farming for a period of three years from the time the land plot is granted.

The right of use of leased land is also terminated on the breaking of the land lease contract in circumstances stipulated by the Fundamentals of Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics on the Lease System.

Legislation of union and autonomous republics may also stipulate other cases of termination of the right of tenure and the right of use of land and leasing of land.

Article 10. Transfer of the right of tenure and right of use of a land plot

On the transfer of the right of ownership of buildings and structures, the right of tenure or right of use of the land plot is transferred together with the said facilities, in accordance with the procedure and on the terms stipulated by the legislation of union and autonomous republics.

Article 11. Withdrawal of land

The withdrawal of land for state and social needs takes place by a decision of the relevant soviet of people's deputies with the consent of the landholder or by agreement with the land user according to the procedure stipulated by legislation of the USSR and union and autonomous republics.

The withdrawal of agricultural land for nonagricultural needs may only be permitted in exceptional cases in accordance with the legislation of union and autonomous republics.

Where the landholder or land user does not consent, the decision of the soviet of people's deputies may be the subject of a judicial appeal.

The withdrawal of particularly valuable productive land, defined in accordance with the level of the land survey valuation for a given region, and of land occupied by natural and historical and cultural amenities that are under special protection, is not permitted. A list of such land is stipulated by the legislation of union and autonomous republics.

The withdrawal of land in suburban and green belts, the experimental grounds of scientific research institutions and educational establishments, and first-category forest for state and social needs is permitted only in exceptional cases in accordance with the procedure stipulated by the legislation of union and autonomous republics.

Enterprises, institutions, and organizations with an interest in the withdrawal of land plots must reach a preliminary agreement, before the start of planning, with landholders and land users, and also with local soviets of people's deputies, on the siting of the project, the approximate size of the plot, and the conditions for its allocation, with a view to ensuring the comprehensive development of the territory. The financing of design work prior to the preliminary agreement is not permitted.

The withdrawal of land from kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and other agricultural enterprises in order to grant it to USSR citizens and agricultural cooperatives is carried out by the rayon or city soviet of people's deputies in the circumstances and in accordance with the procedure stipulated by the present Fundamentals and by the legislation of union and autonomous republics.

Article 12. Land tax and land rent

Land tenure and land use in the USSR are subject to payment. Payment for land is exacted in the form of land tax or rent, set according to the quality and location of the land plot.

The taxation procedure and rates are set by the legislation of union and autonomous republics. A leaseholder pays a rent the level of which is set by agreement between the parties according to the procedure and within the limits stipulated by the legislation of union and autonomous republics.

Payment for forestry land is exacted as part of the payment for the use of forests.

Payments for land are paid into the budgets of local soviets of people's deputies, may be partially centralized in the budgets of union and autonomous republics, and are channeled first and foremost into conserving land, improving its quality, and providing material incentives for landholders and land users, including leaseholders, for the implementation of the said measures, and also into land management and the social development of the territory.

The legislation of union and autonomous republics may stipulate concessions relating to the exaction of payment for land: Complete or partial exemption for a specified period, postponement of payment, reduction of the rate of land tax.

Protected sites, national and dendrological parks, botanical gardens, and also enterprises, institutions, organizations, collectives, and citizens who have received derelict or unproductive land for tenure or use are exempted from payment for land. In accordance with the procedure stipulated by the legislation of union and autonomous republics, nature reserves, experimental farms of scientific research institutions and educational establishments in the sphere of agriculture, cultural, educational, and health care institutions, and also enterprises engaged in traditional crafts in localities inhabited and used for economic activity by small peoples and ethnic groups, other enterprises, institutions, and organizations, and USSR citizens may be exempted from payment on a decision of the soviets of people's deputies.

Article 13. The competence of local soviets of people's deputies in the sphere of regulating land relations

The jurisdiction of soviets of people's deputies of autonomous oblasts, autonomous okrugs, krays, oblasts, and other territorial administrative units in the sphere of regulating land relations extends to:

1) the granting of land for tenure, use, and lease to citizens, enterprises, institutions, and organizations;

2) the registration of the right of tenure, the right of land use, and land lease contracts;

3) the organization of land survey documentation;

4) the organization of land management;

5) the withdrawal of land in circumstances stipulated by the present Fundamentals;

6) exaction of payment for land;

7) monitoring of the utilization and conservation of land.

The granting of land within the territorial limits of autonomous oblasts and autonomous okrugs for union-wide, interrepublican, and republican needs takes place with the consent of the relevant autonomous formations.

Deputies' commissions are set up by local soviets of people's deputies to resolve land questions.

The delimitation of the competence of local soviets of people's deputies at various levels in the sphere of regulating land relations is determined by the legislation of union and autonomous republics.

Article 14. The competence of union and autonomous republics in the sphere of regulating land relations

The jurisdiction of union and autonomous republics in the sphere of regulating land relations extends to:
1) the disposal of land within the borders of union and autonomous republics for unionwide, interrepublican, and republican purposes by agreement with rural, settlement, city, and rayon soviets of people's deputies, as well as landholders and land users;
2) the drafting and improvement of the land legislation of union and autonomous republics;
3) the setting of the borders of territories with a special legal regime for land in localities inhabited or used for economic activity by small peoples and ethnic groups by agreement with the relevant local soviets of people's deputies;
4) the setting of the procedure and maximum rates of payment for land, as well as concessions in the exaction of payments;
5) the drafting and fulfillment, in conjunction with local soviets of people's deputies, of republican programs for the rational utilization of land, the improvement of soil fertility, and the conservation of land resources together with other nature conservation measures;
6) the monitoring of land utilization and conservation;
7) the organization of land management and the conduct of the state land survey.

Article 15. The competence of the USSR in the sphere of regulating land relations

The jurisdiction of the USSR in the sphere of regulating land relations extends to:
1) the resolution, in conjunction with union and autonomous republics, of questions of granting land for unionwide and interrepublican needs;
2) the setting of the basic provisions regulating land relations in the USSR and the drafting and improvement of USSR land legislation;
3) the drafting, in conjunction with union and autonomous republics, of unionwide programs for the rational utilization of land, the improvement of soil fertility, and the conservation of land resources, their approval, and the monitoring of their fulfillment;
4) the establishment of principles common to the USSR for payment for land;
5) the organization of monitoring [kontrol] of land utilization and conservation and the establishment of systematic scrutiny of the state of the land (supervision) [Russian: monitoring];
6) the establishment of the procedure for the conduct of the state land survey;
7) the establishment of the basic provisions of land management.

Section II. Rights and Duties of Landholders and Land Users

Article 16. Rights and duties of landholders

Landholders are entitled:
1) to engage in autonomous economic activity on the land;
2) to ownership of agricultural produce and of the income from its sale;
3) to utilize for the purposes of economic activity, in accordance with the stipulated procedure, widespread [obshcherasprostranennyye] minerals, peat, forests, and water resources existing on the land plot, and also to exploit other useful properties of the land;
4) to erect housing, production, cultural, and domestic and other buildings and structures;
5) to ownership of sowings and plantings of agricultural crops and plantations;
6) in the event of the withdrawal of land or voluntary renunciation of the land plot, to receive full compensation for expenditure on increasing the fertility of the land;
7) to transfer all or part of the land plot for temporary use in the circumstances and according to the procedure stipulated by the present Fundamentals and by the legislation of union and autonomous republics.

Landholders are obliged:
1) to utilize land efficiently in accordance with the designated purpose, to increase its fertility, to use nature-conserving production techniques, and not to allow a deterioration in the ecological situation on the territory as a result of their economic activity;
2) to implement the range of land conservation measures stipulated in Article 42 of the present Fundamentals;
3) to pay land tax on time;
4) not to violate the rights of other landholders or land users, including leaseholders.

Article 17. Rights and duties of land users

Land users are entitled:
1) to utilize land in accordance with the conditions under which it was granted;
2) to utilize, in accordance with the stipulated procedure, widespread minerals, peat, forests, and water resources existing on the land plot, and also to exploit other useful properties of the land;
3) to erect housing, production, cultural, and domestic and other buildings and structures by agreement with the soviet of people's deputies that granted the land;
4) to receive, in the event of the termination of land use, compensation for the value of land improvements carried out at their own expense;
5) to ownership of sowings of agricultural crops and of agricultural produce;
6) to transfer all or part of the land plot for temporary use in the circumstances and according to the procedure stipulated by the present Fundamentals and by the legislation of union and autonomous republics.

Land users are obliged:

1) to ensure the utilization of the land in accordance with the designated purpose and the conditions on which it was granted;
2) to utilize efficiently the land granted to them, to use nature-conserving production techniques, and not to allow a deterioration in the ecological situation on the territory as a result of their economic activity;
3) to implement the range of land conservation measures stipulated in Article 42 of the present Fundamentals;
4) to pay land tax or land rent on time;
5) not to violate the rights of landholders or other land users, including leaseholders.

Article 18. Protection of the rights of landholders and land users

Interference in the activity of landholders and land users by state, economic, or other organs and organizations is prohibited, with the exception of cases of violation of legislation by landholders and land users.

Violated rights are subject to restitution in accordance with the procedure stipulated by legislation of the USSR and union and autonomous republics.

Losses caused by the violation of the rights of landholders and land users are subject to full compensation.

Disputes on compensation for losses are examined by the courts or the state arbitration system.

The rights of landholders and land users may be restricted only in circumstances stipulated by the present Fundamentals and by the legislation of union and autonomous republics.

Article 19. Guarantees of land tenure

Withdrawal for state or social needs of land plots granted to USSR citizens may only take place after the allocation by the soviet of people's deputies, if the citizens so wish, of a land plot of equal value, the construction on the new site, by the enterprises, institutions, or organizations to which the land plot is being allocated, of housing, production, and other structures to replace those withdrawn, and the provision of full compensation for all other losses in accordance with Section IX of the present Fundamentals.

The withdrawal of land for state or social needs from kolkhozes, sovkhozes, agricultural research institutions and training farms, and other state, cooperative, and social agricultural and forestry enterprises may take place on condition of the construction, if they so wish, of production and other structures to replace those withdrawn and the provision of full compensation for all other losses in accordance with Section IX of the present Fundamentals.

Section III. Land Tenure and Land Use by USSR Citizens

Article 20. Land tenure by USSR citizens

USSR citizens are entitled to receive land plots for heritable life tenure:
for the pursuit of peasant farming;
for the pursuit of personal subsidiary farming;
for the construction and maintenance of a home;
for horticulture and livestock raising;
for dacha construction;
in the event of inheritance or acquisition of a home;
for traditional folk crafts.

Legislation of union and autonomous republics may make provision for the granting of land plots for tenure for other purposes, too.

The procedure for inheritance of the right to tenure of a land plot is defined by legislation of the USSR and union and autonomous republics.

Article 21. Land use by USSR citizens

Land plots are granted to USSR citizens for use for truck farming, haymaking, and pasturing of livestock out of land under the jurisdiction of the relevant soviet of people's deputies. Enterprises, institutions, and organizations may allocate plots for these purposes out of land in their tenure or use.

Legislation of union and autonomous republics may make provision for the granting of land plots for use for other purposes, too.

Article 22. Grants of land for the duration of service

Enterprises, institutions, and organizations in transportation, forestry, the timber industry, communications, water resources, fisheries, and hunting, as well as other sectors of the national economy, make grants of land for the duration of service to individual categories of their workers out of land in their tenure and use on the terms and in accordance with the procedure defined by the legislation of union and autonomous republics.

Section IV. Agricultural Land

Article 23. Granting of agricultural land

Land granted for agricultural needs or designated for such purposes is deemed to be agricultural land.

Agricultural land is granted:
1) to USSR citizens—for personal subsidiary plot farming and individual horticulture, truck farming, and livestock raising;
2) to cooperatives of USSR citizens—for collective horticulture, truck farming, and livestock raising;
3) to USSR citizens, kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and other agricultural state, cooperative, and social enterprises and organizations—for commercial agriculture;
4) to scientific research, educational, and other agricultural institutions, agricultural production and technical colleges, and general educational schools—for research and educational purposes, the propagandization of leading experience, and the pursuit of agriculture;

5) to nonagricultural enterprises, institutions, and organizations and religious organizations—for the pursuit of subsidiary farming.

Farmstead plots for personal subsidiary farming are granted by village, settlement, and city soviets of people's deputies.

In cases stipulated by legislation of the USSR and union and autonomous republics, agricultural land may be granted to other organizations and persons for the pursuit of agriculture.

Article 24. Land tenure for kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and other agricultural enterprises, institutions, and organizations

Kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and other agricultural enterprises and organizations receive land for permanent tenure to engage in public-sector agricultural production. The said enterprises, institutions, and organizations may additionally lease land plots.

The right of kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and other agricultural enterprises, institutions, and organizations to land is retained if they join agro-industrial associations, combines, agro-industrial firms, and other formations.

Cooperatives which are formed on the basis of subunits of agricultural enterprises (excluding experimental farms) and leave the said enterprises are, by a decision of the soviet of people's deputies, granted land plots out of the land they formerly worked, taking into account the need to create equal conditions for economic activity. These plots are subject to withdrawal from the total land of the said enterprises. The procedure and conditions for granting land plots are defined by the legislation of union and autonomous republics.

Members of kolkhozes and other agricultural cooperatives and workers at agricultural enterprises (excluding experimental farms) who wish to leave them and pursue peasant farming are, by a decision of the soviet of people's deputies and taking into account the need to create equal conditions for economic activity, granted plots withdrawn from the land of the said enterprises. The procedure and conditions for granting land plots are defined by the present Fundamentals and the legislation of union and autonomous republics.

Article 25. Land tenure for citizens engaging in peasant farming

USSR citizens expressing the desire to run a peasant farm based primarily on personal labor and the labor of members of their families are granted land plots, including a farmstead plot, for heritable life tenure or on a lease, as they wish. Legislation of union and autonomous republics may stipulate the circumstances and conditions for the granting of land only on a lease.

Citizens engaged in peasant farming may additionally lease land plots for production purposes.

Legislation of union and autonomous republics defines the preferential right of citizens to receive a land plot in the light of their experience of agricultural work, necessary qualifications, and other conditions and factors.

The maximum size of a land plot for citizens engaging in peasant farming is defined in accordance with the legislation of union and autonomous republics by local soviets of people's deputies, taking into account regional peculiarities, specialization, and the potential for cultivation of the land granted primarily by means of the personal labor of members of the peasant farm.

The land plots of citizens engaging in peasant farming may not be divided. The right of tenure of a land plot is passed on by inheritance under the conditions stipulated by the legislation of union and autonomous republics.

On the sale of the property of a peasant farm and on the transfer of a land plot to another citizen, enterprise, or organization by a decision of the soviet of people's deputies, the landholder has the right to receive full compensation from them for all expenditure toward the harvest, as well as expenditure on improving the quality of the land, in accordance with the increase in the land survey valuation during the tenure of the land plot.

A citizen engaging in peasant farming may, in the event of his becoming incapacitated for work or reaching pension age, transfer the right of tenure of the land plot or grant it for temporary use to a family member engaged jointly with him in running the peasant farm, or in the absence of such, to other persons according to the procedure and conditions stipulated by the legislation of union and autonomous republics.

Article 26. Procedure for granting land to USSR citizens for the pursuit of peasant farming

The granting of land to USSR citizens for the pursuit of peasant farming takes place on the basis of their applications on the submission of the rural soviet of people's deputies, by a decision of the rayon soviet of people's deputies.

Land plots are allocated to citizens, as a rule, as a single area, together with the water sources and forests located in the said area.

Members of kolkhozes and other agricultural cooperatives and workers at agricultural enterprises who leave them are allocated a land plot on which the land survey valuation should, as a rule, be at the average level for the farm. If land plots with a valuation lower than the average land survey valuation for the farm are granted, tax and other concessions are stipulated by the legislation of union and autonomous republics.

Land plots are granted to other USSR citizens for the pursuit of peasant farming out of reserve land in accordance with Article 38 of the present Fundamentals.

A refusal to grant land may be the subject of a judicial appeal.

Section V. Settlement Land

Article 27. City and urban settlement land

All land within city (settlement) limits is under the jurisdiction of the city (settlement) soviet of people's deputies. The procedure for setting or amending city (settlement) limits and land use and economic arrangements on the territory of cities (settlements), the withdrawal and granting of land plots, and the conditions for their use are defined by the present Fundamentals and the legislation of union and autonomous republics. The decision to grant land plots for tenure, use, and leasing within city (settlement) limits is taken by the city (settlement) soviet of people's deputies.

The inclusion of land plots within the city (settlement) limits does not entail termination of the right of land tenure and land use on the said plots.

Article 28. Rural settlement land

All land falling within the limits set under the land management system for rural settlements is classified as rural settlement land.

Rural settlement land is under the jurisdiction of rural soviets of people's deputies. Within the limits of rural settlements the rural soviet of people's deputies adopts decisions on granting land plots for tenure, use, and leasing.

The procedure for the utilization of rural settlement land is defined by the legislation of union and autonomous republics.

Section VI. Land for Industrial, Transportation, Communications, Defense, and Other Purposes

Article 29. Land for industrial, transportation, communications, and other purposes

Land for industrial, transportation, communications, and other purposes is defined as land granted for use by the corresponding enterprises, institutions, and organizations to carry out the tasks with which they are charged.

The size of land plots granted for the said purposes is specified in accordance with norms approved according to the stipulated procedure and with design and technical documentation, and the allocation of plots takes place according to the order of priority for their development.

The procedure for the utilization of land for industrial, transportation, communications, and other purposes is defined by legislation of the USSR and union and autonomous republics.

Article 30. The granting of land for agricultural purposes by enterprises, institutions, and organizations in industry, transportation, and communications

Enterprises, institutions, and organizations in industry, transportation, communications, and other sectors of the national economy grant land not being used by them for temporary use, by decision of the local soviet of people's deputies, to citizens, kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and other enterprises, institutions, and organizations for agricultural purposes according to the procedure and under the conditions set by legislation of the USSR and union and autonomous republics. Payment for the said land is made according to the procedure stipulated by Article 12 of the present Fundamentals.

Article 31. Land for defense needs

Land for defense needs is defined as land granted for the siting and permanent activity of troop units, institutions, military educational establishments, enterprises, and organizations of the USSR Armed Forces and border, internal, and railroad troops.

The procedure for granting land for defense needs is defined by legislation of the USSR and union and autonomous republics.

Section VII. Land Designated for Nature Conservation, Rest and Recuperation, Recreational, and Historical and Cultural Purposes

Article 32. Nature conservation land

Land occupied by protected sites, national and dendrological parks, botanical gardens, nature reserves (excluding hunting reserves), and natural monuments is classified as nature conservation land.

On the said land, activity at variance with its designated purpose is prohibited.

In order to ensure the safekeeping of protected sites, national and dendrological parks, botanical gardens, nature reserves (excluding hunting reserves), and natural monuments, protected zones are established, with a ban on activity on land in the said zones that adversely affects their safekeeping.

The procedure for the utilization of nature conservation land is defined by legislation of the USSR and union and autonomous republics.

Article 33. Rest and recuperation land

Land plots possessing natural therapeutic factors favorable to the organization of preventive and therapeutic treatment are classified as rest and recuperation land.

Health resort land is subject to special protection. With a view to the preservation of natural therapeutic factors, health protection districts are established at all resorts. Within these districts it is prohibited to grant land plots for tenure, use, or leasing to enterprises, institutions, and organizations whose activity is incompatible with the preservation of natural therapeutic properties and favorable conditions for the population's leisure.

The procedure for the utilization of rest and recuperation land is defined by legislation of the USSR and union and autonomous republics.

Article 34. Recreational land

Land designated and utilized for the population's organized mass leisure and tourism is deemed to be recreational land.

On recreational land, activity hampering its utilization for its designated purpose is prohibited.

The procedure for the utilization of the said land is defined by legislation of the USSR and union and autonomous republics.

Article 35. Historical and cultural land

Land occupied by protected historical and cultural sites, memorial parks, burial grounds, and archeological monuments is classified as historical and cultural land.

On this land any activity at variance with its designated purpose is prohibited.

The procedure for the utilization of the said land is defined by legislation of the USSR and union and autonomous republics.

Section VIII. Forestry Land, Water Resources Land, and Reserve Land

Article 36. Forestry land

Forestry land is defined as land covered by forest, and also land not covered by forest, but granted for forestry needs.

Local soviets of people's deputies, by agreement with state forestry organs, may grant forestry land for temporary use for agricultural purposes. Payment for the said land is exacted according to the procedure stipulated in Article 12 of the present Fundamentals.

The procedure for utilization of forestry land is defined by legislation of the USSR and union and autonomous republics.

Article 37. Water resources land

Land occupied by water, glaciers, marshes, and hydroengineering and other water resources installations, as well as land designated as waterside zones, is classified as water resources land.

The procedure for the utilization of water resources land is defined by legislation of the USSR and union and autonomous republics.

Article 38. Reserve land

Reserve land is all land not granted for tenure or permanent use. It also includes land for which the right of tenure or use has been terminated in accordance with Article 9 of the present Fundamentals.

Reserve land is under the jurisdiction of soviets of people's deputies and is intended for granting for tenure, use, or leasing primarily for agricultural purposes in accordance with the present Fundamentals.

Section IX. Compensation for Losses to Landholders and Land Users and for Losses of Agricultural and Forestry Production

Article 39. Compensation for losses to landholders and land users

Losses arising from the withdrawal or temporary occupation of land plots or from the restriction of the rights of landholders and land users, including leaseholders, or from deterioration in the quality of land resulting from the effects of the activity of enterprises, institutions, organizations, or citizens are subject to payment of compensation in full (including lost profit) to the landholders and land users (including leaseholders) suffering the said losses.

Compensation for losses is paid by the enterprises, institutions, and organizations to which the withdrawn land plots are allocated, and also by enterprises, institutions, and organizations whose activity entails restriction of the rights of landholders and land users, including leaseholders, or deterioration in the quality of adjacent land, in accordance with the procedure stipulated by the present Fundamentals and other legislation of the USSR and union and autonomous republics.

Disputes associated with compensation for losses and with determining the size of the losses are resolved by the courts or the state arbitration system according to their competence.

Article 40. Compensation for losses of agricultural and forestry production

Losses of agricultural and forestry production caused by the withdrawal of agricultural or forestry land for utilization for purposes not related to the pursuit of agriculture and forestry, by the restriction of the rights of landholders and land users, including leaseholders, or by deterioration in the quality of land resulting from the effects of the activity of enterprises, institutions, and organizations are subject to payment of compensation to soviets of people's deputies. These losses are compensated in addition to the compensation for losses stipulated in Article 39 of the present Fundamentals.

Compensation for the said losses is paid by the enterprises, institutions, and organizations to which the withdrawn agricultural and forestry land is allocated for needs not related to the pursuit of agriculture and forestry, and also by enterprises, institutions, and organizations around whose facilities conservation, health, and protection zones are established, resulting in the exclusion of agricultural and forestry land from use or its conversion into less valuable land.

Funds received by way of compensation for losses are utilized for the development of new land and for increasing the fertility of soil and productivity of forestry land.

The scale of compensation and the procedure for defining losses subject to compensation, as well as a list of enterprises, institutions, and organizations exempt from the payment of compensation, are set by the legislation of union and autonomous republics.

Section X. Conservation of Land

Article 41. Purpose and tasks of land conservation

Land conservation includes a system of legal, organizational, economic, and other measures directed to the rational utilization of land, the prevention of unjustified withdrawal of land from agricultural use, and protection against harmful man-made effects, and also the reproduction and enhancement of soil fertility and the productivity of forestry land.

Land conservation takes place on the basis of a comprehensive approach to land areas as complex natural formations (ecosystems), taking into account zonal and regional peculiarities.

The system of rational utilization of land should be nature-conserving and resource-saving by nature and should provide for the conservation of soil and the limitation of effects on the plant and animal world, geological formations, and other components of the environment.

Article 42. Nature of and procedure for land conservation

Landholders and land users, including leaseholders, carry out:

rational organization of territory;

restoration and improvement of soil fertility, as well as other properties of the land;

protection of land against water and wind erosion, seasonal flooding, inundations, swamp formation, secondary salination, drying, compaction, pollution by industrial waste and chemical and radioactive substances, and other destructive processes;

protection against the invasion of agricultural land by scrub and young forest and other processes of deterioration in the productive condition of land;

suspension of use of degraded agricultural land, if soil fertility cannot be restored by other means;

recultivation of derelict land and improvement of its fertility and other useful properties of the land;

removal, utilization, and preservation of the fertile stratum of soil in the course of operations involving disturbance of the land.

State organs adopt the necessary land conservation measures within the framework of unionwide and republican programs.

The procedure for land conservation is stipulated by legislation of the USSR and union and autonomous republics.

Article 43. Ecological requirements relating to the siting, design, construction, and commissioning of facilities, structures, and installations affecting the state of the land

In connection with the siting, design, construction, and commissioning of new and modernized facilities, structures, and installations, as well as the introduction of new techniques that adversely affect the state of the land, land conservation measures should be provided for and implemented.

The commissioning of facilities and the application of technologies not supported by measures to protect land from degradation or disturbance is prohibited.

The siting of facilities affecting the state of the land is coordinated with land use and nature conservation organs and other organs in accordance with the procedure defined by legislation of the USSR and union and autonomous republics.

Article 44. Economic incentives for the rational utilization and conservation of land

Economic incentives for the rational utilization and conservation of land are directed toward increasing the interest of landholders and land users, including leaseholders, in the preservation and regeneration of soil fertility, and at protecting the land against the adverse effects of production activity, and include:

the allocation of funds from union, republican, or local budgets for the restoration of land disturbed other than through their fault;

exemption from payment for land plots at the stage of agricultural development or improvement for a period stipulated in the operations plan;

the granting of concessionary credits;

partial compensation from budget funds for reduction in income resulting from temporary suspension of use of plots disturbed other than through their fault;

the provision of incentives to improve land quality, increase soil fertility and the productivity of forestry land, and increase the production of ecologically clean output.

The procedure for implementing measures relating to economic incentives for the rational utilization and conservation of land is stipulated by legislation of the USSR and union and autonomous republics.

Section XI. Monitoring of Land Utilization and Conservation

Article 45. Tasks of state monitoring of land utilization and conservation

The tasks of state monitoring of land utilization and conservation are to ensure compliance by all state and social organs, state, cooperative, and other social enterprises, institutions, and organizations, and citizens with the demands of land legislation, with a view to ensuring the efficient utilization and conservation of land.

Article 46. Organs carrying out state monitoring of land utilization and conservation

State monitoring of land utilization and conservation is carried out by soviets of people's deputies and specially authorized organs.

The procedure for the implementation of state monitoring of land utilization and conservation is stipulated by legislation of the USSR and union and autonomous republics.

Article 47. Land supervision [Russian: monitoring]

Land supervision is a system of oversight of the state of the land stock for the purpose of ensuring prompt detection and evaluation of changes and the prevention and elimination of the consequences of negative processes. The structure, content, and procedure for exercising supervision are laid down by the USSR Council of Ministers.

Section XII. The State Land Survey

Article 48. Purpose of the state land survey

The state land survey is intended to provide soviets of people's deputies and interested enterprises, institutions, organizations, and citizens with information on land with a view to organizing its rational utilization and conservation, the regulation of land relations and land management, the validation of the scale of payments for land, and the valuation of economic activity.

Article 49. Content and operating procedure of the state land survey

The state land survey comprises a range of essential information and documents on the legal regime governing land, its distribution among landholders and land users, the categorization of land, and the quality characteristics and national economic value of land.

The state land survey is operated by means of the implementation of topographical, geodesic, cartographical, soil, geobotanical, and other surveys and prospecting, the registration of land tenure and land use arrangements, and the accounting and valuation of land.

The state land survey is conducted by land management organs according to a single countrywide system, and is financed from the state budget.

The procedure for operation of the state land survey is established by the USSR Council of Ministers.

Section XIII. Land Management

Article 50. Purpose and content of land management

Land management comprises a system of measures aimed at implementing land legislation and decisions of soviets of people's deputies relating to the organization of land utilization and conservation and at creating a favorable ecological environment and improving natural landscapes.

Land management provides for:
1) the formulation of plans for the utilization and conservation of land resources and land management plans;
2) the setting of borders of territorial administrative formations in the localities;
3) the collation of plans for the formation of new land tenure and land use arrangements and the rectification of existing such arrangements so as to eliminate inconveniences in land distribution, the allocation of actual land plots, and the drafting of documents certifying entitlement to land tenure and land use;
4) the drafting of plans for intrafarm land management and other plans relating to land utilization and conservation;
5) the formulation of forecasts and unionwide and regional programs for land utilization and conservation;
6) the validation of the siting of territories with special nature conservation, recreational, and protected site regimes and the setting of their borders;
7) originator's oversight of the implementation of land management plans;
8) the implementation of topographical, geodesic, cartographical, soil, geobotanical, and other surveys and prospecting.

Article 51. Organization of land management

Land management is carried out by state land management organizations and is financed from the budget. The formulation of land management plans relating to the management, radical improvement, and conservation of land plots may be carried out by other land management organizations on the initiative of landholders and land users at their own expense.

Section XIV. Resolution of Land Disputes and Liability for Violation of Land Legislation

Article 52. Procedure for resolving land disputes

Land disputes are resolved by local soviets of people's deputies, the courts, or the state arbitration system according to the procedure stipulated by the legislation of union and autonomous republics.

Property disputes relating to land relations are resolved by the courts or the state arbitration system according to their competence.

Disputes involving enterprises, institutions, and organizations of one republic concerning questions of land use on the territory of another republic are examined by commissions formed on a parity basis from representatives of the interested republics. If the commission fails to reach an agreed decision, disputes on the said questions are subject to examination under the procedure stipulated by USSR legislation.

Article 53. Liability for violation of land legislation

The assignment of land plots by sale and purchase, gift, lien, or unauthorized exchange is invalid.

Persons guilty of unauthorized occupation of land plots and of the spoiling of agricultural or other land, its pollution with chemical or radioactive substances, production waste, and effluent, the siting, construction, design, and commissioning of facilities adversely affecting the state of the land, nonfulfillment of the requirements of the nature conservation regime for land utilization, failure to return land occupied temporarily or failure to fulfill commitments relating to bringing the said land into a suitable condition for utilization for its designated purpose, destruction of boundary markers on land use borders, and misrepresentation of information relating to state registration, accounting, and valuation of land bear civil, administrative, or criminal liability in accordance with legislation of the USSR and union and autonomous republics.

Land plots occupied without authorization are restored to the rightful user without compensation for expenditure carried out during the period of unlawful use.

Liability for other forms of violation of land legislation may be stipulated by the legislation of union and autonomous republics.

Enterprises, institutions, organizations, and citizens are obliged to pay compensation for damage caused by them as a result of violation of land legislation.

Section XV. International Treaties

Article 54. International treaties

If rules other than those contained in USSR land legislation are set by an international treaty of the USSR, the rules of the international treaty apply.

The same procedure applies with regard to the land legislation of a union republic if an international treaty of the union republic sets rules other than those stipulated by the land legislation of the said union republic.

Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet,

M. Gorbachev. Moscow, Kremlin, 28 February 1990.

Congress of People's Deputies

Moscow TV Carries Congress of People's Deputies

Gorbachev Opens Session

LD1203071290

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 0658 GMT on 12 March links up with Moscow Domestic Service in Russian for a live relay of the opening of the Third Congress of People's Deputies at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow.

At 0700 GMT Gorbachev and other leaders enter the hall and occupy their places on the platform.

Gorbachev welcomes those present. He notes that 2,092 deputies are registered for the congress. He asks the deputies to register their presence; the electronic board shows 2,087 present. Gorbachev thereupon declares the congress open. All stand for the national anthem.

At 0711 GMT, following the national anthem Gorbachev begins his address. He says that the congress presidium does not include a representative from the Lithuanian SSR as a Lithuanian Supreme Soviet session is taking place. The news from there is "disturbing", though full information is not yet to hand. The decisions being taken in Lithuania are of fundamental concern for the whole country.

Gorbachev says that the USSR Supreme Soviet chambers should study the situation in Lithuania, make an assessment of it and draw the necessary conclusions. The deputies agree.

At 0714 GMT Gorbachev announces that a group has to be formed to supervise the operation of the electronic voting system at the congress, as stipulated in the rules. A vote is held on the proposed list of members of that supervisory group. The list is endorsed.

At 0719 GMT Gorbachev says that the rules stipulate the formation of a congress secretariat. A list of members has been circulated, though a change has been proposed due to the illness of a Georgian deputy. A change has also been proposed in the Uzbek representation. The revised list is voted on and accepted.

At 0725 GMT, moving on to the congress agenda, Gorbachev says the following points have been submitted: draft law on presidency, draft law on amendments to constitution in connection with law on land and law on property, and draft law on amendments to Articles 6 and 7 of the USSR constitution. The agenda should also cover the election of a USSR president if the draft law on the presidency is adopted. Finally, the powers of USSR people's deputies should be discussed.

Gorbachev asks whether there should be a vote on the agenda or whether the debate should begin immediately. The deputies vote against discussing the agenda.

A deputy from the floor says the points on the agenda should be voted one at a time, stating that the president should be elected by the people, not the congress. Gorbachev says there is no "trap" here, and that the agenda should be voted on as a whole.

Lithuanian Developments 'Disturbing'

LD1203074190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian continues its relay of the Congress of People's Deputies session in Moscow.

Following the national anthem, at 0711 GMT Gorbachev begins his address. He says that the congress presidium does not include a representative from the Lithuanian SSR as a Lithuanian Supreme Soviet session is taking place. The news from there is "disturbing", though full information is not yet to hand. The decisions being made in Lithuania are of fundamental concern for the whole country.

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Agenda Adopted

LD1203080990

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian continues its relay of the Congress of People's Deputies session in Moscow.

At 0740 GMT the deputies vote to adopt the agenda.

Gorbachev says the congress is planned to last three days. Today, he says, we could discuss the recognition of the authority of newly elected USSR People's Deputies and the pesidency issue. If the presidency law is passed a president could be elected tomorrow. On day three, the result of this secret ballot could be announced. Gorbachev asks if this is acceptable: a vote confirms this plan of action.

At 0745 GMT Chairman of the Credentials Commission Gidaspov takes the floor to list the USSR People's Deputies elected since the previous congress. He gives detailed voting figures for each and reads out a draft decision recognizing the authority of the People's Deputies mentioned.

At 0751 GMT Gorbachev asks if there are any questions to Gidaspov. No questions are heard. The draft decision is put to a vote and accepted.

Lukyanov Begins Speech

LD1203081390

[Editorial Report] At 0756 GMT 12 March, Moscow Television Service in Russian continues its live relay of the Congress of People's Deputies session in Moscow. Moving to the presidency issue, Gorbachev gives the floor to Lukyanov.

Lukyanov says this issue is of fundamental importance for the country's development. Why is this draft law being submitted, he asks. The internal nature of the renewal process has made this objectively necessary. It is essentiai to accelerate the perestroyka processes, to clearly stipulate the functions of the top state authorites for geniune democratization.

Perestroyka has led to increased political activity in society, but people are "increasingly concerned" by economic problems, inter- ethnic tension and the growth in crime. The old command- administrative mechanisms are still being dismantled, while the new ones are not yet in place. There is nothing surprising in this. For decades the CPSU has controlled everything. It will take time and effort and new cadres in order to abandon this.

It is time to redefine the CPSU's role in society, Lukyanov says. As far back as the 19th Party Conference the party spoke out against usurpation of local soviet power. The platform for the 28th Congress shows that the party is open to dialogue with other forces and movements. Hence the proposals to amend Articles 6 and 7.

The new wording of these articles is directly connected with the evolution of democracy in the USSR and participation of the masses in all spheres of administration.

Articles 11, 12, and 13 of the Constitution must also be changed in connection with the laws on property and land. These are aimed at overcoming alienation from the means of production and at developing initiative.

At 0811 GMT Lukyanov says that experience shows that decentralization of power can only realize its potential with a "strong...coordinating center." Measures must be taken to ensure that administrative power is transferred from party to state structures. In this connection, the draft law on the creation of the post of president is submitted for consideration by the congress. This should ensure greater efficiency in the entire structure of power and consolidate society. The president should help develop social dialogue and consensus within the country, as well as reacting to emergency situation.

At the same time, Lukyanov adds, the supreme body by legislative power remains the congress, and of executive power, the government. The president is a link between these. The presidency should be "consistently democratic" and "soviet" in nature. The draft law proposed calls for a strong president, energetic government and independent courts. There is no cause for concern over absolute power.

The first president is to be elected on a contested basis by the Congress of People's Deputies, subsequent presidents to be elected by the people. Two terms of office is the limit. The president is under the control of the congress and can be removed by it. The president is obliged to act according to the law. The constitutional supervision commission will check the legality of presidential decrees.

Lukyanov continues, saying that the presidency will not restrict the powers of the legislative bodies. The president will present an annual state of the nation report to the congress. Some have asked whether the presidency will not hamper the development of the Soviet Federation. Presidential power should, however, play a "creative" role here as a guarantor of republican sovereignty.

A federation council is to be set up to examine the development of the federation and the country's nationalities policy. Article 77 of the Constitution is to be amended to take account of the council. Lukyanov stresses that the president's functions do not infringe the prerogatives of constituent parts of the federation.

At 0825 GMT he says: As regards the government, the presidency will make it more accountable, since it will have to report once a year to the president. A presidential council is to be set up and the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR will be a member of this.

Lukyanov on Election of President

LD1203083790

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian continues its relay of the Congress of People's Deputies Session in Moscow.

Continuing his speech,

At 0811 GMT Lukyanov says that experience shows that decentralization of power can only realize its potential with a "strong...coordinating center." Measures must be taken to ensure that administrative power is transferred from party to state structures. In this connection, the draft law on the creation of the post of president is submitted for consideration by the congress. This should ensure greater efficiency in the entire structure of power and consolidate society. The president should help develop social dialogue and consensus within the country, as well as reacting to emergency situation.

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Lukyanov on President's Role

LD1203084990

[Editorial Report] At 0828 GMT 12 March, Moscow Television Service in Russian continues its relay of the Congress of People's Deputies session in Moscow.

Continuing his speech, Lukyanov says that a majority in the USSR Supreme Soviet approved the draft law submitted today.

A special article of the USSR Constitution is to be devoted to the presidency. The president's coordinating role will be one of his key functions, enhancing the efficiency of the administrative mechanism. The president represents the USSR abroad. As in other countries, the USSR president may return a law to the legislative bodies. The president may submit a proposal for reelection of the Congress of People's Deputies. This system is aimed at ensuring stability, Lukyanov stresses. As regards the president's right to impose presidential rule and a state of emergency in specific territories, this will be regulated by a special law. Only the legislative bodies can introduce a state of emergency across the country as a whole.

Continuing, he says the president will play a leading role in defense matters. He will also grant awards and pardons.

The Supreme Soviet Presidium will henceforth concentrate on the organization of congresses and Supreme Soviet sittings, no longer involving itself in presidential matters.

Lukyanov Continues Speech

LD1203085790

[Editorial Report] At 0838 GMT 12 March, Moscow Television Service in Russian continues its relay of the Congress of People's deputies session in Moscow.

Continuing his speech, Lukyanov sums up by saying: We often do not manage to see the long term when we are discussing big changes. But the essence of the changes is progressive and irreversible. A new order is being formed; maybe some will have to be improved. But nobody is going to make it easy for us; we must do it all for ourselves. The institution of a presidency is a democratic one. The laws being discussed are directly connected with development of our society. Our Congress is to discuss the framework on which the changes will hang.

He adds: All the republican bodies and the public organizations must be involved in deciding on changes. The changes are big ones, and there may be resistance to overcome. We need strong discipline and responsibility to carry through the changes. Law and order and peace for citizens must be ensured. All this is only possible with the support of the millions.

At 0843 he says he is certain that everything will be done to make it a success.

At 0844 Gorbachev asks if it is all right to give Lukyanov questions on paper; nobody asks for an oral question and answer session. A break is proposed. Concerning the live relay, Gorbachev proposes doing the same as was done with the Supreme Soviet, i.e., everything will be broadcast eventually.

At 0845 a break of 30 minutes is declared. The relay concludes.

Further as warranted.

Central Committee Plenum Opens in Moscow

LD1103073490 Moscow TASS in English 0729 GMT 11 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 11 TASS—The Soviet Communist Party Central Committee opened a plenum in the Kremlin today to discuss the submission of proposals concerning Articles 6 and 7 of the national Constitution to the Extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies, an opening date for the 28th party congress, a review-and-election campaign in the party, the rate of representation of party members at the Congress, and procedures for electing delegates there.

The plenum will also elect a People's Deputy from the party.

Gorbachev Opens Congress of People's Deputies

LD1203071490 Moscow TASS in English 0710 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 12 TASS—By TASS parliamentary correspondent: The Extraordinary Third Congress of Soviet People's Deputies opened in the Kremlin today.

The Congress will discuss establishing the post of president of the USSR and the introduction of several constitutional amendments.

On Sunday, the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party decided to ask the Congress to abolish the Communist Party's constitutional monopoly on power.

The Congress was opened by Supreme Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.

Congress Deputies Approve Agenda

LD1203080290 Moscow TASS in English 0800 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 12 TASS—The Congress of Soviet People's Deputies has approved the following agenda:

1. The confirmation of the powers of the newly elected Soviet People's Deputies.

2. The introduction of changes and amendments to the Soviet Constitution and the establishment of the post of president of the USSR.

3. Elections of president of the USSR.

Lithuanian Deputies Absent From Congress

LD1203075890 Moscow TASS in English 0753 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 12 TASS—Lithuania failed to dispatch its representative to the Presidium of the emergency Congress of Soviet People's Deputies, which has just opened in the Kremlin, Supreme Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev said in his opening remarks.

Gorbachev said reports from the Baltic Republic, which declared itself independent on Sunday, were "alarming".

"Decisions that are being taken there affect the vital interests and the future of the republic, its people and our entire state," Gorbachev said.

The Soviet leader suggested that the Congress ask the Soviet parliament and government to study the situation following decisions by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet and come to corresponding conclusions.

As of 1000 [0700 GMT], 2,087 of the 2,245 deputies had registered at the Congress.

Deputies Debate Lukyanov Speech

LD1203101690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0930 GMT 12 Mar 90

["At the Extraordinary Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Some 15 minutes ago, the Congress resumed its work after a half-hour break. Our team's editor, Zoya Neych, told me that the debates on Comrade Lukyanov's speech have started and that the debates were opened by Deputy Alekseyev.

In conclusion I want to inform you that the agenda of the congress is as follows in the next few days:

Tomorrow it is intended that candidates for the post of president of the USSR will be put forward and that the president will be elected. On 14 March a report will delivered by the tellers' commission on the election of the president and on the adoption of a resolution on the decisions which will be adopted.

And thus the Congress of USSR Deputies is continuing its work in the Kremlin.

Agenda of Congress of People's Deputies Noted

LD1103122790 Moscow TASS in English 1211 GMT 11 Mar 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent Audrey Orlov]

[Text] Moscow March 11 TASS—The extraordinary Third Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR will open in the Kremlin tomorrow at 1000 Moscow Time (0700 GMT). The central item on its agenda is the Soviet Parliament's proposal to institute the post of president of the USSR.

The Supreme Soviet adopted this decision after heated debates at the end of February. The deliberations focused primarily on whether it was necessary to inaugurate this post immediately or after a new national and political structure for the country is adopted.

Most delegates believed it was necessary to inaugurate the post as quickly as possible, in light of aggravations in the internal political situation.

If the Congress approves this proposal, this first Soviet president will be elected by it on an alternative basis. Subsequently, the country's top leader will be elected by the population by direct, universal, and secret ballot on an alternative basis.

Furthermore, the Party Central Committee is expected to submit for the Congress' consideration a proposal to amend Articles 6 and 7 of the Soviet Constitution, which legalise the Communist Party's leading role. This question is being discussed at the plenary meeting of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, which opened here today.

The Congress of People's Deputies of [the] USSR is expected to last for two or three days.

Political & Social

PRAVDA Review of Plenum Context, Goals Cited

LD1103092190 Moscow TASS in English 0854 GMT 11 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 11 TASS—"A plenary meeting of the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee opens today to determine the date of the 28th CPSU Congress, the time limits of the party election campaign, the norms of representation and the procedure for electing delegates to the congress," today's PRAVDA writes editorially. "The Plenum will also express its view on key party problems—on the Party's place in the country's political system and on the draft of the new Party rules."

The Plenum is meeting exactly five years after the extraordinary 1985 plenary meeting that charged Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, with difficult and important duties.

The concept of perestroyka, the radical and revolutionary reform of our society, did not appear overnight. "It was hardly possible to foresee in the spring of 1985 all the ups and downs of future developments, their abrupt swerves, and to set up precaution signs marking dangerous intervals,' the newspaper stresses. "This is why today's complaints that perestroika's masterminds allegedly had no thoroughly elaborated stage-by-stage plan are so naive."

"The past quinquennium reflects all aspects of our life, both joyous and dramatic," PRAVDA says. "We have breathed the fresh spring air of glasnost and democracy, smelt the reek of Chernobyl and Ferghana. We have felt ourselves free citizens of a free country and have suffered the consequences of a scanty consumer market, inflation and budget deficit. We have felt the bitterness of inter-ethnic strife and social instability."

"The past five years have changed our country beyond recognition, and it will never again be what it was," the newspaper says. "Today's soviet society difiers much more from 1985's society than 1985's society differs from that of 30-40 years ago. We have traversed a long road...."

"It is not easy to advance along this road. Five years ago, at the March plenary meeting, Gorbachev stressed the correctness of Lenin's thesis that a principled policy is the only correct one. It is precisely such a policy that the country's leadership is adhering to in carrying out perestroyka."

"The 28th Party Congress is called upon to further specify and verify this course. The presidency, if introduced, and election of a worthy candidate to this supreme office, who would help consolidate our society, will contribute to our successful advancement. Vigorous actions in this direction guarantee the quicker pace of perestroyka and the solution of urgent socio- economic and political problems," the newspaper stresses.

Gorbachev Presents Report at Party Plenum

LD1103121590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0930 GMT 11 Mar 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Presenter] We have now finally received a report by our special correspondent from the Kremlin, where the CPSU Central Committee Plenum is taking place. [video caption names correspondent as Sergey Slipchenko. He is shown talking to camera in a Kremlin lobby]

[Slipchenko] Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev finished his report at the latest CPSU Central Committee plenum exactly 10 minutes ago. The plenum began its work today. The report lasted about an hour, and it dealt with three issues.

The first question was about the presentation at the extraordinary congress of USSR People's Deputies of proposals on Article 6 and Article 7 of the USSR Constitution. The second question was on the timetable for convening the 28th CPSU Congress, the holding of the party report back-and-election campaign, and the representation norms and procedure for selecting delegates for the CPSU Congress. The third question was on draft rules for the CPSU.

There is an assumption that Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's report will be published in PRAVDA. There is also an assumption that the report will be read on all-union radio.

The CPSU Central Committee plenum has as yet only just started its work, but it is possible to give some preliminary information. A total of 840 delegates and guests are taking part in the work of the plenum. Of this number, 248 are members of the Central Committee, 108 candidate members of the Central Committee, and 70 members of the Central Auditing Commission: There are 314 invited guests.

The agenda contains five items. I have already specified the first three items. The fourth is a draft statute of the Central Auditing Commission of the CPSU Central Committee, and the fifth the election of a people's deputy from the CPSU Central Committee.

Gorbachev Plenum Speech Reported

PM1203111190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Mar 90 second edition pp 1-2

[Report by CPSU Leader Mikhail Gorbachev to the 11 March CPSU Plenum in Moscow entitled: "M.S. Gorbachev's Report at CPSU Central Committee Plenum"]

[Text] Comrades. The present plenum of the Central Committee can be seen as a direct continuation of the February plenum. Its main task is to complete the elaboration of draft documents for pre- congress discussion, to consider the draft of the new Rules [Ustav], and to resolve organizational issues for the preparation of the congress. You have the appropriate documents and proposals. Properly speaking, pre-congress discussion has already begun in the party and it is gathering strength. The draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th Party Congress provided a good incentive for this undoubtedly beneficial process. It has been received in the party and in the country as a serious conceptual document which reflects and gives a critical analysis of the state of affairs, ways to tackle the very acute socioeconomic and political problems facing the country, and the fundamental aims of the renewal of our society. I would like to stress that we regard the draft platform precisely as the basis and foundation of the discussions which are spreading in the party and in society. Therefore the multilayered and, I should say, polyphonic reaction to the draft is natural. It would have been worse if, as in former times, exclamations of formal approval had been heard from all sides. It was our aim—and I spoke of this at the previous party Central Committee plenum—to create a document which was open for party-wide discussion and thereby to assist the further galvanization of our collective quest. Of course, we see this whole process as leading mostly along the course of perestroyka, within the framework of our socialist choice. So a critical, positive, and insistent quest is simply vitally essential for us. It will take place

right up to the congress, which will have the final word by adopting the party's program document for the foreseeable future.

The discussion which has started shows that it centers upon issues of reforming the party. This is quite understandable, for many problems of social development come together at this point, as at the focus. As you recall, the draft platform formulates the fundamental directives for the restructuring of our party.

Now they have been given a detailed treatment in the draft rules. The document that has been submitted to you has been formed not in the minds of apparatus officials but is a collection of constructive proposals, which have come to the CPSU Central Committee and party newspapers and magazines and have been developed in our theoretical centers—the Institute of Marxism-Leninism and the Academy of Social Sciences—their republican branches, and party higher educational establishments. In the past few months, the CPSU Central Committee has received more than 40 complete draft rules from primary local party organizations and individual communists. The CPSU Central Committee has also received thousands of decisions from party meetings and plena of party committees concerning issues of the rules. All this has been thoroughly studied and accumulated by the Central Committee's commissions and has been more than once examined by the Politburo. As we see it, in its essence, the document that has been prepared reflects prevailing views on the ways and means to democratically reform the CPSU. It is to be discussed by the whole party. Therefore, today we are not only summing up a big stage in its creation but also are starting a new phase in working on it. While working on the rules, we proceeded from the new understanding of the party's place in society, its functions, and also the forms, means, and methods of implementing the party policy that has occurred in the years of perestroyka. So, this is a question of elaborating a document which is called upon to become the basic law of the life of the rejuvenated party toward which we are advancing—a party of humane and democratic socialism. The principle of separating the functions of the party and state bodies, which was formulated at the 19th party conference, and the consistent withdrawal of the party from the state system in its capacity of the nucleus directly governing all the processes, are the main ingredients of this new understanding. In other words, it is a question of the party returning to its original purpose of being a vanguard political force in society, elaborating and offering to society courses of prospective development, and striving for their implementation through the communists in state and public structures. We regard a rejuvenated CPSU as an alliance of like-minded communists, which bases its activity on creatively developing the ideas of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. We regard the rejuvenated CPSU as a party of socialist choice expressing the interests of the working class and all the working people, a party which strives to consolidate the Soviet society of many nations around its program platform.

We state that the CPSU proceeds from the position of internationalism; that it is open to cooperation with communist and workers' parties, socialist and social-democratic parties, liberal and national-democratic parties, and all public forces and movements which are for peace and social progress.

The CPSU is thus renewing itself and assuming a new image on its own ideological and political foundations. The draft rules correspond to the provisions of the CPSU Central Committee platform, which give a new characterization of the party's role and functions in the conditions of a reform of all aspects of society's economic, sociopolitical, and spiritual life. Such a process of renewal of the party is difficult and not straightforward. On the one hand, it is hindered by old attitudes and habits, and by the tendency of many party functionaries—and indeed some of the party masses—toward directly executive functions. The renunciation of these attitudes and habits seems to many people to be a loss of political influence, a forfeit of party positions, and a general weakening of the party.

On the other hand, a certain number of people have appeared who see the main route for the CPSU'S evolution as transforming itself into a parliamentary-type party, or even into some kind of amorphous sociopolitical tendency with vague boundaries and a formal membership; in other words, a multicolored patchwork quilt sewn together from the most heterogeneous factions, groups, and tendencies.

The struggle for political leadership within the framework of democratic procedures and election campaigns will, of course, be one of the CPSU's principal functions from now on. In reference to this function, it is necessary to work out corresponding clauses in the rules and to significantly change the methods of party work and the forms of organizing it. Such innovations have been introduced in the draft party rules. It is possible that additional work and development will need to be done on them; the discussion of the draft will show this.

One cannot, however, avoid taking the other side of the matter into account. This consists in the fact that because it is the ruling party, the CPSU is politically responsible to the people for the condition of the state and of our socialist federation; for the economic situation; for the security of citizens; for ensuring their rights and liberties; and for observing the country's international interests.

This rules out in principle lightweight parliamentary games for us. Moreover, it demands that the CPSU should not distance itself from participation in solving the country's urgent problems. It also demands that the CPSU should conduct serious policies, enabling ti to make fruitful use of the mandate of political leadership.

I also think that a firm "no" needs to be said to those who oppose the changes in the party's role and place in society, and to those who, taking advantage of our desire and resolve to accomplish a reform of the party, would

like to set them in their own direction and who hope for a weakening in our political position. We see that the main line for the renewal of the CPSU in its vanguard role will not be lost. On the contrary, with it changing from a formally declared role to a political reality, it will have an effective influence on various aspects of life in our society.

During all of the discussions underway, a question arose among several comrades: Will the changes that have begun not lead to a transformation of the most primary nature of our Leninist Party? Quite a few conversations are currently being held on this theme. Voices are being heard saying that the CPSU has, as it were, become obsolete at its foundation and that it is essential to replace it with another party which posesses another primary quality. In conjunction with this, the idea of renaming the CPSU the Social Democratic, Socialist, or other party is being suggested. The essence of this idea is to eliminate from the name of the CPSU of the definition "Communist," which ensues from its ultimate ideal and long-term tasks.

I consider that such a proposal must not be adopted. Its implementation will inflict a serious blow to the ideological foundation of the CPSU, and will arouse disillusion among many communists and nonparty people who support the CPSU as a party with lofty aims. The international consequences of such a step, if it were taken suddenly, also need to be seen. It would have a negative effect on the activities of those parties which, under difficult conditions, are fighting for the communist idea.

The strictly new visions of the role of the CPSU also dictate the necessity for a radical restructuring of its rules, and not only of the rules but also of a number of state acts, which also includes the USSR Constitution. In connection with this, it seems expedient that the Central Committee should present legislative initiatives to change the articles in the basic law concerning the party, at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

You have the corresponding proposals. The essence of them amounts to excluding the clause on the leading role of the CPSU and on the party as the nucleus of the political system and to set out, in the basic law, equal opportunities for the CPSU and other political and social organizations to take part, naturally in legal and democratic forms, in the social and political life and to fight for the implementation of the aims of their programs.

I think that such changes are in line with the new understanding of the party's role as recorded in both the Central Committee draft platform and in the draft rules. In stating these new party rules, we intend also to legalize the deep transformations in the internal party life. They will change the nature of the CPSU and will give it a genuinely democratic nature. Moreover, internal party relations should acquire new qualities: Democratism and comradeship; pluralism of views and glasnost; and respect for the interests of the minority together with essential party discipline. At the same time, the party, of course, must remain a strong and united organization living according to a common law, to which each person entering the party voluntarily agrees.

This line for democratization has been reflected in the very logic of the draft rules, their structure, and volume. Numerous wishes have been taken into account, to the effect that the new rules should be short, containing only the fundamental norms of party life, making it possible to open up the scope for the independent creativity of communists and to provide a guarantee of real autonomy for party organizations. The new draft rules are approximately one third less in volume, compared to the existing ones; contain six sections instead of 10; and contain 39 paragraphs instead of 72, although in conversation with comrades yesterday I felt that even here there were still reserves.

The main point of changing the norms as provided in the rules lies in putting the communist at the center of party life, having provided the widest possibilities for him to take part in elaborating and implementing party policy; and in forming leading party bodies and controlling [kontrol] their work. This was first and foremost reflected in questions about membership of the CPSU. A new situation is being created here. First, all the prerogatives relating to admission of members into the CPSU, including the final resolution of this question, are being given to those who know the people better than any other authorities—to primary party organizations. Second, the abolition of candidate probation and the obligatory submission of a recommendation in joining the CPSU is envisaged.

Third, a provision is introduced for voluntarily leaving the party, which naturally does not mean that party organizations are relieved of working to strengthen the ranks of the CPSU or of cleansing it of people whose behavior discredits the party or is incompatible with the party rules.

It is proposed to move away from a detailed list of obligations for communists. The rights of party members are more clearly formulated, as a guarantee that they will be active as party members and citizens.

The idea of enhancing the role of communists is also an integral feature of the proposals for democratizing the mechanism for appointment by election within the party. These proposals envisage the whole mass of the party having a part in this process. Enshrined are the principles of a choice of candidates and of putting forward candidatures from below, as well as the direct participation of all communists in electing delegates to conferences and congresses, and in the election of first secretaries of party committees at these conferences and congresses rather than at plenary sessions.

It is envisaged to give party organizations the right, at the same time as electing delegates to the conferences or

congresses, to put proposals for candidates for membership of the party body at the next level up.

The responsibility of all members of party committees to report back is introduced, as is the possibility of dismissing from bodies to which they have been elected those communists who have failed to justify the trust placed in them. The dissolution of such elected bodies when their term of office expires will also be possible, as will be the restriction of the period in office of all elected persons in the party to two terms.

With a view to democratizing party life there are new versions of those sections of the rules that regulate the organizational structure of the party. A proposal has been made that the party should be structured strictly along territorial lines. Such an approach, however, would lead to the party becoming divorced from labor collectives, to the weakening of its links with the masses. For this reason, in advocating that both the territorial and production strands in party structure should be preserved, we see the the importance of a growth in the self-reliance of party organizations at all levels. It is vitally important today to continue decentralization in the management of party work so as to ensure not only democratic unity in the ranks of the party but also real autonomy for primary and local party organizations and the Communist Parties of the union republics. We believe that the CPSU Rules should define only the very basics concerning the status of these links in the party structure, leaving them to manage for themselves the elaboration and implementation of their own action programs and forms of political work, and the solutions to many questions concerning structure, cadres, publications, and finances.

Particular attention in the rules is given to the primary party organization as the basis of the party. We have endeavored in the normative rules to consolidate the growing influence of the party's grass-roots sectors in developing CPSU policy and to eliminate the petty interference of superior bodies and the apparat from their activity. The new rules guarantee the possibility for the primary party organizations, independently and responsibly, to decide matters connected to determining programs and the forms of activity. The new rules also allows them to decide on their own structures and the regularity and procedures for holding meetings and political actions.

There is a strong emphasis in the draft rules, and I hope that you have noticed this, on creating conditions that would favor vigorous activity on the part of the party's rayon and town committees. We believe that increasing the role of these sectors, which buttress the party structure and which are the closest to the primary organizations and engaged in direct political work among the population, should now become one of the fundmanetal lines in the process of democratizing the life of society.

From this point of view, we find proposals to abolish the rayon and town committees, as well as the oblast and kray committees of the party—claimed to be unnecessary barriers between the Central Committee and the primary party organizations—unacceptable. It is not hard to envisage the consequences of such a "reform." The CPSU Central Committee would not be capable of maintaining direct links with more than 400,000 primary party organizations. The communists themselves would lose the oportunity of influencing the state of affairs in rayons, towns, oblasts, and krays and would, even more than in the days of stagnation, retreat into local interests. They would not even be able to conduct the political contest for the elections to the soviets of People's Deputies with any degree of efficiency, which, evidently, is just what the opponents of a defined party structure are hoping for.

Incidentally, the experience of the countries of Eastern Europe attests that the weakening of the party followed immediately the destruction of the rayon and town sectors.

In opposing the demands to destroy the existing structure of the party, we are by no means advocating that it should remain ossified. The provisions of the rules relating to this matter give scope for creative approaches. This means that the party structure should no longer be strictly tied to the territorial and administrative division of the country. This was, as we know, wholly explicable previously, when party committees managed everybody and everything in their regions.

All party levels are given the right to resolve structural matters themselves, including the right to establish or disband rayon committees, town committees, and so on. The rules provide for the first time the possibility of setting up soviets of secretaries of party organizations, party clubs, discussion centers, and other organizational formations which go beyond the bounds of the traditional party structures. This is undoubtedly an important step on the way to the democratization of party activity. It in fact enshrines in the rules the experiences that we have accumulated for the past several years.

The draft rules take account of and resolve ethnic aspects in party construction at a qualitatively new level. The acute problems of interethnic relations have affected the party, too. Issues relating to mutual relations between the Communist Parties of the union republics, both among one another and with the center, have become very topical. It is worrisome that in the search for new solutions, the main subject of our concern—the integrity of the CPSU—is sometimes forgotten. In particular, proposals are being voiced to transform the CPSU on the federative principle, as a union of Communist Parties of the union republics, and to enshrine in the CPSU Rules only those rights which are voluntarily delegated to the center by the Communist Parties of the union republics.

At the same time, proposals are being made to provide for the right of the Communist Parties of the union republics to secede from the CPSU by means of a referendum among the communists of the republic.

It is not difficult to imagine the consequences of such innovations. This would mean a division of the CPSU along national lines, under which a unified party policy would be impossible; it would be impossible to implement the integrating and coordinating functions of the CPSU in society; and it would be impossible to do the joint work to strengthen the Soviet Federation and the Union of the Socialist Soviet Republics.

The norms laid down in the draft rules allow the CPSU to be kept united. At the same time, they enshrine a new status for the Communist Parties of the union republics, ensuring them real independence within the program and rules of the CPSU. This independence will be realized through granting the Communist Parties of the union republics the right to draw up their own program documents and normative documents, and in accordance with these to resolve organizational, cadres, publishing, and financial issues, and to conduct a political line in all spheres of development of their republics.

And the draft rules also make provision that fundamental decisions of the Presidium and commissions of the CPSU Central Committee regarding the Communist Parties of the union republics should be examined with the participation of their plenipotentiary representative, and in the event of disagreement with the decision adopted, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of a union republic has the right to demand convocation of a CPSU Central Committee plenum to discuss the matters under contention. In connection with the principles and approaches laid down in the draft rules to the resolution of problems regarding the republican Communist Parties, there also arises the very important matter of the creation of a republican party organization in Russia.

There is no need to speak of the special role which Russia, as a mighty systematizing factor, plays in the framework of the union, and the communists of Russia in securing the unity and integrity of the CPSU. The question of creating a Communist Party of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] has now been raised with full determination in a substantial number of the Russian oblast party organisations. In Leningrad, for example, its creation has been advocated in the course of a referendum, as we have been informed by the Leningrad Oblast Party Committee, by 80 percent of communists. I think this matter must be resolved by the communists of the republic themselves.

At the last expanded plenum, as you will recall, we agreed that the party organizations of the RSFSR would, at their meetings and conferences, discuss this matter, and that the results would be summed up by a republican party conference just prior to the 28th party congress. It is being proposed for your examination, comrades, to hold this conference on 19 June in the city of Moscow. It will have to elaborate the overall position of the communists of the RSFSR and submit it to the party congress. Taking this into account, it would be logical not to elect delegates to it separately but to invest delegates elected to the 28th CPSU Congress from the party organisations of the RSFSR with the appropriate authority. They will make a decision and advance it at the congress.

We have discussed this matter specially at the Politburo on several occasions, and at the last Central Committee plenum within the framework of discussing the draft platform for the 28th congress. Of course, we could proceed in this manner: to elect delegates to the Russian party conference independently, and to hold this conference, where considerations and proposals would be elaborated for examination at the 28th party congress. But will it not work out in such a way that the delegates to the Russian conference will meet, elaborate proposals, and then be followed by delegates to the congress from the Russian party organizations? And it is by no means clear whether they will agree with what has been advocated by the delegates to the Russian party conference. And there could arise some kind of muddle instead of continuity. What we are proposing is therefore logical: The delegates to the 28th congress, elected from the Russian party organizations, will meet at their conference a couple weeks before the congress, themselves discuss these matters, elaborate proposals on a collective basis, and defend them at the congress.

We think this position of the Politburo is well thought out, that it is correct.

Preparations for such a conference could be entrusted to the Russian Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee and a preparatory committee formed of representatives of the party organizations of krays, oblasts, okrugs and Moscow city. I believe that this would ensure precisely what is needed. I assume that only this approach will make it possible to integrate all the initiatives that have arisen in this sphere over the recent period into a single stream, and rapidly begin a constructive solution of this great problem. Provisions included in the section on the supreme organs of power are formulated in detail in the draft rules. This is quite understandable, for the normative basis of organizing the activity of the supreme party bodies—unlike the leading bodies of local party organizations and the Communist Parties of union republics—cannot be determined by any documents other than the CPSU Rules. What is new in this section is, first of all, the establishment of a wider executive organ for the Central Committee of the party, the CPSU Central Committee Presidium—to which representatives of workers, peasants, the intelligentsia, servicemen and party veterans should be elected, and which should also comprise as ex officio members the leaders of the Communist Parties of the union republics. The number of Presidium members is to be established by the congress.

It is proposed that standing commissions of the CPSU Central Committee be created, headed by Central Committee secretaries, which will be called upon to study issues concerning the activity of the party in various aspects. Unlike the commissions now in existence, they will be invested with the right to adopt decisions on issues within their authority.

It is proposed that the posts of chairman and deputy chairmen of the CPSU—to be elected by the party congress—be introduced in the party. They will carry out the everyday general management of the work of CPSU bodies and ensure that it is coordinated and effective. This idea is already contained in the CPSU Central Committee platform and is being discussed in party organizations. A number of questions have arisen among communists, and one of them, on which I wish to dwell for a few words, is this: Will this not somehow damage the collegiate nature of the work of party bodies? Comrades, we believe that the idea which we have formulated is a correct one. Why? If we are to be realists and to analyze honestly —and this is the only way in which we can act—the mood of many communists is that the main leading figures in the party should be elected by communists directly. Therefore a proposal has arisen that they should be elected not at plena of party committees but by communists themselves at party meetings, conferences, and congresses. Since the delegates to conferences and congresses will be elected in party districts, that is, directly by the primary organizations, these representatives of the primary organizations will express those organizations' wishes regarding the election of the aforementioned figures.

But let us discuss this. I think that this idea embodies the notion of collectivity at its highest level. The main figures in the party, from a primary organization to the upper echelon, will be controlled by the communists. One has to mention that there are those who advocate the establishment of a modified Secretariat of the Central Committee as a permanent body of the CPSU Central Committee. I think that we have to discuss this issue, too, here at the plenum.

A large detachment of communists serves in the USSR Armed Forces. Party work has its specific features here, which should be taken into account when drafting the CPSU Rules. A way toward enhancing the role of Army party organizations and political organs in the construction of a qualitatively new Armed Forces, founded on the principles of revolutionary restructuring, lies in rejuvenating all party political work. This should be done through democratizing the life and activity of military collectives. The norms of the CPSU Rules that are directed at Army party organizations have to be geared to this goal, too. Of course, comrades, this will be a difficult restructuring of Army structures, but it has become ready for tackling. We expect to have an exchange of views on this very important issue here, at the Central Committee Plenum.

The creation of a central control and auditing commission of the CPSU, elected by a party congress and accountable to it, will promote the democratization of the party and its political and moral rejuvenation. Life has shown that the current system of party control and auditing work has exhausted its capacity. This can be explained, to a considerable degree, by the fact that a secondary role has been allotted to control and auditing bodies in life and in the rules. They do not have the necessary independence. Locally, many party commissions are preoccupied, mainly, with carrying out commissions given to them by the secretaries of party committees. At the same time, auditing work is carried out, as a rule, under the leadership of financial and economic subdivisions of the party apparatus. Life itself has confronted us with the need to set up within the party structure a single independent control body with elected members at the center and at the corresponding local bodies. This was envisaged in the decisions made at the 19th party conference, and now it has been reflected in the CPSU Draft Rules.

The fear is being expressed that such a measure will lead to "two centers" arising in the party. The Central Committee Politburo, having discussed this matter on more than one occasion, regards such fears as unfounded, inasmuch as the new monitoring body will not have leading functions. All its activity will be focused on monitoring the fulfillment of program documents and the CPSU Rules, the decisions of congresses and conferences, the execution of the party budget, the observation of party discipline and ethics, and reviewing appeals from communists.

The Central Control and Auditing Commission will have a democratic form and will elect its own accountable executive body, a Presidium and its cochairmen.

We would probably be able to take upon ourselves the responsibility—let us consider this among ourselves—and permit the setting up of control and auditing commissions in rayon, city, okrug, oblast, and kray party organizations, and Communist Parties of the union republics at their conferences and congresses before the introduction of corresponding changes in the CPSU Rules, that is, during the period of preparation for the 28th party congress.

Such work is already being carried out as an experiment. On the basis of the experience we have accumulated, a proposal is also being made for the CPSU Rules.

At conferences and congresses it would also be possible to confirm the tenets on the commissions having regard for their functions reflected in the draft of the new CPSU Rules and also in the draft tenet on the Central Control and Auditing Commission of the CPSU that has been put forward for discussion at our plenum. If there are no objections, then it would be possible to reflect this approach in a decision of the Central Committee plenum.

In the context of the democratic restructuring of the CPSU, the draft rules envisage substantial changes in the practice of shaping and expending the party budget.

The demands of primary party organizations that are currently being advanced everywhere, to leave at their disposal up to 50 percent of the party subscriptions collected by them, are being implemented. I think that in present-day conditions, when a number of new functions and spheres for the application of political efforts are

appearing in the activity of party organizations, this is a timely and correct measure.

A clause is being introduced into the party rules on the openness of all matters relating to the formation of the budget and the expenditure of party resources. Henceforth, the party's budget will be examined and approved at plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, with its subsequent publication.

A new scale of membership fee payment has been proposed in the draft rules. It has been compiled taking into account the countless proposals and wishes of communists. It is true, however, that among these there were also proposals to free certain categories of party members from the payment of fees. Such a step would not be in the traditions of our party. And also, I do not think it would be understood by communists. Therefore, the draft envisages the introduction of a symbolic membership fee for certain categories. This is, evidently, in this case precisely the happy medium that is needed.

Concluding my description of certain new points of the draft rules, I would like to stress that these innovations are the result of objective requirements for the contemporary development of the party and for its radical renewal. In formulating them in the draft rules, we are planning to submit a document for discussion by communists aimed at the kind of perestroyka in internal party relations that would combine the broad democratization of the party with the growth of its level of organization and capability as the vanguard force in our society.

Comrades, allow me also to dwell on certain matters of preparation for the congress. There is a proposal to convene the congress on 2 July 1990 in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses. The agenda of the congress was approved at the September plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. It is proposed that it be supplemented by the content of the CPSU platform "for a humane, democratic socialism." We could, even now, come to an agreement with regard to setting forth in the Central Committee report all matters relating to the draft platform and draft rules of the CPSU. It goes without saying that the proposed agenda does not rule out the possibility of other matters arising at the congress, proposed by way of an initiative or other procedure, and various draft decisions. We should help the congress pass in a creative atmosphere. We need to establish the quota of representation at the congress and the procedure for electing delegates.

At the 27th CPSU Congress one delegate was elected for every 3,670 party members. Since then the party has grown. By 1 January 1990 it had 18.8 million party members. Bearing this in mind, it is proposed that one delegate for every 4,000 party members be elected to the 28th congress. According to calculations, this would make it possible to have approximately 4,700 delegates at the congress.

With regard to the procedure for electing delegates, we should proceed from the premise that party organizations must be provided with greater freedom to resolve their own matters themselves, guided by democratic standards.

Proposals have come from many party organizations, especially urban ones, for holding elections of delegates to congress in the party constituencies. There are also supporters of the previous procedure for electing delegates, especially where party organizations must operate over a wide area.

All these issues were raised during a meeting with a large number of secretaries of party committees, gorkoms, and raykoms. The specific conditions of their work does, after all, leave its imprint on the approaches to this matter. The Central Committee Politburo considers it possible to give party organizations the right to determine for themselves which procedure for electing delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress suits them best. True, there have already been critical comments on this count, too. This, however, is really a characteristic trait of the current sociopolitical process. All proposals are subject to doubt, one way or another. Those who were proposing yesterday that party organizations be given the right to determine for themselves how to elect delegates are today saying that a plenum instruction must be issued so that local party bodies do not give commands to the party organizations.

All in all, we frequently find ourselves in the position of Nasreddin of Bukhara [Mullah Nasreddin, a humorous figure in Muslim folklore]: When he rode a donkey he was reviled for tormenting the poor beast, yet when he carried the donkey on his shoulders he was once again accused—of being an old donkey carrying a young one.

We must weigh everything and decide rationally, realizing that truly democratic elections should take place in the party, and that representatives of party organizations should be elected such as would assume responsibility for resolving issues of our society's development and reforming the party.

The proposals of the Central Committee's Party Building and Cadre Policy Commission on this count have been published. As a whole, they have received support from communists. I think it would be right for the Central Committee to debate them today and make an appropriate decision.

During preparations for the party congress, one ought to take into consideration the numerous wishes of communists who insist that work be conducted on the basis of the broad party aktiv. It will be necessary without delay to attract, through commissions of the Central Committee, communists who do not belong to central bodies, first and foremost secretaries of primary party organizations, local party workers and scholars to summarize discussion material on the draft platform of the Central Committee and the CPSU Rules, and to work through corresponding proposals. I think this will be democratic

and will meet the spirit of the times. It is also expedient, during election of delegates to the congress, to create from their number working commissions or groups to work out main documents and resolutions for the CPSU Congress; the order for holding the congress; and the standing orders for its sessions. Such an approach will make preparations for the congress more fruitful and democratic.

Now, about the reportback and election campaign in the party. At the last plenum of the Central Committee Politburo, plenum participants spoke out in favor of full-blooded reports and elections in all sections of the party, combined with broad discussion on the Central Committee draft platform and the CPSU Rules, preceding the congress.

However, this viewpoint did not receive support everywhere. A number of party committees are pressing for reports and elections to be held after the congress. I think that that is hardly correct, and here's why: As is known, the situation in a number of party organizations is notable for instability. At times there were enough emotions at meetings to take matters in this or that oblast or rayon as far as the dismissal of the party leadership. Given all the nuances, the dissatisfaction of the people with the work of party bodies lies at the root of these events. Incidentally, elections to republican and local bodies of power showed this in a number of places. In this situation can one avoid all leading party bodies, from the party bureau of the primary organization to the CPSU Central Committee, going through reportback and election campaigns and obtaining the mandate of trust from communists? I think that the situation dictates the necessity of this to us.

At reportback and election meetings, conferences, and congresses a detailed investigation should take place of all sides of the work of the party organization. No one should evade accounting for what he has done for perestroyka. Otherwise, preparations for the congress will not touch communists, will not allow them to understand fully the measure of responsibility for the fate of the party that is placed on each person who would like to continue working in its ranks. More than that, this circumstance may be taken in the party itself, and as a whole in our society, as the "machinations of the apparatus" which wants to avoid an account in front of communists on the road to the congress.

This is one aspect of the matter. The other consists of the fact that party bodies at all levels particularly need now an inflow of fresh forces, of leading cadres for the restructuring stage, who have the knowledge of political methods of work, who are free from tunnel vision and organizational sluggishness, and who are dedicated to the cause of socialism. The party needs, as never before, political fighters, energetic and brave people who would be able to break the notion that has formed in the public consciousness of the party body as a bureaucratic, official apaparatus. Only during the process of reportbacks and elections, in an atmosphere of honest and open conversation on the party and socialism, can a program of practical action be formed and will real fighters for perestroyka be elected as delegates for the congress. Only by leaning on the political framework of the reportback and election campaign can a genuinely creative and confiding atmosphere, free from innuendo and hidden political maneuvers, be created at the congress.

Finally, we need to have, by the congress, such elective bodies as would bear all responsibility both for adopting decisions, including those by the congress, and for their practical implementation. It is only on such a basis that the party's words will not be parted from its deeds. Those who support the holding of reportbacks and elections in the post-congress period say that without appropriate changes in the CPSU Rules it is impossible to elect leading bodies on a democratic and contested basis. But nothing is preventing a procedure from being established that would permit party organizations to hold elections of the leading bodies, taking into account proposals from below, and in such a way that more candidates be included on the ballot paper than mandates are available. Gatherings, conferences, and congress are higher bodies of the party organizations and have the right themselves to determine how to elect their leaders—at the plenum of the committee, or directly by the whole membership of the gathering, conference, or congress. I think our plenum may make a decision on this matter and in this way remove all of the communists' doubts.

The party committees could themselves establish the sequence for holding reportbacks and elections, proceeding from the fact that they should end in June. These are the basic issues connected with the organizational aspect of the preparations for the congress.

Comrades, the current Central Committee plenum marks the point at which the first stage of preparation for the 28th CPSU Congress ends, when the main decisions have been made, and the keynote and statutory documents are submitted for the party's verdict. At the new stage ahead there lies launching a partywide, a nationwide discussion of the pre-congress drafts and including every communist in the resolution of fundamental party matters. I am confident that the ideas and proposals formulated in these drafts will be received with interest and understanding by communists, that they will serve as a fine basis for a serious conversation at the reportback and election meetings, conferences, and congresses, and as a conversation on vital matters, on the future of our party, on the prospects of the country.

Speakers Listed in 11 Mar Plenum Debate

LD1103151390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 11 Mar 90

[Text] During the first half of today, the CPSU Central Committee Plenum discussed two questions—the presentation to the extraordinary USSR Congress of People's Deputies of the proposal concerning Articles 6 and 7 of the USSR Constitution, and also the time frame for the convocation of the 28th CPSU Congress, the holding

of the party report-back and election campaign, and the standard for representation and the procedure for electing Congress delegates. Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, presented a report.

Those taking part in the debate were comrades Prokofyev, first secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee; Dzhumagulov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers of the Kirghizian Soviet Socialist Republic; Bayzhanov, first secretary of the Dzhambul obkom of the Kazakh Communist Party [CP]; Bakatin, member of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR internal affairs minister; Litvintsev, member of the CPSU Central Committee, first secretary of the Tula obkom of the CPSU; Yakovlev, USSR minister of justice; Mishin, member of the CPSU Central Committee, All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions secretary; Borovikov, member of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR ambassador extraordinary plenipotentiary to the Republic of Poland; Shved, second secretary of the Provisional Central Committee of the Lithuanian CP of the CPSU Platform; Frolov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, chief editor of PRAVDA; Mironenko, member of the CPSU Central Committee, first secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee; Semenov, first secretary of the Grodno obkom of the Belorussian CP; and Shatalin, acting academician-secretary of the Economic Department of the USSR Academy of Science.

The CPSU Central Committee Plenum continued its work in the afternoon.

Plenum Participants Interviewed

LD1103234890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 11 Mar 90

[Report by Special Correspondent Sergey Slipchenko on the CPSU Central Committee Plenum from the Kremlin; from the "Vremya" newscast—recorded]

[Text] [Slipchenko, over video of crowded foyer] We cannot convey to you the essence of the speeches which have been given in the hall, we are working only here in the foyer, but Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's speech, and all the speeches in the debates, will be published tomorrow in the press.

So, what is happening in the party Central Committee at present? Is there the unity, which many people have been writing about recently, or not? What steps and decisions can restore and raise again the authority of the party? And, in general, what is being said about authority in the speeches of the members of the Central Committee? I put these questions to various plenum participants. [video shows Slipchenko with Paton and Yashin] Now at last the plenum, it seems, is tackling an issue which has been under discussion for a long time and which has been blown up—and the stage of making a decision on it has finally been reached. What in the speech of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev on Articles 6 and 7 of the USSR Constitution touched you, impressed your mind and heart?

[B.Ye. Paton, member of CPSU Central Committee, identified by screen caption] This question, on the whole, has been predetermined at the previous plenum, when the platform of the Central Committee for the 28th Congress was being adopted, and that is why we have already prepared for such a decision, for such a formulation. And in my opinion, there are no horrors and fears in this. This enshrines in the constitution what we have actually attained. But the main thing is that when the Constitution does not determine the role of the party as guiding and leading, the party itself must win that leading position by its activity, in its renewed shape, so as to become the vanguard party of our society.

[Yu.A. Yashin, plenum participant, identified by screen caption] The opinions were the same, [Yashin corrects himself] not the same, perhaps not only on Articles 6 and 7, I would say, but in general on the assessment of political, economic, social, and perhaps also the politico-ideological situation, the state of affairs as a whole in the country, and in the party, in the country and in the party.

[Slipchenko] So there were two stands: One was saying that the processes develop in a normal way and the second stand, which says the processes are developing abnormally, that is how one should understand it.

[Yashin] I would not say that. If you like, none of the speakers said that processes are developing normally in our country. But there were speeches of a somewhat, so to say, exceptionally critical aspect, perhaps, which claimed that everything, perhaps I express myself too sharply, which say that everything we have is bad. Probably it is not quite true. But there were other individual speeches by comrades, who believe that everything is all right, the party's authority is not declining. And that so those who claim the opposite are allegedly mistaken.

Until we change the state of things in the primary party organizations, it is very difficult to talk today about the vanguard role of the party.

There is a need to change them from the point of view of their independence, from the point of view of their responsibility, and from the point of view of their active role. There is no other way. And again, even in the draft rules it is written that rayon committee's [raykom] must in some way direct, lead, or coordinate the work of the primary party organizations toward the closest cooperation with the masses. I do not agree at all. The masses are the party, the primary organizations of the party. And if they work together with you, in the name of the masses and for the masses, only then may a change be possible of the party as the vanguard. Do I understand it corectly. [words indistinct] Nothing else is possible. This is my position, my point of view...

[Paton] And at the plenum that point of view prevailed. Notice that it is secretaries of the primary party organizations, who have been invited to the second plenum. And it is this fact that stresses the significance and the role, and the need to listen to the secretaries of...

[Unidentified speaker, prompting] ...of gorkoms and raykoms. [S.S. Shatalin, plenum participant] We need good, strong, and lawful political power, and of course, the party, which does not formally represent state power any more, nevertheless still continues to exert...as it used to by tradition, it will go on like this for a long time, inspite of any laws we adopt. So, in this situation, of course, we should act in such a way, so that the Central Commitee plenum in fact should reflect different points of view, so that it should be closer, I would say, to the center-left position, which, in my opinion, is both radical and considered.

[Slipchenko] And the solution will be found only at the congress.

[Shatalin] Undoubtedly, undoubtedly.

[Paton] And in light of the fact that we now will adopt here—I am convinced, that at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, which opens tomorrow, Articles 6 and 7 in the new edition will undoubtedly be accepted. This means that we officially pass on to a multiparty system. And this is important, I think, from the point of view, that our communist party, which, without doubt, remains the vanguard party, must find in itself the strength, the skills and the possibilities for cooperation with these newly forming parties, by no means making any fundamental ideological concessions, of course. But at the same time working together with them, with these new parties, on the ideas of perestroyka. And this, I think, is very important.

Plenum Vote on Articles 6, 7 Said Unanimous

LD1103235190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 11 Mar 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast; interview with CPSU Central Committee member P.K. Luchinskiy by special correspondent Sergey Slipchenko in the Kremlin on 11 March—recorded]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted]

[Slipchenko] What "i's" have been dotted in the work of the plenum here now?

[Luchinskiy] Aspects relating to submitting for review at the Congress of People's Deputies Articles 6 and 7 of the Constitution. A formulation has been adopted, as you have heard, and tomorrow this new version will be submitted to the Congress of People's Deputies. So we shall discuss it together.

[Slipchenko] And what was the outcome of the voting on adopting it? Was there a preponderance of votes for or against?

[Luchinskiy] You know, it was adopted unanimously. It was discussed at great length at the commission sitting. The discussion on it continued for over an hour. The most diverse options were put forward in regard to the formulation of this article, but one of the variants was adopted, and we shall submit it to the congress tomorrow.

[Slipchenko] Is the Central Committee united now, or are there people in the Central Committee embodying different directions?

[Luchinskiy] Well, of course, there are different directions, so to speak, but they are not formal groupings. People have different opinions and different understandings of the processes taking place. In my view, that is a realistic process. But if we were united, this line would probably not be a realistic one. That is why today, too, diverse interpretations were voiced, so to speak. But there were, unfortunately, fewer suggestions as to the solution. We all come out with assertions, or make criticisms or elucidate things, but the way out of this situation, nonetheless, consists in resolving as rapidly and quickly as possible the issues that have accumulated.

[Slipchenko] There is one view, one often blown up in the press, to the effect that today's Central Committee cannot resolve [changes thought], cannot fulfill a vanguard role, cannot go forward, that the party Central Committee is always lagging behind life in resolving topics and problems, and that in terms of the age of its members, the Central Committee fails to meet the demands life imposes. What is your point of view on opinions such as these?

[Luchinskiy] I think there is a great deal of truth in such statements. And that is why the date of the congress has been advanced, in order for new people to come up, people who would set about tackling more effectively the problems currently facing society.

CPSU Plenum Official Report Noted

LD1103193990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Mar 90 second edition p 1

["Information Report on the CPSU Central Committee Plenum" 11 March proceedings]

[Text] The plenum of the CPSU Central Committee began its work on 11 March 1990. The following matters were put forward for consideration by the plenum:

1. On the submission to the extraordinary Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies of proposals on Articles 6 and 7 of the USSR Constitution.

2. On the dates for the convocation of the 28th CPSU Congress, the holding of a report-back and election campaign in the party, the representational norm and the procedure for the election of congress delegates.

3. On the Draft Rules of the CPSU.

4. On a draft tenet on the Central Control and Auditing Commission of the CPSU.

5. The elections of USSR people's deputies from the CPSU.

M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, gave a report at the plenum.

Those taking part in the plenum were given an opportunity to familiarize themselves beforehand with the Draft Rules of the CPSU and other materials on items on the agenda.

Speakers in the debate were: Yu.A. Prokofyev, first secretary of the Moscow City CPSU Committee; A. Dzhumagulov, chairman of the Kirghiz SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers; S.M. Bayzhanov, first secretary of the Dzhambul Oblast Committee of the Kazakhstan Communist Party; V.V. Bakatin, USSR minister of internal affairs; Yu.I. Litvintsev, first secretary of the Tula Oblast CPSU Commitee; V.F. Yakovlev, USSR minister of justice; V.M. Mishin, secretary of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions; V.I. Brovikov, USSR ambassador extrarodinary and plenipotentiary to the Republic of Poland; V.N. Shved, second secretary of the provisional Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU platform); I.T. Frolov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and PRAVDA editor in chief; V.I. Mironenko, first secretary of the VLKSM [Komsomol] Central Committee; V.M. Semenov, first secretary of Grodno Oblast Committee of the Communist Party of Belorussia; S.S. Shatalin, acting academician-secretary of the Department of Economics of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

A drafting commission to revise the Draft CPSU Rules and prepare other documents from the Central Committee plenum was formed at the plenum.

The plenum adopted a decision to submit the draft USSR Law on Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the USSR on Issues of the Political System (Articles 6 and 7 of the USSR Constitution) for examination by the extraordinary Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies, as a legislative initiative.

The plenum documents will be published in PRAVDA in full and as accounts in other mass information media.

V.A. Koptyug, chairman of the Electoral Commission, delivered a report on the elections of a USSR people's deputy from the CPSU.

Candidates for USSR people's deputy spoke at the plenum: P.A. Abrosov, a metalworker at the "50-Latiye SSSR" Moscow Automated Production Line Works, N.P. Kustarev, a blacksmith at the Gorkiy Automobile Works, and A.P. Shustov, a metalworker and electrical fitter at the Moscow "Stankokonstruktsiya" works.

N.P. Kustarev was elected USSR people's deputy from the CPSU as a result of a secret ballot.

The CPSU Central Committee plenum will continue its work.

'Studio Nine' Program Examines Various Issues

LD0903180190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1255 GMT 9 Mar 90

["Studio Nine" program presented by Valentin Sergeyevich Zorin, political observer of Soviet television and radio, with participants Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergey Fedorovich Akhromeyev, adviser to the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet; Andrey Afanasyevich Kokoshin, corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences and deputy director of the USA and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences; and Aleksandr Yevgenyevich Bovin, political observer of IZVESTIYA; with a video report by correspondent S. Goryachev—live in the studio]

[Text] [Zorin] Greetings comrades. In our conversation today in Studio Nine at the Ostankino television center I would like to raise for discussion one question which at first glance might seem simple, even elementary, but in reality it is not so simple. In any event, the letters coming into Studio Nine mention it quite often and it is raised by our regular listeners and these are people who are well informed about international affairs and, consequently, this question is of interest. I will quote from one of these letters. It was sent in by someone from Leningrad, Comrade Yelizarov, candidate of biology: In the current international situation which has changed greatly for the better does a military danger still remain for our country, or does such a danger no longer exist? Well, that is how lecturer Yelizarov puts the question.

In order to examine this problem and to try to clarify it and to reply to questions which arise, we have invited to our studio today Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergey Fedorovich Akhromeyev, adviser to the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet; Andrey Afanasyevich Kokoshin, corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences and deputy director of the USA and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences; and Aleksandr Yevgenyevich Bovin, political observer of IZVESTIYA, who has long been concerned with this problem.

But before we begin discussing this problem I would like to present for your attention a short video recording of mini-interviews taken by our correspondents in central Moscow. Please.

[S. Goryachev] Kalininskiy Prospekt in central Moscow. The headquarters of the USSR Armed Forces is just over there. And here on Kalininskiy Prospekt people are hurrying about their peaceful affairs. Do they consider that today, now, there still remains a military danger for the USSR? Let us ask them.

[First passerby] I believe that there is no direct danger.

[Second passerby] No danger exists for the USSR.

[Third passerby] I think that now the situation has improved and in general we should restructure our army toward reducing weapons.

[Fourth passerby] I would not build up such optimistic plans on the basis that no real threat exists for us. There is a threat and this must be taken into account.

[Fifth passerby] I believe that the present situation is such that first and foremost the danger comes from the economy and not from the threat of war.

[Sixth passerby] I believe that it is still too early to disarm.

[Seventh passerby] No such threat exists in reality, not in reality, but one must be vigilant. [video shows street interviews]

[Zorin] So, as you can see, there are varying points of view but what do the specialists think about this? I would like, at the start of our conversation today, for each of our participants to briefly reply to this question: Does a real military danger exist for the USSR today? Sergey Fedorovich, let us start with you.

[Akhromeyev] All right. I think that this problem has two aspects. The first is whether a direct threat of war exists today for the USSR. And the second is, does there exist a military danger or danger from another power conducting a policy from a position of strength in their relations with the USSR. If there is military strength then there is also military danger.

So, if one says, does a direct threat of war exist for the USSR today, a threat that someone will unleash a war against it, I think that today no such danger exists. Indeed, in the past five years the improvement in the international situation, the improvement in relations between the USSR and the United States, between the NATO bloc and the Warsaw Pact, has removed this threat of war. But can we say today that this is already irreversible, that the military-political situation for some reason or other cannot deteriorate? I think that this cannot yet be said. And hence—and perhaps today this is of no practical importance today—if the situation deteriorates a threat of war might arise. But I repeat that this is not a current problem.

As for the second problem—does policy from a position of strength, pursued toward the Soviet Union, exist today, I mean a position of military strength—it does exist. This is because even though relations are changing and becoming better, and being transformed, all the same—and I think that in the course of our conversation I will succeed in demonstrating this—this policy toward the Soviet Union, pursued from a position of strength by the United States and the NATO bloc, still exists today. Hence, the military threat exists, too.

[Zorin] Andrey Afanasyevich, how is this seen from the scientific viewpoint?

[Kokoshin] All the same, I would, first and foremost, like to say that these radical viewpoints expressed on the streets require considerably more preciseness and they require comment. I think that indeed the military threat, the threat of war, has substantially declined lately, I mean a direct military threat. But since considerable military preparations take place within both the NATO countries and the United States, and some other countries that oppose us, we can not, all the same, say that the military threat has been removed altogether. Moreover, tendencies still exist in the development of the Armed Forces of the United States and NATO which are very alarming to us and with which we can never become reconciled. All this compels us to think that we should, of course, regard all these tendencies with a great deal of attention. And it is not just a matter of being attentive, but also of us taking commensurate measures in response.

[Zorin] Aleksandr Yevgeniyevich, what do you have to say?

[Bovin] Well, the question is indeed simple: will there be a war, this is how we will put it. Well, given the tremendous arms stockpiles amassed in the world this is what I think, generally speaking: Well, a possibility, possibility of war does remain. But we must also answer another question: What is the probability that it will happen? Well, this is a more practical question. Here one must, of course, be mindful of what kind of war one is talking about. If you take a large-scale war between the West and the East, or else between us and the United States, if you assume that someone is preparing for a war or that someone will deliberately start a war such as this—I think that here the probability is practically nil of such a war breaking out. But if you take, say a war of a different type, an accidental war, as it is sometimes called, one that is triggered off by accidental technical malfunctions or, let us say, by psychological failures, or if you take a war that results, say, from the escalation of some kind of a local conflict, then the probability of such a war is, well, all the same, it is greater than nil. This is how I would put it, although there is now no direct threat, these days, as it were, of a war like that breaking out.

So here, in my view, it is necessary to make these replies a tiny bit more specific, but, generally speaking, relative to what we had 10, 15 or 20 years ago, the general tendency of course consists in the fact that the threat of war, precisely war and not the military threat in the somewhat abstract sense in which Sergey means it, it does exist. And as for the military threat in the form of a policy of strength pursued toward us, then generally I do not, incidentally, see as yet any prospects that such a policy will end. In the future, at least, I think that his policy of strength will continue as some sort of component of their policies toward us, without fail.

[Zorin] I want to ask you to continue, but I would like to turn the question in what is, perhaps, a somewhat unexpected direction as far as our TV viewers are

concerned. All these years, when we were talking of the military threat, we proceeded from what may be called the presumption of the other side's guilt. That is to say that even if a war starts, it would start because we were attacked. But, in order to have an objective answer to the question we are now examining, I want to ask you this: Could it turn out in this way, that it will be us and not them who will be the first to commence military operations now, in our time?

[Bovin] Well, I do not know about today. All in all, of course, looking into history I see that there were situations when we were the first to act and provoke things. Take the Cuban crisis, the Caribbean crisis. After all, we provoked them, having, say, sent our missiles to Cuba. Take, say, Afghanistan... or Czechoslovakia, Hungary.... We introduced troops and, all in all, anything could have happened there. But I think that now, made wiser both by our own bitter experiences and taking into account developments in the world situation and the radical changes in our philosophy of foreign policy, if you like, changes linked with the new political thinking—well, I think that in this sense, as it were, our policy does not now contain such a threat and from this point of view never, not under any circumstances, I stress, will we be the first to initiate military operations, at least, as it were, for as long as we think the way we do now and the way we will surely think tomorrow.

But here, incidentally, I again return to the second aspect of the concept of a military threat—the policy of force. Here, perhaps, the question is a bit more subtle. If you will pardon me, we too, pursue a policy of force toward the United States—nor can we fail to. We are a great power. If, let us say, attempts are made to frighten us by a show of force, then we are compelled to do so.

[Zorin] Sergey Fedorovich, you wanted to speak?

[Akhromeyev] Yes. I would like to draw us into polemics a little and this is probably not a bad thing. I would like to argue with Aleksandr Yevgenyevich a little. But first of all let me say what I am in complete agreement with him about—that not only in theory, not only in the speeches of our leaders but from life, too, I think, everyone has been convinced that today we are conducting our foreign policy without force in those areas where force is not used against us. That is, even if events take place in the world which are, and I will speak frankly, very unpleasant for the USSR, and force is not employed and if it does not affect us directly, we do not employ force there. The whole world has now seen this. In essence this is where the radical changes in our foreign policy lies and it is from here that changes have gone on to affect the whole world.

But you are right that in areas where a policy is conducted toward the USSR from a position of strength—and we are a great and independent power and that means we must respond in some way and, naturally for this we must have strength. But there is a difference here. Perhaps, people will say that it is because I am a Soviet man and what is more a military man that I argue in this way, but this is my conviction and this is why I say this: All the same, today, the United States in its relations with the USSR is conducting a policy from a position of strength and we are obliged to respond to this.

Just look. We are reducing our armed forces and, what is more, by no small amount, but by 12 percent. But the U.S. Armed Forces remain virtually unchanged. We are reducing military expenditures. We have reduced them by 8.5 percent and in 1990 we will reduce them by a furtheer five to six percent, evidently. And just look at the tables. [video shows tables with the title, in Russian: U.S. Military Allocations in the 1989-91 Financial Years] Thus, the United States is virtually not reducing its military expenditures. They say that they are decreasing because the cost of everything is increasing and there is inflation. That is indeed true. But inflation in our country is no less and we are reducing military expenditure by eight percent in the course of one year.

[Bovin] Excuse me for interrupting you but I think that the point is that they, too, by the year 1994, as far as I understand it, from 1991, according to a Pentagon statement, have removed 180 billion [currency not specified] from the planned programs.

[Akhromeyev] Aleksandr Yevgenyevich, this is just the plan. And so far it is just a plan which has not been approved by anyone yet. I am speaking about facts, what we have already done. I always say this: Look, they have deployed 15 aircraft carrier strike formations. This amounts to 1,500 combat aircraft and thousands of long-range cruise missiles. And all of these forces are able, in a short time, if they decide to deploy them, in five to seven days, to be off the coasts of the USSR. [video shows world map with ships positioned off Soviet coasts]

And, by the way, as far back as the end of the 1940s they surrounded us with bases and there are about 1,500 such bases and there are over 500,000 servicemen on them with aircraft and ships and all of this is still a living reality. [video shows map of U.S. bases around the USSR]

Therefore, we are obliged to take this into account. That is why—you posed a hypothetical question, but I was forced to switch it over to what exists in the world today and to what causes concern to me and to many ordinary Soviet people who were asked the question on the move—I was prepared for the conversation today, but they were just walking along and they were asked and replied what they thought.

[Zorin] Andrey Afanasyevich, I think you wanted to say something.

[Kokoshin] Well, in theory I do agree with all that has been said and we really do have to follow very closely how to use our military force and the methods of military force used by the United States and their allies and to answer correspondingly. I would say that, of

course, at the moment the response from the United States and NATO to our actions to cut the military budget, the number of our armed forces and armaments is fairly feeble. Let's be blunt. And one would like to see a lot more in this respect, a more energetic and constructive response. However, there is a degree of movement on this. I agree with what Sergey Fedorovich said, that we too must take our own inflation into account. An adjustment has to be made for inflation. We will then have some comparable calculations vis-a-vis military budgets. Unfortunately we are not doing this at the moment. We carry on as if we have no inflation and we are not making any adjustments. The United States has been doing it for a long time and this gives them grounds for presenting their military budget accordingly, so to speak. But what has the Ministry of Defense already planned, specifically? This must also be borne in mind. It consists of fairly modest cuts so far. If one takes what happens when inflation is taken into account, it is a 2.6 percent planned cut in the military budget for....

[Bovin] The U.S. military budget.

[Kokoshin] That's right. For the 1991 financial year. What precisely does this specify? Out of 18 divisions—and overall they do not have a great many infantry divisions—out of 18, what they call active divisions, they are planning to disband two. They intend to put a complete stop to production to the main battle tank, the M1. As for the Navy, two battleships are being taken out of commission with the fleet. The program for the Osprey, a new plane for the Marines is being completely stopped. Purchases of F-14 bombers are being stopped, etc.—what I would call a fairly extensive list, all in all. These, however, are steps that cannot satisfy us nor, incidentally, do they suit the U.S. Congress. Several plans put forward by eminent specialists at the Brookings Institute and Harvard University are now circulating among an influential group of Congressmen in the Senate for more radical cuts in the U.S. military budget and therefore in the Armed Forces. They are tentatively to amount to 50 percent cuts in the military budget for the year 2000. It is still unclear how this will take shape but I think that Congress will, regardless, substantially cut what has been stated by the administration.

[Akhromeyev] But these are just plans at the moment, Andrey Afanasyevich.

[Kokoshin] Well, Sergey Fedorovich, you know some cuts have been made in previous years and some programs were cut back, in particular, the naval construction program for 600 ships. This has, so to speak, died a quiet death with no fuss made.
[Akhromeyev] 576 not 600.
[Kokoshin] Right. And 14 aircraft carrier units.
[Akhromeyev] 15. No, 15. [laughing]
[Kokoshin] It's 14 according to the plan for 1991.
[Akhromeyev] And I'm prepared to show that it's 15.

[Zorin] Okay, Okay. Confirmation of the defensive nature of our military and strategic concepts has been in recent years—and a good deal has been written about this—the doctrine most usually called the doctrine of reasonable sufficiency. Marshal, I would like to ask you what reasonable sufficiency actually is and who it is that determines both the measure of reason and the degree of sufficiency and how they do this?

[Akhromeyev] Very well, I will try to explain. Well, to start with, since this is a concept, there is some sort of theoretical understanding of this concept. By the term defensive sufficiency or reasonable sufficiency we mean a state, in this case the USSR, being in a position, with such a quantity and quality of armed forces which in a specific, military-political situation ensures reliable defense of the state and the defense of state interests, and no more than that.

But, indeed, you are right. How is this to be defined and who will define it? I will try to explain with a life example. From 1985 to 1987 as a result of common efforts and our efforts in the first instance we achieved a reduction in military-political tension in the military-political situation. Although quantitatively the armed forces of the sides—of the United States and USSR, of the NATO bloc and the Warsaw Pact—remained the same.

In 1988 I was still chief of the General Staff when the leadership of our state proposed to us to analyze the situation and to report, since the situation had improved, how much the USSR's Armed Forces could be unilaterally reduced. The General Staff, the leadership of the defense minister, with the involvement of scientists, spent about six months studying this problem. We carried out major exercises, training sessions; we conducted research work. We studied the implications of cuts of 300,000, of 500,000, of 700,000 [troops] and worked out several variants. We came to the conclusion that in the given situation the maximum the armed forces could be reduced unilaterally was by 500,000 men. When we reported this to the country's Defense Council, the Defense Council held three meetings and examined it. We in the military leadership were instructed to look again and then, when the question was worked out, the decision was taken to reduce the USSR's Armed Forces unilaterally by 500,000 men. We had 4,260,000 men. By 1 January, 1991 they will be reduced to 3,760,000. Today there are slightly less than 4,000,000.

So that is how, specifically, in a specific situation, defensive sufficiency was defined for 1990.

[Zorin] Sergey Fedorovich, but this is not a constant magnitude. It will change.

[Akhromeyev] Quite true. We are now holding talks on reducing armed forces in Europe and on reducing strategic offensive armaments. The situation is continuing to improve, to our universal satisfaction. So, if we sign these treaties and implement them and reduce the armed forces, that will be the next stage and the numbers will be in accord with reasonable sufficiency for 1991-1992.

[Bovin] I would like to note a couple of things. This theme is a very interesting one and rather weakly developed in our literature. Let us take, for example, the nuclear sphere, nuclear strategy. What does defensive sufficiency mean for our side? How many nuclear charges do we need to have to be absolutely sure that the Americans, say, will not make a strike against the USSR. Evidently, it is necessary to have a sufficient number to inflict unacceptable damage upon the Americans. That is our sufficiency. That amounts to—well, there is the classical calculation done by McNamara—that we should have the possibility, under any circumstances, to destroy 30 percent of the population and 70 percent of the industrial potential of America, even if they have made a strike. To achieve this according to our scientists' calculations, it is sufficient for us to have 400-500 missiles, in defenses, with a one megatonne warhead on each. Well, include the number which will be stuck in the defenses and the number which will have some degree of unreliability, well, simply add another 200. Well, that is what is meant and is considered as reasonable sufficiency. Well, in reality we have many times more than that, now. So, it turns out that we have a vast opportunity for reductions. I would like to ask my comrades this question: Does this nuclear potential which we really possess really fit into a strategy of reasoanble sufficiency or defensive sufficiency. This is very interesting and in that case how should it be reduced?

[Zorin] Andrey Afanasyevich.

[Kokoshin] Aleksandr Yevgenyevich, first of all one must proceed from the question of what you would have left after a preemptive strike from the other side.

[Bovin] Naturally.

[Kokoshin] One must take account of the very varied conditions of that strike. In effect to reach that size of 500-600, say, warheads, it is necessary, with the very worst variant of strike from the other side which has 10, 12 or 14 thousand warheads, to have a much greater potential. In general, what we have at present, in the face of the major nuclear potential of the United States, is approximately just what we need to ensure unacceptable losses in our response strike.

[Zorin] The theme of our argument was described many years ago by the U.S. political scientist (Herman Kahn) as thinking about the unthinkable. It is a very terrible subject.

[Kokoshin] But you cannot get away from it.

[Zorin] I would like to put this question to you, Andrey Afanasyevich. Our conversation is taking place at a moment which is a turning point in the history of Europe, a turning point from the point of view of the military-strategic balance, too. I am referring to the real prospects that have arisen recently for the appearance on the European [Zorin corrects himself]...on our European continent, of a united Germany. How could this new factor, from your point of view, affect the problem of the security of our country.

[Kokoshin] Well, if one speaks about this very briefly then history has, of course, taught us to regard the German question with particular attentiveness and concern. I would say. And this historical memory sits very strongly upon us and we should not in any way turn our back on this memory. But as far as the way in which the unification of Germany will affect our security, everything will depend on the conditions and the way in which it occurs. Well, of course, the effect of the unification of Germany on our security interests will be one thing if it takes place in such a way that all the security interests of the USSR and other states, in particular those of our neighbors such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, are fully taken into account and the corresponding level of military confrontation in Europe is considerably lower than it is on whole at present. But, if these interests are not properly taken into account and all the concerns which we and our neighbors have are not included in the package of accords on the Germany question, then the question of the German danger, the question of the military danger from the unification of Germany, which be much more acute.

[Zorin] Sergey Fedorovich, what would you say on this question.

[Akhromeyev] I would like to say a few words about means, about the way the problem could really be resolved so that European security can be preserved. It is very important to sign a peace treaty. It has been 45 years since the war ended, but juridically it is still continuing. There is no peace treaty. Evidently, if we concluded a peace treaty with Germany, that is Germany and at least the four powers that have borne responsiblity for Germany during the post-war agreement, then we would resolve, we would manage to resolve the question of borders which is a very important question. And, therefore, that is precisely what is needed.

And the second thing which is really needed, European security, should, of course, be realized during the pan-European process, at Helsinki-2; the common European home, as we call it, would be a reliable protection of peace and security and the further development of Europe in the right direction.

[Zorin] These are very important considerations because well, a peace treaty is, of course, a good thing but history has taught us that at times, these peace treaties are nonbinding pieces of paper. In particular, such things have happened in the history of Germany. So that, evidently, on its own treaty is insufficient without some sort of structure.

[Bovin] What do you think, will Germany be a member of NATO? The question of borders, it seems to me, is sufficiently close to being decided positively. The Germans will declare that these are the borders. But as far as NATO is concerned, it seems to me that this is the most

important qustion—how this problem will be resolved. Will it enter NATO or not, and on what conditions, that is the most important and most interesting question.

[Akhromeyev] Yes, as of today, in my opinion there is a clash of interests here, a direct clash. The West is in favor of a united Germany entering NATO, while we say that we do not agree with this, or at least that is how I understand our policy. And, it seems that there is a direct clash of interests here. This means that it is necessary to seek a solution to the question which is acceptable to both sides. And I think that the main direction is to reduce military tension between the two alliances. If, in practice, the military aspects of the two military alliances disappear, are reduced, then there will occur a drawing together of their position is with regard to a unified Germany. If these alliances were political ones and not military-political ones, then in my opinion the question could be resolved relatively easily.

[Zorin] Is that possible?

[Akhromeyev] I think that if both alliances make real efforts towards [Akhromeyev changes thought]—in actual fact this is the inevitable path being followed by us; if we don't resolve this, military confrontation will continue.

[Zorin] The problems of a unified Germany is one of the new problems connected with the subject of our conversation today: the existence of danger for our country or the absence of such danger.

The profound changes taking place within the Warsaw Pact are one more new factor. Well, we'll call a spade a spade. The proceses that are now taking place within the Warsaw Pact are processes that lead to a weakening of its military role. That, at any rate, is how it seems to me. Sergey Fedorovich, what do you think about this?

[Akhromeyev] Valentin Sergeyevich, first, I think that these major changes will somehow or other affect both military alliances and will do so inevitably in the near future. In the world the public has started playing an immense role. If in the west they see that the military threat on the part of the Warsaw Pact is disappearing, the public will make appropriate demands on their government, on their administration, and this needs to be responded to.

But now specifically about the Warsaw Pact. Because I am saying that there, [In the West] the changes can take place but here, [in the Warsaw Pact] they are already taking place. Well, what has taken place?

First, you know that the Warsaw Pact was a treaty not only of states but of socialist states. Previously it had an ideological slant. After all, the head of delegations to the Political Consultative Committee were first secretaries of the corresponding parties. So, this ideological shell, so to speak, has now been removed from the Warsaw Pact. This is now an alliance, a military- political union of states which have certain common state interests. If the state system of our friends there changes, do their state interests, which forced them to unite in the Warsaw Pact, disappear? I doubt this. In most states, these state interests remain intact, and, hence, the objective basis for the Warsaw Pact's existence also remains intact. Look how Poland is now raising the question, let's say, of the future of Germany, of its particpiation in a peace treaty. After all, this matter it relies on certain forces. And Poland is not the only one.

[Zorin] Yes, Czechoslovakia, too, evidently has long-term interests.

[Akhromyev] Yes, (?Of course), but there is a but. There is the GDR, if it is unified—Aleksandr Yevgeniyevich has already raised the question: what then of a United Europe? That is why, indeed, changes are taking place. But I think that the state interests [Akhrorneyev changes thought] and now it is still difficult to even assess these changes—after all, elections are to take place in the next few months in most states. But, as a whole, I think, the objective interests of our allies are such that the Warsaw Pact will remain intact for a certain considerable time to come.

[Zorin] Thank you. Well, the events taking place within in our country have a direct bearing on the subject of our conversation. It is difficult to separate foreign and domestic policy. In the end, the problem of the soundness of the rear has always been regarded as one of the important factors of the defense capability of states and it seems that in the complicated processes that are taking place today in our country; both the interethnic quarrels and the various political negative processes are exerting a quite definite influence on the problem of our country's security. I would like you, Aleksandr Yevgeniyevich, to express your point of view on this matter.

[Bovin] But you have actually formulated the essence of the matter. Of course, and we all understand this perfectly well, the difficulties with perestroyka that are now taking place in our country both in the economic and social sphere and the in the sphere of interethnic relations are undoubtedly having an adverse effect, so to speak, on the structure of our safety, can seriously limit, so to speak, our possibilities of manoeuver in foreign-policy and, on the whole, if one uses the classic political langauge, of course, weaken our authority in the world arena.

And the Americans understand this perfectly well, and not only the Americans, all those who surround us. If one reads the press, scientific (?literature), all understand this perfectly well: that we are in a very complicated situation. But the following is very interesting here: Well, let's put it this way, they hold trump-cards, they are seeing all this, but these very Americans are unable to really use these trump-cards against us, they are unable, because, from their point of view, perestroyka is more important than these trump-cards. They understand perfectly well that if we don't carry through perestroyka, if we return—well, we will not return to the way things

were before—if we don't move on to a new system of historical coordinates, this closed Russia, again a return to concentrated power politics, [opyat vozvrashcheniye k kontsentratsionnoy politike, k silovoy politike] is quite possible again. That is why from their point of view, Gorbachev must not be prevented from pursuing this series of radical reforms, so to speak, which he is pursuing. Of course, men are weak, their temptation is very great. And of course, say, while working on Eastern Europe, both the Americans and the Western Europeans will still try here, so to speak, to separate us from these countries; they will attempt to lead them even further away from the Soviet Union and weaken the influence of communist parties there. But all this is very much being wrapped up, so to speak, in all these polite expressions, is being covered with all kind of wadding, and it s sometimes very difficult to catch a thief red-handed. But, nevertheless, such is the Realpolitik.

[Zorin] I would like to continue your reasoning just a little. The dialectics of the process taking place in the international area, of processes which are undoubtedly positive, is such that there is also a reverse side. Well, actually, such is dialectics. The feeling of military danger, of a military threat—let's speak frankly about this—during several decades to a considerable extent united our society. There was such a real factor. The lessening of the military threat, the feeling by the people that this threat has somehow receded, well, I would put it as follows, has lowered the degree of public vigilance. It seems to me even that certain forces in our society have fallen into a euphoria which is not quite justified. Yes, of course, the military threat has lessened as a result, in particular, of much hard work by our leadership, bold actions. This cannot be denied. But can we really forget, that, say, in the American arsenal—both Sergey Fedorovich and Andrey Afanasyevich already mentioned this today—there are several hundred, say, of intercontinental missiles with nuclear warheads which are on combat alert duty and which are targeted on our towns, on you and me? Whatever you say here, you cannot get away from this reality. You cannot get away from the fact that very great efforts are still needed so that for the changes taking place both in thinking and in politics, an appropriate material base is created. And in these conditions, the loss of the feeling of danger, which has resulted in an increase of irresponsibility of various kinds of the extremist forces, can, in the end, turn against our country as a whole. After all, the security of the Soviet Union as a state, relying in particular on its military might, is also the security of individual regions of our country. It is the security of every Soviet citizen. It is our common security, an indivisible concept and, in my view, this must not be forgotten by those who sometimes pronounce such fine-sounding phrases from various mass meeting rostrums, from the pages of the newspapers, and by those who not infrequently hear them with excessive trustfulness. It must be remembered that the factor of the rear, the factor of the soundness of the rear, is an absolute factor of the country's security.

[Akhromeyev] Valentin Sergeyevich, I would like to return to the question you asked: How is our internal political situation influencing the state of the armed forces? I, personally, am very worried by this question and by several aspects of it. For example, in our TransCarpathian region the people, the population, are objecting to a radar station, part of the missile attack warning system, although, in general, it does not cause any serious harm to the environment. And if it does cause some harm this could be prevented by taking specific measures. But what would it mean if this station was not working? Then, we would not know, we would have no warning of a missile attack. This is a fundamental question of the country's defense capacity.

Or, the question of Semipalatinsk has been raised. It is a serious problem. But if we do not carry out nuclear tests then in 10 years time we shall not have a single nuclear explosive in the USSR. They get old and you cannot do without nuclear tests. If both the United States and ourselves were to put an end to them we would agree today. But if they hold tests then inevitably we need to hold them, as well.

Or take other questions. When we are called a military occupation force. But these are soldiers, sergeants and officers. When they say that you do not have electoral rights in the republic because you are a servicemen. When they will not register wives as residents. When it is difficult for the children of servicemen to get an education. This is not only demeaning but it creates very difficult situation for the families and has an effect on the morale of the officer. I think simply that our society should pay attention to this and that society should give the necessary help to the armed forces.

[Zorin] I am in agreement with virtually everything that you have said, Sergey Fedorovich, with the exception of one point and I cannot hide my disagreement. This is on the question of Semipalatinsk. You are substituting one concept for another. The need for tests while the United States carries out these tests and the problem of safety for people living in that region. If one is speaking about whether or not it is necessary to carry out tests, while we are obliged to do this, then I think that the reply is clear that we must, although it is necessary to struggle to ensure that no-one conducts these tests.

But this mass movement of people, of peace supporters—I work in the Peace Committee and I come into contact with this mass movement—cites very serious facts about the damage to the health of people living in that region. That means that not everything has been done to ensure that leakages of radioactive materials do not present a danger. I am not a specialist in this area but as far as I know in Nevada, for example, the situation is rather better than in the area of Semipalatinsk. That means that not everything has been done. So, to answer the question in this way: Since we must retain our nuclear arsenal and we need it so let Semipalatinsk continue to operate—I am not sure that this is the proper way to answer the question.

[Akhromeyev] Valentin Sergeyevich, today we are not prepared to discuss the question in the way that you have just raised it. I put this request to you: Let us devote another one of your other meetings to this question. And then it will be stated clearly how matters now stand at Semipalatinsk.

[Bovin] Well, there is a more general theme, here. I fully understand your concerns but do you not think that it is the closed nature, that wall of secrecy which has surrounded our army for many years, its expenditures and its problems which has created this real alientation between the army—as some sort of closed-in structure devouring a vast amount of the people's money for heaven knows what—and ordirary people. It seems to me that if the army opened itself up more and said: This is what we are spending money on, so much on tanks for this reason here, so much on this, so much on that. Ant here we have these radar stations. It is no secret to the Americans that there is a station there. They know it very well. It is a secret for us because all of this information cannot be obtained. If there was this openness perhaps it would be easier to resolve these problems which you mention.

[Akhromeyev] Aleksandr Yevgenyevich, you are right. But this concerns all aspects of our society. And time is needed for everything. It is not possible to open everything up in one week or two weeks or even in a year. Work is needed for this.

[Bovin] Many years have already passed.

[Akhromeyev] No. It is a fact that this matter is under way and is proceeding quite rapidly toward openness.

[Bovin] Of course, things have got better.

[Akhromeyev] Therefore, it is now just a matter of time, it is a matter of progress by our society as a whole.

[Zorin] Andrey Afanasyevich, you have just returned from quite a lengthy trip around the United States. I know that you met many quite important and authoritative people in Washington and had conversations with them. I would like to ask you: Are Washington politicians making use or trying to make use in any way of the difficulties which we have spoken about in connection with the prospects of the unification of Germany and in connection with the situation in the Warsaw Pact and in connection with what is happening in our country, and if they are trying to do this, then in what way.

[Kokoshin] This question is resolved, in general, by contention in Washington. Aleksandr Yevgenyevich has already touched upon this theme. Of course, there are people whose palms are itching—and not just itching. They are trying to implement such a policy, to take maximum advantage of our difficulties, to gain as many concessions as possible of any kind for themselves at talking with us, to achieve more predominance in influence in various regions of the world, in particular to increase their influence at our expense in Eastern Europe. Undoubtedly, this line does exist. But in my view it is not the dominant one. There is, at the same time, another line. And the supporters of that line are striving, in particular, to reduce considerably the United Sates's military expenditure, to reduce the scale of military preparations, on the premise that the situation in Europe has changed radically. They raise the question that the administration—and this is a very influential group of U.S. politicians, they do not only raise questions, they then act by force of the right to hold the purse-strings which Congress possesses—that as yet the adiminstration has not responded adequately to the changes in, say, Eastern Europe, to the changes in the USSR's policy and the position of the Warsaw Pact and they demand much more radical reductions in the U.S. Armed Forces and, in general, even a review of the whole U.S. military strategy and military doctrine. In my opinion this is now starting to gain speed.

[Zorin] The time is approaching when we shall have to end our conversation. I think that from what has been said the conclusion is clear, we have a certain consensus here. Largely as a result of the actions of the USSR and its leadership, the danger, the military threat to our country today is considerably, immensely, less than it was some time ago, some years ago although it does remain. But I have one question which I have been keeping under wraps, so to say. The fact that these changes have taken place—changes for the better—the fact that the military threat has decreased is evident. But I would like to ask you, Sergey Fedorovich, whether the point of no return, as it is called, has been passed. That is, is there no possibility—well today things are getting better and better moving toward greater and greater security—that as a result of some external or internal events everything will go backward and we shall return to that unhappy time which we experienced five or six years ago. So, has this point of no return been passed, are these processes irreversible or not, in you opinion.

[Akhromeyev] Well, Valentin Sergeyevich, you are asking me this question but there are four of us sitting here and no doubt each will have his own reply to that question. Indeed, well my opinion is this: There are two sides, there is politics and there are those things which follow behind it—military doctrine and real military actions. Politics always goes ahead. When it is good it goes ahead and even everything changes after it, including everything in the military sphere. And when it is bad, too, politics also goes on ahead and the military follows along behind.

So if today one considers it from the point of view of politics and from the point of view of interaction between states and state leaders it may be the case that we have already achieved a peak. But the military—I don't want to praise myself here while criticizing the other side; it must be both sides—they are still lingering behind. But if one is to speak concretely I still think it is the U.S. and the NATO military that are lingering behind, because while the politics have moved ahead the doctrines have not changed. Because they still operate

with all those doctrines that were in use before 1985. Whereas we have introduced a new doctrine.

This is why I think that if we manage to conclude an agreement in Vienna on reducing armed forces in Europe—and in all probability we shall manage to—and if on top of that we manage to conclude an agreement on reducing strategic offensive weapons by 50 percent then we would reach a peak point. And when we started reducing those forces we would probably pass that peak. Let us hope for the better.

[Zorin] All right. Andrey Afanasyevich, what do you think?

[Kokoshin] I would like to add something. I think I would not agree with the thesis of Sergey Fedorovich that...

[Zorin], interrupting] I don't know why we have all turned against Sergey Fedorovich today.

[Kokoshin, continuing]... that the military always trail behind politics. The outstanding Russian and Soviet military theorist Svechin once said—very well, I think—that strategy always seeks to emancipate itself from bad politics, and history teaches us that military strategy on quite a few occasions would start living a life of its own, even to overtake politics and impose on them some rules of behavior. This places particular responsibility on politics: Politics must be sensible, wise, and profoundly thought out. Then it really shows, demonstrates, and defines proper guidelines for strategy. If such politics are missing then with the existence of an indeed great military power and without the necessary progress in the field of arms limitation and disarmament there is unfortunately the danger that the military factor will loom large once again in international relations. And in fact if we consider international relations as a whole we'll see that in the so called Third World military power unfortunately continues to play a very big and too active a role. The number of armed conflicts there—both external, between states, and internal—is scarcely diminishing. And there is no guarantee whatsoever that the conflicts unfolding there will not spread to the so-called North as well, where from the point of view of the role of the military factor the situation at present if certainly considerably more positive and calm than it has been for years.

This is why if one is to look ahead I would first and foremost like to see the correlation between politics and strategy, as Sergey Fedorovich has described it, be preserved forever, but for that one really needs thought-out politics that set real and well-defined tasks for strategy and that there should always be that perennial subordination and correlation between politics and strategy, and correspondingly of course, movement ahead in the positive sense on the military and political front.

[Zorin] Aleksandr Yevgenyevich, what's your opinion on whether we have or have not passed turning point?

[Bovin] I don't think we have, yet. And I think that the most important factor in world politics now—strange as it may seem—is our perestroyka. If and when we really manage it then one will definitely be able to say that we have passed the turning point and the lessening of tension will gain a firm hold at least in the North; that it will gain a firm hold and there will be no sliding back. Until this happens inside our country I am not so... I cannot tell... I am not sure that we have passed the turning point—until it has been passed inside the country.

[Zorin] Well, I think although we have not exhausted all the aspects of the problem we were discussing—Sergey Fedorovich has suggested we might continue this conversation one day. I think we'll soon have collected new material and we shall indeed continue it—but I now wish to thank the participants of our talk and our viewers. Thank you.

Scientific

Cosmonaut Says Heat Insulation Damage No Threat

LD0903203490

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1600 GMT on 9 March carries a three-minute communications session with the Mir space complex conducted by presenter Vladimir Bezyayev.

Bezyayev asks cosmonauts Anatoliy Solovyev and Aleksandr Balandin what a holiday means for them. The cosmonauts reply that they always have plenty of work to do, especially since a transport spacecraft arrived only recently and needs to be unloaded. However, they are not experiencing any stress.

Bezyayev then asks: "You have said that there are no stresses. But here there was a most serious stress for everybody when redocking took place and they saw that the protective skin of the ship had become dislodged and was dangling. Does a threat to your health not arise in connection with this, a threat to the orbital station? And, generally, how do you evaluate this situation?"

One of the cosmonauts replies: "This is a situation which generally requires attention, of course. But it probably is not all that serious. Personally for us, no extra burden or stress is arising. Probably it means extra work for Flight Control Center [FCC], because it is necessary to orient the entire installation in such a way that the ship—and the part of it on which the vacuum-shield heat insulation became dislodged—does not get too warm or too cold. Therefore, the corresponding orientation is required. This task befalls the FCC. There are no other specifics for us. I think that we perceived this as already accomplished, so there are no particular anxieties for us. Maybe, there simply will be some extra work for us".

Bezyayev asks: "But, in principle, one cannot exclude the variant that you will have to do a space walk? Is that so?"

The same cosmonaut responds: "We are prepared for that work. Therefore, there is nothing too special about that either."

Providing background information in the studio, Bezyayev says: "I will tell you immediately that such situations have already arisen in orbit for U.S. astronauts and were resolved successfully. But now Anatoliy Solovyev and Aleksandr Balandin have started one most interesting biological experiment, which we will tell you about in detail in the next few days. And in two days time, the second month of flight for Anatoliy Solovyev and Aleksandr Balandin will begin."

Space Cooperation Plans Given to UN Committee

LD1003110990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2239 GMT 9 Mar 90

[Excerpt] UN, 10 March (TASS)—A session of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space ended on 9 March at the UN Headquarters in New York. Those present devoted considerable attention to preparations for the International Year of Space in 1992. In this connection, the Soviet delegation presented a wide-ranging program for cooperation with a number of countries.

Specificially, the Soviet Union proposes to launch a special module, "Priroda" [Nature], and to dock it with the "Mir" manned space station. The module will be equipped with apparatus for studying the terrestrial atmosphere and its pollution, the state of the World Ocean and water pollution, and the processes from which cyclones originate, and for studying the planet's forests. It is also intended to conduct on board the "Mir" space station in 1991-92 scientific experiments devised by young scientists and students in the developing countries, and also to carry out space photography of the territory of several developing states (two-three in each region) and to hand over to them, free of charge, the material obtained. The USSR's proposal to launch space devices belonging to other countries and to international organizations on mutually acceptable terms is also an important direction of cooperation in space. [passage omitted].

Details of Satellite Broadcasts To Be Published

PM0903125790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[I. Butin report: "Select a... Satellite"]

[Text] The magazine VESTNIK SVYAZI [Communications Bulletin] is preparing to publish a book "Satellite Television Reception" [priyem televideniya so sputnikov] as a supplement.

The book will acquaint readers with the current state of satellite television and sound broadcasting, transmission and reception methods, and the main parameters of satellite television broadcasting systems—both existing ones and those in the pipeline.

Plant Produces Satellite Navigation Equipment

LD1203093990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0930 GMT 11 Mar 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Summary] Our Udmurt correspondent reports on the output of Izhevsk radio plant, which previously was received only by restricted departments but is now intended for the most varied type of specialists.

[Begin correspondent recording] It would seem that the first steps have been taken. Judge for yourselves. Journalists' cameras have never previously operated in this workshop of the Izhevsk radio plant association, although we have visited the enterprise several times.

You see before you a compact complex of satellite navigational equipment. Specialists assess it as being up to world standards. At any moment a navigator may determine the coordinates of his ship to within a few meters and stay precisely on course. Now the new Izhevsk complex may be used not just by the Navy but also by the crews of ships belonging to other departments. [video shows various elements of the satellite-navigational equipment, designated "ADK-4M"]

Another item of equipment developed in Izhevsk is a telemetric system of gathering information. It could become a dependable assistant for drivers, rail workers, aviators, and seamen. The accuracy and up-to-date nature of the telemetric information are, as they say, guaranteed. Moreover the equipment may also be used to monitor the condition of patients. [video shows telemetric information equipment with display showing the words "dangerous hurricane"]

Other products of the association includes the most diverse types of household stereophonic equipment, a personal computer, electronic equipment for Jacquard textile looms, and various types of medical apparatus. [video shows stereophonic and other equipment]

The association's present plan for output of goods has been increased by almost R20 million. [end recording]

Military

Yazov Calls National Army Units 'Unacceptable'

PM1203111390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Interview with USSR Defense Minister Army General D. Yazov by N. Burbyga; date, place not specified: "Spring Draft"]

[Text] [Burbyga] What is special about this year's draft into the Army, in your view, Dmitriy Timofeyevich?

[Yazov] It coincides with an important, crucial stage of perestroyka, in which the republican and local soviets are undergoing a change of personnel, preparations are being made for the 28th CPSU Congress, and the Communist Youth League [Komsomol] is being transformed. Perestroyka has embraced the personnel and structure of the Armed Forces and their training. The democratization of Army and Navy life is intensifying. Naturally, all these processes are having a beneficial effect on the spring draft. But there are some negative features, unfortunately. They are due to the fact that in the Baltic and Transcaucasian republics, in Moldavia, and in some parts of the Ukraine a number of informal organizations and nationalist, extremist groupings are trying to obstruct and, if they can, wreck the draft.

[Burbyga] But the country has a Constitution and there is a USSR Law "On Universal Liability for Military Service." How are those whose job it is to protect the law reacting to the events?

[Yazov] Unfortunately, the informal organizations' unconstitutional actions are rarely treated in the proper way by republican and local soviet and law-enforcement organs. Moreover, in some places people have been trying to create a "legal" foundation for these actions of late.

For example, the Baltic republics' Supreme Soviets have adopted or are preparing to adopt legislative acts intended to establish the "illegality" of the presence of Baltic Military District troops on the republics' territory and of actual service in the "occupying" Soviet Army. On 14 February a resolution was adopted in Lithuania "On the Status of the USSR Armed Forces in the Republic and Military Service by Citizens of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR]"; on 1 March a law was adopted in Latvia "On Alternative (Labor) Service by Latvian SSR Citizens"; on 6 December last year a resolution was adopted in Estonia "On the Procedure for the Performance of Military Service by Estonian SSR Citizens." All these acts contradict the USSR Constitution and interfere in an area that is the sole preserve of union organs. However, citing them, local organs of power in the Baltic republics are refusing to assist military commissariats or to participate in organizing and conducting measures connected with the spring draft.

In this situation anti-Army propaganda has been stepped up by informal organizations, in particular organizations such as "Geneva-49," the "Women's League" now active in all the Baltic republics, or the new Latvian "Cross of Fire" organization. They are inciting young people to refuse to serve, to desert, and to destroy military registration documents or return them to military commissariats and the USSR Defense Ministry. The anti-Army actions are accompanied by threats of physical violence and abuse against servicemen and military commissariat staff. I think that a principled political assessment is needed from the Supreme Soviet and Congress of USSR People's Deputies of all forms of unconstitutional activity in the sphere of the country's defense and security.

[Burbyga] Are attempts being made to obstruct the draft in other parts of the country?

[Yazov] Unfortunately, yes. For example, in the Ukraine, in Lvov, the so-called "Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth" (SNUM) is very active. Its ultranationalist platform is expressed in its dedication to the "ideals" and aims of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists [OUN], which was a profascist, anti-Soviet political group—and the armed gangs of the Ukrainian Rebel Army [UPA], which the OUN set up at the request of Hitler's special services and which were fully equipped by them. I would like to point out that in the 1944-53 period alone, UPA thugs killed 30,000 Soviet civilians and more than 20,000 servicemen died in the struggle against the gangs. They murdered Army General N.F. Vatutin, commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, and Soviet intelligence officer N. Kuznetsov....

SNUM "activists" are now brandishing slogans like "Glory to the UPA soldiers," they are demanding the creation of a "Ukrainian national army" and a "Ukrainian defense ministry" and the withdrawal of the "occupying Army," as they call the Soviet Armed Forces. They are urging people to refuse to serve in them and, like the Baltic "Geneva-49," they are promising "protection" for all who surrender their registration documents.

In Kishinev the "National Guard" informal organization is urging young Moldavians to declare their unwillingness to serve in the Soviet Army. In Tbilisi the congress of the "Georgian Social Democratic Party" adopted a program, the military part of which contains, in particular, demands for the creation of a "national defense ministry" and compulsory military service for young Georgians locally, in the "reconstituted national armed forces." The leaders of informal movements and organizations with various names and of various sizes, but of the same nationalist hue, are openly urging a boycott of service in the Soviet Army. Nationalist, extremist members of the Azerbaijan People's Front and the Armenian Liberation Movement are demanding that conscripts from those republics should do their service only on their "own" territory and calling for the creation of "national armies."

The anti-Army actions by informal organizations and movements in various parts of the country are clearly coordinated and the similarity of their demands and methods is obvious. They use the selfsame methods—from lies, slander, intimidation, and blackmail of draftees and their parents to attempted physical violence against those who do not respond to their provocations.

[Burbyga] But how effective are the attempts to obstruct the draft?

[Yazov] Judge for yourself. Last fall more than 66,500 people dodged the draft in the country as a whole. I think

this was due not only to the informal organizations but also to many of the media which, with a zeal that might be better applied, are "debunking" the Armed Forces' past and present and trotting out statements to the effect that the danger of war "no longer exists," that consequently our country "does not need" an Army, that universal obligation to do military service is unacceptable in a "civilized society," and that hence military duty is "pointless." A vacuum has been deliberately created around such concepts as patriotism, internationalism, and military valor...

[Burbyga] Recent events in the Transcaucasus have also led to the phenomenon whereby servicemen from that region's indigenous nationalities have gone AWOL from their units. The leaders of some informal movements are demanding that law-enforcement bodies stop instituting criminal proceedings against them. What is your attitude to that?

[Yazov] It is a most flagrant breach of the military oath of allegiance and a military crime. Anyone who has done this must be held responsible for it as prescribed by law.

[Burbyga] What role do nonregulation relations play in draft evasion?

[Yazov] Increasingly frequent attempts have been made of late to use nonregulation relations, which have, unfortunately, not yet been eradicated from the Army and Navy, as a cover for the illegal actions and far-reaching political aims pursued by the leaders of some informal organizations. Last year, for instance, 40 cases of Lithuanian servicemen willfully leaving their troop units, allegedly owing to nonregulation relations, were thoroughly checked out. This only proved substantiated in five cases. Regrettably, deserters are protected from just punishment by being sheltered and often housed in psychiatric hospitals or in hospitals treating infectious diseases, malicious rumors are spread about imaginary victims of "hazing," and attempts are made to obstruct the actions of law-enforcement bodies.

[Burbyga] A number of republics are currently demanding a change in the procedure for performing service, particularly through the creation of national formations. What would you say on this subject?

[Yazov] People in the Baltic republics are certainly exaggerating the idea of "unacceptable" conditions of service for young men from the indigenous nationalities outside the region. Last fall in Azerbaijan the draft commissions were issued with an ultimatum—either guarantee Azerbaijanis' complete safety during their service or no conscript will leave the republic's territory. Hence the progression to the "need" to create "national formations," and then their own "national armies" and the other military structures with which those currently straining for power link the realization of their selfish political aims.

That is the political backdrop to the question. From the strictly military viewpoint, national formations are unacceptable: They cannot ensure the country's real defense needs.

[Burbyga] Dmitriy Timofeyevich, questions of calling on people liable to military service to attend various training sessions are also associated with the draft. How will they be resolved in conditions of economic reform, the broadening of the cooperative movement, and the republics' transition to economic accountability?

[Yazov] The fact that these questions have arisen is, obviously, due to some lack of coordination in the legislative acts which determine the remuneration procedure with regard to expenditure associated with the draft. The Defense Ministry has submitted its proposals on the procedure for financing training sessions to the USSR Supreme Soviet, the Council of Ministers, the State Planning Committee, and the USSR Ministry of Finance. I think that a decision on these questions to suit everyone will be adopted in the near future.

[Burbyga] Reductions in the Armed Forces are continuing, while the internal troops are being reinforced at the same time. Will the Army and Navy not be weakened as a result of this?

[Yazov] The question must obviously be divided up, since it combines two matters of different scale, significance, and dimension.

First let me say something about the reductions. They are certainly embracing such major troop contingents and such a significant range of diverse arms that they cannot fail to affect Army and Navy combat readiness and combat capability. We are naturally taking this into consideration. The combat readiness and combat capability of the Armed Forces are being maintained at the requisite, sufficient level by the implementation of a whole series of measures, above all to intensify and enhance the quality of the training provided for military cadres and all personnel, improve troops' equipment, and reinforce organization and discipline.

I will now deal with the second part of your question. With the strengthening of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] internal troops and their transfer to a professional basis, it will no longer be necessary to involve Army units in resolving the tasks of stabilizing the situation in various parts of the country, as is currently the case. This will allow the Army and Navy to apply more effort to tackling their own job of ensuring supreme, constant readiness to defend the motherland.

[Burbyga] Why do conscripts from Central Asia, say, serve in the Far North, while conscripts from up there serve in hot areas?

[Yazov] True, you may encounter conscripts from Central Asia, and, what is more, from the central areas of Russia, the Ukraine, and Belorussia, and from the Baltic and Transcaucasian republics in the Far North and in

other regions of the country. Yet you will hardly find conscripts "from there," that is from the Far North, in "hot areas." The point is that draft resources are limited in the Far North—and you will see from the map that it stretches a very long way—and the Transbaykal, yet troops and naval forces are required there owing to operational and strategic conditions. Thus the redistribution of draft resources is dictated by defense needs.

[Burbyga] There have recently been proposals to announce the draft not by a defense minister's decree but, say, by a USSR Supreme Soviet resolution. What do you think of that?

[Yazov] I am in favor of it. The Defense Ministry has been proposing this for a long time. After all, drafting people for active military service concerns not only the Army and Navy but also border, internal, and railroad troops, which are not part of the Armed Forces. What about the draft commissions? They comprise representatives of soviet, party, and economic bodies. As a whole, as we have already said, the draft directly affects the work of many labor collectives and public organizations. So it would be right to implement the draft via a USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decree. We have elaborated and submitted corresponding proposals on this question regarding changes to the USSR Law "On Universal Liability for Military Service."

Baltic Republics

Opening of Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Noted

LD1003205690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 10 Mar 90

[Text] The first session of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic began work late this evening in the Lithuanian capital. TASS correspondent Kazis Uscila reports that the republic's new legislature is beginning its activities with its composition as yet incomplete. Even though elections were held in great haste, by the time the session opened only 131 out of 141 deputies had been elected and registered by the republican electoral commission. Repeat elections have been held in two constituencies on the very day of the session's opening. In eight constituencies the members of the republic's highest legislative body will be elected at repeat elections set for 7 April.

The presidium of the republic's Supreme Soviet that has functioned hitherto proposed that organizational questions be examined at the first session: Namely, electing a credentials commission and recognizing deputies' authority; establishing procedures for elections and for removing chairmen of the Supreme Soviet from office; electing parliamentary leaders; and ratifying the Council of Ministers and appointing a new chairman of the Council of Ministers.

Speaking on republican television and radio, however, the leaders of the Sajudis public movement—which has already won two-thirds of the seats in the new parliament—have declared their intention to seek to have the question of the republic's political status examined as early as 11 March. The agenda for the session is to be adopted by the deputies themselves.

The session will continue its work tomorrow.

Landsbergis Gives Independence Declaration

LD1103161890 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1512 GMT 11 Mar 90

[Declaration read by Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, at the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet session in Vilnius—live]

[Text] As determined by the Lithuanian nation, the independent Lithuanian state, proclaimed on 16 February 1918, [word indistinct] the resolution of the Constituent Seimas of 15 May 1920, and the Constitution of the Lithuanian state of 1922, became a full member of the world community of nations. Up to 14 June 1940, it expressed the sovereign will of the people. [passage indistinct] On 15 June 1940 the Soviet Union, through coercion and aggression, restricted the nation's sovereign will and illegally incorporated Lithuania into the USSR. [passage indistinct] The use of the structures of a foreign state imposed on Lithuania should not be interpreted as [words indistinct] of sovereignty of the Lithuanian people or the recognition of the annexation carried out by that state.

During the election on 24 February 1990 to the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, the people of Lithuania, having the right of election, by their own will granted a mandate to the representatives of the people and obliged them to restore the Lithuanian state and to express the nation's sovereign will through this Supreme Soviet, which from 1713 on 11 March 1990 will be called the Lithuanian Supreme Council [taryba].

Explains Statement

LD0903185190 Vilnius Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 9 Mar 90

[Interview with Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Sajudis Seimas Council, USSR people's deputy and Lithuanian Supreme Soviet deputy, by correspondent Eduard Kosoborskiy in the Vilnius studio; date not given—live or recorded]

[Text] [Kosoborskiy] Esteemed chairman, you have just made a statement. What did you feel, sitting here in our studio?

[Landsbergis] I made the statement because I thought it was necessary to say something to people who recently have been, I would say, intimidated and who have, as is natural, anxieties and doubts as a result. I felt this, I consulted my colleagues in the Sajudis, I consulted Lithuanian Communist Party leaders. We concluded that such a statement was necessary at this time, that it was essential to explain not only the rumors which have been spread, but also the open forms of pressure on social consciousness in Lithuania in the form of well known demands which would be addressed to Lithuania in the event it constituted itself as an independent state.

[Kosoborskiy] You have in mind Algirdas Brazauskas' statement on Lithuanian television?

[Landsbergis] I have in mind both Algirdas Brazauskas' statement in which he dwelt on his conversation with Mikhail Gorbachev, and at the same time correspondent Kapelyushnyy dispatch published in IZVESTIYA who had all the figures which, apparently, were on Mikhail Gorbachev's desk during this conversation. Since discussions take place on such a level, people may consider this a very serious warning. But in my opinion this is rather a policy than the real future. This is a policy for today because for a really serious international future it is groundless to pose the question in this way. I have already said this in my statement and I do not wish to repeat it.

[Kosoborskiy] I would like to ask you about rumors that the Sajudis people's deputies will not take part in the third extraordinary congress.

[Landsbergis] Perhaps they will not take part at all, or perhaps they will make a symbolic appearance, such as during the election of the president of the Soviet Union. But it is obvious to them that they cannot, being Lithuania's representatives, elect another state's president.

[Kosoborskiy] You referred today to the information of IZVESTIYA correspondent Kabelyusnyy, which was published earlier, and today IZVESTIYA has published information by Kapelyushnyy in which he suggests that if all administrative and legal bodies are depoliticized, then it would be necessary to look for experts elsewhere.

[Landsbergis] As far as Ozolas is concerned, I can only say that, in my opinion, he did not leave the ranks of the Lithuanian Communist Party, but only suspended his participation or left the leadership. First of all, as far as depoliticization of institutions linked with law and public order is concerned, this is an essential principle adopted in all democratic countries because people must be absolutely [words indistinct], not belonging to political groups. I do not know whether these officials must leave any party or whether it is sufficient for them to postpone their active participation in the party [words indistinct].

[Kosoborskiy] We are talking together at the beginning of spring. What about you, is it spring for you?

[Landsbergis] Spring is [word indistinct] word. In my case it is a working day—obviously a spring day. Whether the sun is shining or whether it is cloudy, it does not matter. We are working, working hard and our work is progressing rather well.

[Kosoborskiy] Thank you very much.

Comments on Independence

LD0903174990 Vilnius Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 9 Mar 90

[Statement by Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Sajudis Seimas Council, and member of the USSR Congress of Peoples Deputies and Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet, on 9 March in Vilnius—recorded]

[Text] Esteemed comrades. I would like to say a few words to the present and future citizens of Lithuania.

Lithuania, the country where you live and where we all live, has now entered the stage of legislative self-determination. Lithuania has made a decision to become once again an independent democratic state. This idea does not appeal to everyone. The preservation of as much as possible of the huge empire with all its conquests, including Lithuania, is regarded by some as something of the most enormous value. It does not matter if poverty, destitution, and disintegration are prevailing everywhere. Let the injustice flourish, because they all feel so imporatant and great in this huge country.

Yet, this country is also moving toward self-determination. Will this country be able to live in truth and not by lies? Will this country be able to strive for justice in international relations as well? The most simple-minded people who live here and over there simply do not like the idea of the possible loss of their posts as bosses and the privileges these posts provide. They do not need any changes, and especially not on such a large scale.

However, Lithuania cannot be stopped now. Of course, it can be stopped by force. However, the times have changed and so has the leadership of the Soviet Union, which now wants the country, the USSR, to have the trust of today's world.

Yet, nevertheless, such weapons as intimidation and instigation are used. We have already seen and perhaps you have also experienced for yourselves how [words indistinct], how people are being intimidated: people would be offended, people would be driven out, certain property would be confiscated. And who knows; perhaps a certain part has already been intimidated and has believed it all.

Democratic Lithuania wants to be a homeland for all its citizens regardless of their nationality. Lithuania is not going to drive anyone out and no one is going to be offended. People are intimidated by possible unemployment, by a possible economic blockade. What can be said to this?

It is inconceivable that the Soviet Union, through its present leadership, would start smothering Lithuania in this way [words indistinct] There is no doubt that attempts are being made to scare us. Attempts to intimidate or instigate are also made by discussing the possible alteration of borders and the annexation of territory from Lithuania. Maybe some advisers have palmed off the so-called arguments on M. Gorbachev; by the way, they palmed off the stuff on correspondent Kapelyushin so this material is made public in the media. Klaipeda, Druskininkai are mentioned in this material. Perhaps some people may be intimidated [words indistinct] This does not have any basis or future. This is a method of political and psychological pressure so that perhaps some people may get worked up in one direction and others in another.

And why doesn't it have either basis or future? To this we can simply say that if the Soviet Union regards the occupation of the Klaipeda region by Hitler in 1939 as a lawful act, then the Soviet Union is embarking on a very dangerous international policy so that, who knows, looking from the viewpoint of the Soviet Union the occupation of western and later the entire territory of Czechoslovakia and the occupation of Austria would become legal acts. [passage indistinct]

It is true that when Stalin and Hitler became friends shameful deals were made. However, the Soviet Union is dissociating itself from all of these. Why, then, should Hitler's idea and his pretensions to Klaipeda be supported so that now similar pretensions can be made by the Soviet Union.

This political situation compromises the Soviet Union, maybe even intentionally slipped [words indistinct]. On the other hand, since we know the meaning of the Helsinki agreements and the concluding act of the Helsinki conference where the principle of the inviolability of the present borders is consolidated, how would the Soviet Union look if it seriously started to be the first to make claims to the borders of Lithuania? Obviously, none of this is seriously being considered. It is a part of the psychological warfare on the eve of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet session.

I would like to advise all people of goodwill, all possible citizens of Lithuania whom we welcome. You should not work against Lithuania. You should not succumb to incitement against [words indistinct]. We must live together; we must be friendly. We remember how in 1920 the Soviet Government, the Lenin government, signed a peace treaty with Lithuania and not only defined the borders between the states futher to the east than the present borders, recognizing these lands as Lithuanian, but most importangly, treated Lithuania as a neighbor who should be helped and with whom good-neighborly relations would be desirable. At that time the Soviet Union paid postwar reparations to Lithuania and helped Lithuania stand on its feet. And these good-neighbourly relations continued right up to Stalin's crime in 1939-1940.

It is desirable to return to such relations and continue their tradition. Claims for payments by Lithuania to a state that has come with coercion are groundless. Never before has an aggressor demanded ransom of its victim. This is, at least, a misunderstanding and, of course, a card in the political game that will be put aside soon when Lithuania and the Soviet Union start normal political negotiations on the settlement of mutual relations.

Landsbergis Elected Chairman of Supreme Soviet

AU1103140790 Paris AFP in English 1355 GMT 11 Mar 90

[Text] Vilnius, Soviet Union, March 11 (AFP)—Lithuanian nationalist leader Vytautas Landsbergis was on Sunday elected chairman of the republic's Supreme Soviet, a position equivalent to head of state. An AFP correspondent in the Lithuanian parliament said that Mr. Landsbergis, 58, leader of the Sajudis movement, received 91 votes for and 42 against.

His opponent, Algirdas Brazauskas, first secretary of the independent communist party of Lithuania and outgoing chairman of the Supreme Soviet, received 38 votes for and 95 against.

Landsbergis Presents Platform

LD1103132790 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0947 GMT 11 Mar 90

[Speech by Vytautas Landsbergis, candidate for Lithuanian Supreme Soviet chairman, delivered at Lithuanian Supreme Soviet session in Vilnius—live]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] There are moments when I have to describe my program when a task to be solved is specified. My program is not my personal program. I could point to the election platform of Sajudis [Lithuanian Movement for Restructuring] or perhaps I could point to Sajudis itself and to the very essence of Sajudis. [passage omitted] Our common goal is to restore our society, our state, and carry on establishing it. [passage omitted] I feel I cam make a contribution here. I feel I am a part of our common cause. I can contribute in many ways. If you decide today that I am needed as chairman of the Supreme Soviet, I will make my contribution in this way. [passage omitted] I would like to strive for concord among various groups of people and political forces in Lithuania, among nationalities in Lithuania, between Lithuania and its neighbors. [passage omitted]

Brazauskas Presents Platform

LD1103134490 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0901 GMT 11 Mar 90

[Speech by Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Chairman Algirdas Brazauskas, delivered at the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet session in Vilnius—live]

[Excerpts] Esteemed chairman, esteemed deputies. We are solving today very complex problems, and, of course, a great deal will depend on the person who will be elected to be chairman, on his actions and thinking, in the future events in Lithuania. [passage omitted] The restoration of an independent Lithuania is the basic and most urgent task. This is recognized by the whole of Lithuania, this is recognized by all parties, including the Communist Party. [passage omitted] I think that the way toward independence must be well considered.

I understand that Lithuania's independence, announced on 16 February 1918, and repeated in 1920 in the Constituent Sejmas, was an historical act. This act has not been abolished. It is valid today. Therefore we have the right to base ourselves on this historical date and to plan Lithuania's political way toward genuine independence. [passage omitted]

Another problem is the status of the Soviet Army garrisons in Lithuania. This is a very delicate problem. It agitates our people, and we understand this. I imagine that on the basis of international law, a gradual reduction—bearing in mind the status of the neutral Lithuanian state—this problem could be solved by way of mutual negotiations. [passage omitted]

I would like to state that one of the most complex and important problems is the problem of the economy. [passage omitted] I imagine that for us, the problem concerning our neighbors is very important. You will agree, esteemed deputies, that all people wish to live well with their neighbors. [passage omitted] I hope that in the future, Lithuania will endeavor to live with its neighbors peacefully, while enjoying mutual advantage and supporting each other. [passage omitted]

I understand that independence is not yet a democracy. Therefore, to my mind, the basis of sovereignty is the matter of the sovereignty of each citizen, each Lithuanian. I think that this state sovereignty must be based on this human basis, on the sovereignty of our citizens. [passage omitted] I am a supporter of the real consolidation of sovereignty, because its political consolidation is insufficient. I think that it must be built in conjunction with firm economic foundations. [passage omitted] We must work very hard to consolidate economic sovereignty. [passage omitted] Today it is impossible to ignore the economic situation and economic relations. [passage omitted]

We must all unite in this parliament, regardless of which party we belong to, because this political system is still being created in our society, still gaining traditions, and in this very responsible period of time for Lithuania we must be united.

Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Proceedings Viewed

LD1103195890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 11 Mar 90

[Text] The Lithuanian Supreme Soviet session is continuing its work. Our correspondent Elyana Kurkletite reports:

[Kurkletite] I will remind you that 133 deputies have been elected, while there are a total of 141 mandates. Those elected included 70 nonparty people; 63 deputies from various parties, including 40 from the Lithuanian Communist Party; nine Social Democrats; five members of the Lithuanian Communist Party on the CPSU Platform; four from the Green Party of Lithuania; three from the Democrats; and two deputies from the Christian Democratic Party of Lithuania. The majority of the deputies elected by the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet were supported by Sajudis in the election campaign.

The most heated debates were engendered today by the candidatures for the post of chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet. Two candidatures were discussed—that of Algirdas Brazauskas, who has held the post of chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium for the last two months and who is first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, and that of Vitautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Sejm Council of Sajudis. Both candidates for the post of chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet expounded their programs, which did not differ on the main issue: The restoration of independence of the Lithuanian state. They diverged only on the paths necessary for achieving this goal. Algirdas Brazauskas spoke in favor of a more considered, balanced path in which the main role would be played by negotiations with the USSR Government, a path on which economic ties with other republics would not be broken. Vitautas Landsbergis went as far as favoring USSR People's Deputies from Lithuania renouncing their mandates.

Academician Vitautas Statulievicius, an elder of the USSR People's Deputies, said that the majority of USSR People's Deputies who were polled favor going to the third Congress of USSR People's Deputies which opens tomorrow. He expressed disbelief that this issue had been debated by a small number of Sajudis Deputies without the participation of the majority, and even without the elder.

In recent days the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has received some 100,000 letters and telegrams, including collective letters from workers' collectives and the inhabitants of entire rayons, which propose that a referendum be declared and that general elections for the president of the republic be set.

Lithuania Adopts Name Change

LD1203084890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0610 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Text] [Presenter] Yesterday a number of important documents were adopted at the first session of the 12th Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Repubic [SSR] Supreme Soviet. In bulletins and the latest news we reported this, but today we would like to acquaint our listeners in more detail with these documents and the session's work. And so over live to Vilnius to our correspondent, Elyana Kurkletite. We are listening to you, Elyana.

[Kurkletite] Yes, yesterday I reported several times on the first session's work, but I will remind our listeners once more that the most heated issue was the discussion of the two candidates for the post of the republic Supreme Soviet chairman: the leader of the Lithuanian communists, Algirdas Brazauskas, and Vytautas Landsbergis. Both candidates put forward their platforms and answered many questions from deputies. By a majority of votes Vytautas Landsbergis was elected chairman of the republic's Supreme Soviet. Of the 133 deputies 91 voted for him, and 28 for Algirdas Brazauskas.

[Presenter] Elyana, if you could, tell our listeners something about the new chairman.

[Kurkletite] Vytautas Landsbergis is a musicologist; he lectures in the conservatory, he is a professor and heads the Lithuanian movement for perestroyka. He is the chairman of the Sajudis Seimas Council. I will also remind our listeners that 133 deputies have been elected to the 141 seats in the republic's Supreme Soviet, the

majority of whom supported Sajudis in the election campaign, and that Lithuanian communists are in a minority in the parliament.

[Presenter] And if you could, tell us in more detail about those documents that were adopted yesterday.

[Kurkletite] Well, in the first place there was the declaration on the authority of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet's deputies.

[Presenter] What would you single out as the most important thing in that document?

[Kurkletite] The declaration says that an elected deputy of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet has been entrusted with the mandate as representative of the people, and is duty bound to restore the state of Lithuania and express the sovereign will of the people of Lithuania through the current Supreme Soviet, which they did yesterday.

The session also adopted the law on the name of the state and the coat of arms. This law decrees that the constitution and other laws use a single official name of the state: "The Republic of Lithuania." the abbreviated and compound name is Lithuania. From now on the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet will be called the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Lithuania, and the office of the chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet will be called the office of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Lithuania.

This law also decrees that in future the official state coat of arms and the symbol of the republic of Lithuania will be a portrayal of a vytis, the symbol of pursuit ["vytis" means either pursuit or knight].

And further, and probably the most important, document is the act of the restoration of an independent Lithuanian state, which says that, expressing the people's will, the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Lithuania decrees and ceremoniously proclaims the restoration of the realization of the sovereign rights of the Lithuanian state, encroached on by alien forces in 1940. Further the text of this document says that the 16 February 1918 act of the Lithuanian Taryba on independence, and the resolution of the constituent Sejmas on the renewal of a democratic Lithuanian state were never rescinded. They remain in full force and are the constitutional basis for the Lithuanian state.

The territory of Lithuania is corporeal and indivisible, and on it no constitution of any other state is in force. The Lithuanian state guarantees human and civil rights of national associations, and it recognizes the principle of the inviolability of the borders formed in the final act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975.

Yesterday the session finished at midnight, and it is possible that some words of the documents I have mentioned have not been translated from Lithuanian into Russian with absolute precision. I think that all these documents will be published in the press, and it will be possible to be more precise. But such is their essence.

[Presenter] Elyana, so which constitution is now in force in Lithuania?

[Kurkletite] The session adopted the law of the Republic of Lithuania on the restoration of the validity of the Lithuanian Constitution of 12 May 1938, while discontinuing the validity of certain articles of that Constitution. This is more a symbolic act, since at the same time a law has been adopted on a temporary fundamental law for the Republic of Lithuania, taking into consideration the political, economic, and public relations that have changed since 1938. The temporary fundamental law will also be worked on further. These are the basic documents adopted yesterday at the first session of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Lithuania, and today the session will continue its work.

Moscow TV on Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Session

LD1103205690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 11 Mar 90

[Report by correspondent A. Paulyus in Vilnius on the 11 March session of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet; from the "Vremya" newscast—recorded]

[Text] Even this morning, a few hundred people gathered before the start of the meeting in the square outside the building of the Supreme Soviet. [video shows crowd outside building carrying flags and placards]

On the placards are inscribed the words: For a coalition without communists, Lithuania has no future with the Lithuanian Communist Party, and so on.

Those gatnered were chanting Landsbergis, Landsbergis, and in so doing evidently proposing the candidacy of the leader of Sajudis for the post of chairman of the Supreme Soviet. [video shows session in progress with speakers at the rostrum, Brazauskas and Landsbergis are seen in the audience]

First on the agenda of the morning sitting was the matter of the recognition of the powers of deputies. Then the procedure for the election and removal of the chairman of the republic's Supreme Soviet was discussed.

The elections began. Four candidates were put forward for the post of chairman. These are Algirdas Brazauskas, hitherto the chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee; Professor Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Sejm Council of Sajudis; lawyer Kazimieras Motieka, member of the Sejm Council; and journalist Romuauldas Ozolas.

The last two withdrew their candidatures and thus the name of Deputies Brazauskas and Landsbergis were out on the ballot. Vytautas Landsbergis was elected

chairman of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet by a majority of votes—91 in favor and 42 against. [video shows deputies voting, Landsbergis is seen speaking at rostrum]

Here, a few words ought to be said about the deputies. The majority of them are new people. Only a few individuals remain from the previous convocation of the Supreme Soviet. No longer visible, or almost not visible, are the secretaries of the city committees and rayon committees of the Communist Party, ministers, and also workers and ordinary peasants. There are engineers, doctors, scientific workers, literary figures.

Ninety-five percent of the deputies have received higher education. These are those whose candidatures in the elections to the Supreme Soviet were supported by Sajudis. Deputies from the Lithuanian Communist Party are in the minority. There are a few people from the Social Democrats, the Democrats, and other parties.

After electing the deputy chairmen and secretaries of the Supreme Soviet a statement by the Council of Ministers of the republic on the resignation of its powers was read. Then the deputies commenced to discuss and adopt a number of laws and other documents, including on the restoration of the Lithuanian state. Here is the first paragraph of this document: Expressing the will of the people, the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic resolves and solemnly proclaims the restoration of and the implementation of the sovereign rights of the Lithuanian state infringed by a foreign power in 1940.

And further, I quote: The territory of Lithuania is integral and indivisible. No Constitution of any other state is effective on it. The Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic, as the spokesman of the sovereign will, will seek to attain the implementation of the complete sovereignty of the state, it says in conclusion.

The session of the Supreme Soviet of the republic is continuing.

Facts Provided About Lithuanian Deputies

LD1103080690 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0700 GMT 11 Mar 90

[Remarks by Aloyzas Sakalas, chairman of the Mandate Commission of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, at the Supreme Soviet session in Vilnius on 11 March—live]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] An outline of the elected deputies to the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet follows: 70 are nonparty members; 63 deputies are members of various parties, including 40 members of the Lithuanian Communist Party; nine deputies are members of the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party; five deputies are members of the CPSU; four are members of the Lithuanian Greens Party; three are members of the Lithuanian Democrats Party; and two deputies are members of the Lithuanian Christian Democrats Party.

The professions of the deputies are as follows: 28 are engineers, 17 are lawyers, 13 are economists, 10 are teachers, nine are linguists, seven are agronomists; six are doctors, six are physicists, six are journalists, four are historians, and the rest of the deputies are of various other professions.

Of the deputies, 126 have higher education, one has not completed higher education, and six have secondary education; 42 deputies have scientific degrees, and 26 deputies have scientific- academic titles.

The elected deputies represent various generations because their age range varies: there are six deputies aged 21-30, 44 deputies aged 31-40, 34 deputies aged 41-50, 40 deputies aged 51-60, and nine deputies are over 60. The average age of the deputy is 46.

There are 12 women deputies.

Lithuanian Communist Party Secretary on Party Split

LD1003140590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1005 GMT 10 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, March 10. (TASS)—Mykolas Burokevicius, first secretary of the Provisional Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party [LCP] (on the CPSU platform), believes that the split of the communist movement in Lithuania has significantly weakened the position of the communists in the republic at the elections to the parliament and local soviets. In an interview with the "SOVETSKAYA KULTURA" newspaper, he said that today the majority of Lithuanian society has arrived at the idea of the immediate secession of Lithuania from the USSR, but not without prompting from Sajudis and the Independent LCP. That is why to claim the opposite, that Lithuania can acquire a true state sovereignty only within the renewed federation, is going against the tide.

The interview notes that the Provisional Central Committee of the LCP on the CPSU platform does not have its own republican newspaper, and its representatives are not allowed to appear on television. They are deprived of the opportunity of communicating with the public. The whole of the Provincial Central Committee is working on a voluntary basis, without pay and in crowded rooms. It could not participate in the pre-election campaign and conduct the drive for its candidates in a worthy way. The criticism of the top party ' state leadership of the country and the Soviet regime has begun to mount in the republic.

Describing the immediate tasks of the Provisional Central Committee, Mykolas Burokevicius stressed that the most important thing now is to undertake thorough preparations for the 21st congress of the LCP, to elect delegates, to reestablish party structures in rayons and towns, and to found a republican newspaper of the Provisional Central Committee in the Lithuanian, Russian, and Polish languages. The Central Committee will

be resolving cadre, finance, and inner party matters indepedently, without the center. Admittance of new party members has begun. Today there are about 35,000 communists in the Lithuanian Communist Party (on the CPSU platform).

Maslyukov Views Implications of Secession

PM1103184590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Article by Yu.D. Maslyukov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and chairman of the USSR Gosplan, in response to request by IZVESTIYA and TASS correspondents: "How Are We To Renew Our Union—Through Common Efforts, Or Will It Be 'Every Man For Himself?'"—first paragraph is IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] In recent months the Soviet public's attention has frequently been drawn to the rapidly unfolding political processes in a number of our union republics and, perhaps, above all in Lithuania. The contradictory nature of these processes and the different approaches to the assessment of them are self-evident and the interest in them is enormous throughout the country. IZVESTIYA and TASS correspondents asked Yu.D. Maslyukov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and chairman of the USSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee], who was in Lithuania recently with M.S. Gorbachev, to give his views on the content of these processes and their development prospects.

The correction of the distortions in the sphere of ethnic relations and the establishment of genuine sovereignty and equality of all union republics on a sound legal basis within the framework of a federative state are in keeping with the historically established links between the USSR peoples and reflect the integration processes typical of present-day world social development.

In these conditions the calls for secession from the USSR that are being made in some republics would appear to strike a discordant note. But they have a cause: Namely the administrative-edict system condemned by society and the party, and the omnipotence of departments, which greatly restricted the union republics' independence; and also the former dominance of the Stalinist model of nationalities policy, which in many ways formalized the very concept of the sovereignty of national-state formations in the USSR. One should add to this the downplaying of the role of the ethnic factor in the development of the union, the absolutization of the trend toward rapprochement, subjectivism in interpreting the historical development of this or that people, and contradictory assessments of certain republics' actual entry into the USSR.

But to confine oneself to simply recording these distortions of nationalities policy would be to oversimplify the situation and make a one-sided analysis and assessment of the processes occurring in our multilingual, multiracial country. Concentrating merely on mutual recriminations and fueling tension in ethnic relations leads to dangerous new upheavals.

It has been learned that the question of establishing an independent Lithuanian state could appear on the agenda of the new Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet. Practical steps have been taken in that direction before. References have been made to the Soviet-German nonaggression pact of 1939 and the secret additional protocol, which allegedly resulted in Lithuania's losing its independence and being forcibly included in the USSR.

But this situation has already been clarified. The Congress of USSR People's Deputies gave an exhaustive political and legal appraisal of the treaties signed in 1939 with Germany.

Those who raised the question of an independent Lithuanian state outside the USSR in the first place try to demonstrate that during the years of Soviet power the republic's development has gotten bogged down and, as a result, they say, a breakthrough toward progress is possible only in conditions of separation.

But let us take an unbiased look at the situation. Let us remember what Lithuania was like in 1940. One might say that that year did not represent the pinnacle of the USSR's prosperity, but industrial output in the "13th Soviet republic," Lithuania, was only one-third of the average union figure. Nearly 74 percent of the population was engaged in agriculture and little more than seven percent was employed in industry, producing simple agricultural equipment and some consumer goods.

A small state which had lost its traditional markets in the East in the early twenties and did not possess enough capital of its own had no prospect of growth in an atmosphere of fierce competition. In terms of a generalizing indicator like per capita national income, bourgeois Lithuania was among the worst in Europe. It was also well behind its neighbors—Latvia and Estonia—in this indicator. The concepts of unemployment and emigration became generic to the Lithuanian people.

This is no secret today, in 1990, although one is hardly likely to hear it said either at rallies or at the republic's Supreme Soviet sessions (even with reservations about certain distortions in the structure of the national economic complex) that industrial production in Lithuania has increased 84 times over since 1940. In 1988 2,427 rubles [R] of national income were produced per capita in Lithuania. During the years of Soviet power around R50 billion in capital investments have been invested in the development of the republic's economy, with the growth rate of investments in the republic far exceeding the union rate. In 1988 investments reached R3.2 billion. Around one-third of all investments in the national economy since the war has gone on strengthening the rural material and technical base.

Such industrial sectors as machine tool building, shipbuilding, electrical equipment, electronics and radioelectronics, and the chemical and petrochemical industries were created from scratch and the fishing industry was reequipped. Enterprises which other republics had been hoping to accommodate were constructed in Lithuania. The accelerated formation of Lithuania's industrial base provided it with an industrial growth rate that was much higher than in other union republics.

The Lithuanian SSR economy is most closely bound up with the development of all the other union republics—this is an essential part of the territorial division of labor. Out of the 103 sectors in the intersectoral balance sheet, the republic imports in 101 instances and exports in 83.

Essentially lacking its own fuel and power base, the republic gets 75 percent of what it needs from other regions.

According to the latest intersectoral balance sheet, imports into the republic were worth R7.5 billion, while exports amounted to R6 billion, which means that imports exceeded exports by around R1.5 billion.

I mention these data not in order to scare anyone or, as certain Lithuanian comrades have said, to "threaten an economic boycott." The government has not declared a boycott against anyone and does not intend to. I merely would like to show how great the interconnection is among the republics and how devastating the Lithuanian SSR's separation from the USSR national economy would be for Lithuania itself, for the other republics, and for the union as a whole.

Integration is by and large a natural process, the only possible one in conditions of the scientific and technical revolution. All states today are looking to close cooperation and more intensive collaboration to rid themselves of unnecessary problems. They are all the more essential in a single state. For example, the "Elfa" production association in Vilnius produces small-capacity electric motors, and nearly all of them go to other regions of the country to be used in domestic appliances. The association deals with 790 customer organizations and 520 suppliers. Before the end of the current 5-year plan the intention is to spend around R16 million on capital investments in the development of the association, R12.3 million of which will come out of central union funds. Moreover, the association was given a special allotment of R9 million in foreign currency for the purchase of technology in 1989-1990.

Or take the following example. Of the 24 defense complex enterprises on the territory of the Lithuanian SSR producing consumer goods and parts for them, 21 are unique. You can imagine what the severing of established industrial and economic links would mean both for the USSR national economy and for working people in Lithuania.

Is it only a question of plants? Is it only a question of the quantity of meat the republic supplies to the rest of the country, or of the quantity of grain the republic receives from the union granaries? It is a question of the future of the entire people, of their links with the natural socioeconomic milieu which they have become part of over half a century of common life.

Nor can one ignore the fact that, over the years it has been part of the Soviet Union, the Lithuanian SSR has integrated with all the union republics. Therefore, the rupture of established links would naturally significantly affect their interests. It must be made clear here that the responsibility to all the country's republics and the duty to protect them against possible adverse consequences of any arbitrary steps rests with the union state: This is its constitutional duty.

Since we have an established unified national economic complex, the question arises of dividing state property. Obviously, it can only be resolved on the basis of the union Law on Ownership in the USSR and the Fundamentals of USSR and Union Republican Legislation on Land. In accordance with the adopted legislative acts, a considerable number of facilities and enterprises that were set up, financed, and developed with all-union interests in mind are classed as union property. You have defense facilities on which the proper defense of the country and secure borders depend; you also have enterprises and associations in basic and defense sectors of industry, power, machine building, and the production infrastructure of union significance. Main railroads and highways, sea and air transport, seaports, airfields, pipelines, power transmission lines, and many communications facilities are also included. Arbitrary treatment of these facilities would pose the threat of entire sectors paralyzed and a vast number of people out of work.

It would be a difficult job to decide the future of these facilities if the question of their future arose: Through the republic buying up the relevant property; the union leasing it to the republic; the dismantling and removal of the facilities to the territory of other republics; keeping the property where it is now and entitling USSR organs to use it on a contractual basis. Or, finally, organizing joint production and distributing the finished products on the basis of mutually agreed shares, prices, pay levels, and so on. The value of facilities of unionwide significance on the territory of the Lithuanian SSR subject to compensation could be R5.5-7 billion.

Is it right to talk about the need to pay compensation for the value of facilities of unionwide significance? Judge for yourselves: Here is the ratio between produced and utilized national income, for example, that exists between the Lithuanian SSR economy and the country's national economic complex. According to USSR State Committee for Statistics data, over the past two decades national income utilized for consumption and accumulation in the Lithuanian SSR has exceeded national income produced in the republic by a total of more than R5 billion in real prices. These data refute the claims by some Lithuanian economists and politicians about an

alleged USSR debt, as a result of the republic's participation in the construction of facilities in other parts of the country.

One very important question that simply cannot be discounted is that of safeguarding the economic interests of the USSR and the other sides with regard to the use of transport routes which cross Lithuanian territory and which are of international significance. International law can demonstrate many options for the use of main transport routes in relation to production capacities established on the territory of various states by foreign firms. The fundamental task here is to ensure an unbroken network of railroads, highways, and communication and power transmission lines. Particularly as supplies of power, raw materials, and goods for Kaliningrad Oblast in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] cross the Lithuanian SSR, as IZVESTIYA wrote recently.

The annual volume of railroad shipments for the oblast's needs alone is 12 million tonnes. The volume of export and import shipments via the Kaliningrad seaport is 2.4 million tonnes.

A transport service that was specially created for the Soviet Union's international links—the Klaypeda-Mukra (GDR) ferry, which carries 5.3 million tonnes of various types of freight per year, constituting a significant proportion of the shipments handled by the Klaypeda seaport—poses a particular problem. How can its work be ensured without detriment to the USSR, any Soviet republic, or the GDR?

The use of airspace above the republic is an equally acute problem, since it is the main corridor from Moscow and even from the Far East to Western Europe and America.

If the Lithuanian SSR's links with the union are broken there will have to be a special examination of questions of mutual payments for supplies of material and technical resources and finished products. Union republics are bound to raise the question of changing trading prices. Basically it will be a matter of switching—and quite quickly at that—to mutual payments at world prices.

Every year the Lithuanian SSR receives imported products worth R1-1.5 billion (in internal union prices). One-third of this is covered by income from exports of other republics' products. Who is going to compensate for these costs in different conditions?

Sometimes one hears people say that the remedy for the currency famine would be a Westward reorientation of deliveries. Unfortunately, these assertions are not based on serious calculations. Moreover, all available data indicate the opposite: The Lithuanian SSR's interdependence and established economic cooperation with other parts of the country essentially rule out a reorientation of its products to other countries' market in the immediate future. In particular, Western Europe is hardly likely to be interested at the moment in the types and current quality of products produced in the republic. Moreover, the raw materials and other commodities which its enterprises are geared to using do not exist in abundance west of the Baltic. There is no demand on the world market for the products currently being exported from the Lithuanian SSR to other areas of the USSR—meat, milk, cotton goods. Are people not being patently unrealistic when they say that none of this is particularly significant?

The question of the amounts of the domestic and foreign debt applicable to the republic will also have to be tackled. One could take as the criterion for determining this debt the proportion of the overall volume of the country's national income used for consumption and accumulation. In 1988 it was 1.58 percent. Accordingly, the republic's share of the state foreign debt would be approximately R600 million in freely convertible currency, or around $1 billion.

R5.8 billion of the total internal state debt, which was R398.6 billion on 1 January this year, might apply to the Lithuanian SSR. Moreover, the republic will still be in debt to the USSR State Bank because of differences in prices of livestock products to the tune of around R460 million. Thus, the total domestic debt could be approximately R6.3 billion.

The protection of the rights of citizens working at union enterprises in Lithuania and also of all people wishing to keep USSR citizenship is of special significance. In the event of Lithuania's secession from the USSR or even if the situation in the republic gets worse, part of the population might leave. In that case Lithuania would have to compensate the departing families for the property left behind in the republic, the cost of moving would have to be reimbursed, and there would also have to be compensation for the cost of accommodating the people who leave and creating new jobs, although it is self-evident that there is no way you can measure in rubles or in any other currency the moral cost that would be borne by people whose fate had been decided against their will and contrary to the established principles of life.

Obviously, one has also to take into account the opinions of those groups of the population who live on territories that joined Lithuania at particular stages of the Soviet state's development. They joined the republic as a result of the process of our peoples' rapprochement, which served as the foundation of their present-day national-territorial arrangement. The new situation could give rise to territorial problems in their relationships with one another, a danger that must be recognized.

When talking about the international aspects of the problem, it should be borne in mind that the responsibility for deciding self-determination questions is borne not only by the self-determining part of the state, but also by the entire state as a whole. When granting one people or another the right to self-determination, the state is obliged to consider the interests of all the peoples in it. This norm is enshrined in the UN Charter, pacts on

human rights, other international documents, and in all the legal principles contained in them and approved by the international community. The USSR cannot shirk this responsibility.

One cannot ignore the international processes currently taking place in central Europe and in the Baltic. Which way will the scales tip—in favor of stabilization of the situation in Europe and implementation of the Helsinki accords or, on the contrary, toward the opponents of detente and Europe's plunge back into the mire of national-territorial antagonism and confrontation? This is the big question for the entire world community. Because a disruption of the delicate balance of political issues would threaten the stability of the system of international relations established since the war.

Our state's commitments with regard to the Warsaw Pact countries' defense capability also create an intractable group of problems. These commitments are shared by all the Soviet republics. Ill-considered or hasty decisions on questions of military parity could have far-reaching consequences for each of them and bring a wide range of European countries to the brink of losing control of the situation.

The question of Soviet troops in Lithuania is closely related to the problem of protecting the inviolability of borders and safeguarding the USSR's security. It is no secret that there are military bases and defense facilities on Lithuanian SSR territory that are involved in the functioning of the union defense infrastructure. Can one make cavalier gestures and take hasty, unbalanced actions here?

There is another aspect of some importance: Significant violations of intra-union obligations by any republic would inevitably give rise to the problem of succession in respect of USSR international treaties, both bilateral and multilateral. International law and, in particular, the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of International Treaties, based the solution of these questions on the principle of maintaining the stability of treaties, which will compel a republic to abide by previously adopted pledges, unless, of course, it wants to come up against the entire international community.

If one adopts a responsible approach to the self-determination question one cannot ignore the fact that any breakaway state formation would encounter a whole mass of problems which are tackled through the joint efforts of all parts of the federation. It is not just a matter of recognition by other states and international organizations. The agenda will contain the question of political and economic inclusion in the rigid fabric of international relations, which, in conditions of continuing territorial and other claims, could become a problem of survival in the full sense of the word.

World experience shows beyond doubt that one cannot solve one's own problems at the expense of other peoples or by ignoring their interests. The weakening of allied relations between the republics of the federative state would seriously undermine the positive fruits of domestic political perestroyka and renewal of international relations, which might very quickly turn out to be counterproductive for the world situation in general.

Thus the raising of the question of the republic's secession from the union is bound up with the solution of some extremely complex and tough problems, not only economic, but also political, legal, international, and, finally, ethical. In effect, it is replacing one set of complex but familiar problems which are already being actively tackled, with another set that are no less and perhaps even more complex. One should not ignore the fact that whereas political independence can be proclaimed in a day, the creation of a new economy based on market relations and the rejigging of the entire system of ties, including international ties, are a far more complex question.

In my view, the real way to solve ethnic problems in present-day conditions is to develop the federation and widen constructive dialogue at all levels of relations between republic and union and among all the republics in the context of the work that is being done to democratize Soviet society and renew the Soviet state.

Of course, dialogue is necessary, too, when cohabitation is becoming increasingly strained. International experience shows that in cases where the process of the formation of a new state is regulated and takes place at all stages by means of talks between interested parties, there is less chance of manifestations of extremism, violence, and outrages, and a better chance of a satisfactory solution of very complex practical questions.

The CPSU platform "The Party's Nationalities Policy In Present-Day Conditions" provides a detailed analysis of the roots of these problems and maps out ways of harmonizing ethnic relations. The CPSU Central Committee February Plenum made the guidelines even more specific, making it possible to build relations between republics on a fundamentally new basis. Emphasis was placed on the importance of the treaty principle of building the union and on a variety of forms of federative links taking into account historical and other features of the republics. The way is still open to a further quest for constructive solution. It needs only the peoples' goodwill.

You know, but I will remind you again, that great work is under way in the country at the moment, at both union and republican levels, to create a mechanism for the legal regulation of mutual relations between the republics and the all-union federative state. Around 12 draft legislative acts on these questions were submitted on a priority basis to the USSR Supreme Soviet third session alone. They included draft laws on amendments and additions to the USSR Constitution on matters pertaining to the USSR national-state setup, on the general principles of local self-government and local economy in the USSR, on the general principles of the leadership of the economy and social sphere in the union and autonomous

republics, and other documents regulating juridical relations in various spheres of the state, public, and social life of the union republics and the Soviet federation, which is being renewed on a new legal basis. The session agenda includes the fundamentally important draft law on the procedure for deciding questions connected with a union republic's secession from the USSR in accordance with Article 72 of the USSR Constitution.

The draft laws envisage that each union republic will shape its own legislation and the USSR will only adopt the fundamentals (basic principles) of civil, land, forestry, water, mining, labor, financial, environmental, criminal, and procedural legislation.

The Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies adopted a USSR Law on the Economic Independence of the Lithuanian SSR, Latvian SSR, and Estonian SSR. The USSR Government developed it by adopting a special resolution whereby a number of enterprises were switched from union jurisdiction and placed in the charge of the republics; a new prodcedure is being established for siting enterprises, the contract principle is being introduced for deliveries of products to all-union stocks, and republics' rights in the sphere of international economic links are being considerably widened.

The political basis of intra-union relationships is being fundamentally altered to allow all contradictions to be resolved within the framework of the union. When he was in the Lithuanian SSR M.S. Gorbachev stressed that essentially we have not been living in a real federation. I am deeply convinced that now that effective steps are being taken toward that kind of setup, toward the creation of conditions for free and full social development, the severing of federative links will contradict, above all, the interests of the Lithuanian people.

All union republics and the country as a whole have a new opportunity to build their relations in a reformed state, in conditions of maximum enjoyment of sovereign rights by the national-state formations that comprise it. It is a common opportunity for us all and it would be unforgivable to miss it—no matter what fine motives might subsequently be cited as an excuse.

Sajudis Seimas Discusses Future 9 Mar

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[Text] The Sajudis Seimas met today for the 13th time. It is significant in that Lithuania is reaching a turning point in which the distribution of political forces is changing after the Sajudis has won the elections to the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, and in which Sajudis must make a decision on its fate. Therefore, the main problems discussed at today's Seimas were: The assessment of the political situation in Lithuania and discussions on the future of Sajudis. At the same time, preparations for the second congress of the Seimas which will take place in April were discussed.

A report on the political situation in Lithuania was made by the chairman of the Seimas Council, Vytautas Landsbergis. The main event in the present life of our state are the elections to the Supreme Soviet which can be assessed as a referendum and the nation's self-determination, he said. Their results create a new political situation in Lithuania which has not been completely realized by all people. Both the East and the West are waiting for a further step legalizing the will of the people entrusted to its deputies. This will is the basic reconstruction of the state and the society, and the main problem that must be resolved by the new Supreme Soviet is to continue Lithuania's statehood and restore its real sovereignty.

Further discussions on this problem were not constructive. The Seimas deputies essentially submitted proposals which are already being dealt with by the so-called club of the Seimas deputies.

Later, Vytautas Landsbergis acquainted the Seimas with documents drawn up for the first session of the Supreme Soviet which include a declaration about the continuity of the Lithuanian state.

Thus for half a day, debates at the Seimas were hollow because when one deputy proposed to discuss Algirdas Brazauskas as a possible pretender to the post of chairman of the Supreme Soviet, the hall became as noisy as a beehive. In a vote, the Seimas decided not to discuss this question. Only one Seimas member, the same who proposed this problem for discussion, voted in favor.

There were animated discussions on the relations of Sajudis with the present opposition, that is, the Lithuanian Communist Party. Some deputies spoke with concern about the tendencies of authoritarianism which, according to them, were emerging in Sajudis. Professor at Vilnius University, Vanda Zaborskaite, did not support the idea that the opposition should be invited to cooperate only as far as it supported the ideas of Sajudis. We must extend the hand of cooperation to all who wish and can work in the name of Lithuania, stated this scientist. A similar thought was expressed by the well known reformer of Lithuania's schools, Professor Meile Luksiene, who said that one should not hurry and make hasty decisions.

But a decision was adopted in the afternoon which was expected from the Seimas by new Supreme Soviet deputies supported by Sajudis. This was a statement to the Supreme Soviet which proposes that the first session of the Supreme Soviet deals with two most important problems. First, to state that Lithuania's electors have granted to the Supreme Soviet the mandate of the expression of sovereign will. Second, to adopt legal acts on the continuity of the Lithuanian state and the restoration of its violated and hampered right of statehood. This document, although in completely different circumstances, will be a weighty support to the Seimas deputies.

An appeal was also adopted to all Lithuania's citizens inviting them to unite for the benefit of Lithuania's future.

The second and the most important problem discussed today by the Seimas was the future of Sajudis. Reports on this topic were made by three Seimas members: Petras Vaitiekunas, Virgilijus Cepaitis, and Vytautas Radzvilas. Each of them submitted his own model of the Sajudis future. Petras Vaitiekunas, stressing the necessity of Sajudis in the future, stated that when the process of the restoration of real statehood is taking place Sajudis is necessary as an opposition to the state authority structures. Apart from that, it would be an arena for the growth and development of the parties. Sajudis is essential to express the spiritual will of the people. Petras Vaitiekunas could not imagine Sajudis as a party. This, according to him, would be a new superparty, or a blow to the whole multiparty system. Sajudis should be a solid organization, consisting of various parties and movements and engaged in politics and culture, said Petras Vaitiekunas.

It would be nonsense to transform Sajudis into a party, said the second speaker, Virgilijus Cepaitis. But its chaotic structure prevailing hitherto can become, according to him, a brake. Therefore Sajudis needs a backbone which Virgilijus Cepaitis imagines as a new structure from an ideological point of view, a party of regeneration, and after the formation of such a party the whole Sajudis should remain as it is. Virgilijus Cepaitis proposed that this idea be discussed in the Sajudis groups and the final decision made at the congress.

Essentially the same ideas as those of Petras Vaitiekunas were explained by the third speaker, Vytautas Radzvilas, who submitted very logical and consistent arguments. While there is no firm legal foundation to establish democracy, the Supreme Soviet remains the greatest source of danger, the speaker said. Therefore, Sajudis must remain a force that controls the supreme authority and prevents it from deviating from the main aim, the establishment of a democratic state. Vytautas Radzvilas envisages three main functions for the future Sajudis: First, Sajudis will represent the condition of freeing the people. Second, it will become the school of state thinking. And third, it will forge new politicians. In the opinion of Vytautas Radzvilas, at the second congress Sajudis should become even more radical and adopt a new program and regulations.

By the way, new Sajudis draft regulations were discussed today. Many deputies criticized them, above all, because they consolidate Sajudis as a party or, to be more precise, as a party of nonparty people. It was decided to draw up new regulations and submit them to the next meeting of the Seimas. Of course, the final word will be said by the Sajudis congress, which will take place on 21-22 April. Thus it will continue not for three days, as it was planned earlier, but for two days. The congress will also decide on what principle the elections of the new Seimas should take place. It is only obvious now that the present members of the Seimas and its council, elected to the state authority structures, will be able to remain only as Sajudis honorary members.

Sajudis Leader Views New Government

LD1103190390 Vilnius in English to North America 2300 GMT 10 Mar 90

["Weekly Press Digest"]

[Excerpts] All newspapers are concentrating on the subject of the route to independence. [passage omitted]

Lithuania needs a government which would enjoy the support of the most influential political forces and of the broadest sections of the population, contends the newly elected deputy and Central Committee Secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Justas Paleckis, in the GIMTASIS KRASTAS weekly. The Sajudis leader, Vytautas Landsbergis, sees a coalition government and he does not fear that Sajudis will be blamed for the deteriorating economic situation. The newly formed government will state that it is taking over a very deplorable legacy, says Vytautas Landsbergis. The new government will also have to make a statement on the further deterioration of the economic situation The public, however, is sure to blame the new government for the deterioration and one must reconcile oneself to it in advance. The communists have already been punished as they suffered a defeat in the elections. The Sajudis leadership has several candidacies for the post of prime minister. [pasage omitted]

A month ago the Lithuanian Bank was instituted and the law on the Lithuanian Bank was passed. The Lithuanian Bank has been granted the exclusive right to print its money and its task is to regulate the circulation of money and credit to settle the internal and foreign accounts of banks and to set the exchange rate of the republic's monetary unit. Having endorsed the law on the Baltic countries' economic self-dependence in Moscow, it turned out that Moscow had left the main state banks within its competence. It refuses to hand over to Lithuania the foreign exchange and savings banks where the residents keep their savings. That's why the settling of accounts with some republics has already been disrupted and God knows what surprises are in store yet. Moscow is now appropriating the creditary forces of the Lithuanian banks. There would have now been 6.7 billion rubles in the Lithuanian Savings Bank if 6 billion rubles had not been transferred to the Soviet Union's Savings Bank. Since independence is not far off the waywardness of the center is but a temporary obstacle. [passage omitted]

Yeltsin on Lithuanian Independence Plans

LD1003190490 Brussels Domestic Service in French 1700 GMT 10 Mar 90

[Text] Boris Yeltsin is a very popular rival of Gorbachev in the USSR, and he is in Paris for the publication of his

autobiography "Right to the End." The Moscow deputy, who likes stirring things up, replied to many questions from journalists. He was not very conciliatory toward Gorbachev, whom he accuses of having a taste for power and of being indecisive. A direct question was asked of him on Lithuania's independence. Lucien Latin recorded this reply.

[Begin recording [unidentified reporter] If you were to be the future head of state of the Soviet Union—if you were the Soviet head of state, how would you react to the Lithuanians' declaring their independence this coming weekend? And what would you do?

[Yeltsin, in Russian, followed by translation into French] I would be sad at this, but I would not be able to not agree [words indistinct]. Were you thinking that I should bring in the troops? I am thinking about an agreement between states, and agreement between the Soviet Union and Lithuania, an agreement between the Soviet Union and Latvia, an agreement between states. A question on this period of five years which is envisaged in the bill [as heard]. These five years are, indeed, in the bill, but the bill has not yet been debated. I think that the republics will consider that this period of five years is much too long, and I am certain that the republics will oppose this. In five years many things change. The head of state changes, and the leaders of these republics are going to change, too.

I am not going to make any predictions, but I think that the Baltic Republics are not going to send any deputies to this extraordinary congress to be held on the 12th and the 13th. Instead, they wil be there as representatives of those countries. [end recording]

Brazauskas-Gorbachev Talk Discussed

PM0903215590 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 10 Mar 90 p 1

[Dispatch by correspondent V. Zarovskiy from "Political News" feature]

[Text] Vilnius—A. Brazauskas, chairman of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium and first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, has been interviewed on Lithuanian television. He talked about his meeting with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. According to A. Brazauskas, M. Gorbachev stressed that he was receiving him as chairman of the Supreme Soviet and that the conversation was official.

The conversation was about questions connected with the possible decision by the first session of the republic's new Supreme Soviet, beginning on Saturday, which is clearly going to adopt a declaration of independence. One of the main topics was the economy. M. Gorbachev stressed that economic relations would have to be legalized as relations between two states. In the future settlements must be made in freely convertible currency. It is planned to transfer a proportion of the USSR state debt to Lithuania.

According to A. Brazauskas, problems of the borders with Belorussia and Klaypeda and of the Klaypeda region were touched on. Apparently since the war there have been no official documents on the city's and region's joining the territory of Lithuania.

According to A. Brazauskas, the union government, at the top level, seriously intends to prepare for talks. The most difficult and crucial job, he went on, is to solve the aforementioned questions. There will only be real independence once they have been settled. All steps must be considered and tactically correct in order not to disrupt the rhythm of life in the republic. "It would be nice if we ourselves could avoid creating reasons for life to become even harder. But that could happen," A. Brazauskas stressed.

LiSSR Property Law, Constitutional Changes Cited

18200496A Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 21 Feb 90 p 1

["Law of the Lithuanian SSR (Soviet Socialist Republic) on Entering Changes to Chapter 2 of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Lithuanian SSR 'The Economic System'"]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic decrees:

1. To set forth in Articles 10, 11, and 12 of Chapter 2 of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Lithuanian SSR "The Economic System" the following editorial changes:

"Article 10. The basis of the Lithuanian SSR economic system is the property of the Lithuanian SSR, which comprises private property of citizens, property of citizens united in groups (collectives), and state property.

Property relations are regulated by laws of the Lithuanian SSR and by agreements concluded by property owners.

Conditions for locating properties or facilities of other states and international organizations, as well as of citizens or groups (collectives) of other states on the territory of the Lithuanian SSR are determined by the laws of the Lithuanian SSR and by interstate agreements.

The Lithuanian SSR guarantees to all property owners the opportunity to run independently the facilities belonging to them according to the property law, and to use and dispose of these according to the laws of the Lithuanian SSR. In realizing the rights of property in accordance with the laws of the Lithuanian SSR, property owners have the right to hire other people.

Unified legal measures to protect all property owners are being established.

The Lithuanian SSR protects the rights of property owners of the republic in other states.

Article 11. The earth, its contents, internal and territorial waters, forests, other plants and animals, and other natural resources are the national possessions of the republic and the exclusive property of the Lithuanian SSR. Ownership rights to contents of the earth can belong only to the Lithuanian state. Other objects which are the exclusive property of the Lithuanian SSR according to the right to property, can also belong to Lithuanian citizens or groups (collectives).

The Lithuanian SSR has exclusive rights to the air space over its territory, its continental shelf, and its economic zone in the Baltic Sea.

Article 12. Property, belonging to the republic as state property can be transferred, according to the procedure established by laws of the Lithuanian SSR, to citizens or groups (collectives) for payment or other compensation.

In exceptional cases in order to protect the interests of the republic, the property of its citizens or groups (collectives) as well as that of other states, its citizens and groups (collectives) can be nationalized with remuneration."

2. To recognizes that Articles 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18 of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Lithuanian SSR are no longer in force.

3. To charge the Council of Ministers of the Lithuanian SSR to develop proposals for entering these changes into the existing legislative documents and to adopt new ones in connection with the current changes to the Constitution of the Lithuanian SSR.
Chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium A. Brazauskas.
Secretary of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium L. Sabutis
Vilnius, 12 February 1990.

Latvian Party Plenum Views Split, Expels Official

LD1103125690 Moscow World Service in English 1200 GMT 11 Mar 90

[Text] The leadership of the Communist Party of Lativa is taking emergency measures to consolidate forces and prevent a split. Matters were discussed by the Central Committee of the republic's Communist Party at a full-scale session in Riga. As the speakers stated, the process of a split has actually begun, and is proceeding on an ethnic basis. Most of those demanding the establishment of a party independent from the Soviet Communist Party are native residents. The session denounced those working for a split, and expelled Rukmane from Riga's City Party Committee. She was one of the initiators of the establishment of a Latvian Communist Party independent from the Soviet Communist Party. It's been also decided to convene a congress of the Latvian Communist Party on the sixth of next month.

Vagris on Latvian Communist Party Congress

LD1003162590 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 10 Mar 90

[Text] Developments in the Soviet Baltic region remain in the focus of attention of the public here and abroad. Political processes taking place there have had their effect on the republican communist parties as well. We've reported that at the 20th congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party last December, the establishment was proclaimed of an independent party of Lithuania with its program and rules. The Congress' decisions caused a split in the Lithuanian Communist Party and led to the formation of two parties: the supporters of a new independent Communist Party and also of the party standing on the platform of the Soviet Communist Party. Similar tendencies have developed within the Latvian Communist Party and here are some details:

A full-scale meeting of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee was held in Riga recently. It became clear at it that there were three movements within the Lativian Communist Party: one advocates the unity with the Soviet Communist Party—it's supported mainly by the Russian-speaking population of the republic. Another movement representing mainly the Latvians, pressures for the formation of an independent Latvian Communist Party and for its separation from the Soviet Communist Party. Incidentally, the Latvians account for about one-third of the republican Party membership. The third movement, referred to as the Center Movement, urges greater independence of the Latvian Communist Party within the framework of the Soviet Communist Party. There are Latvians and also representatives of other nationalities among its supporters.

The debate at the full-scale meeting was a heated one. After its closure, our reporter asked the first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party, Yan Vagris, to assess the situation within the party. After all, many speakers at the full-scale meeting refer to it as a crisis. And here's what Yan Vagris said:

[Vagris in Russian fading into English report] Yes, many speakers used the word crisis since in the process of the debate on the republican Party status, the status of the Latvian Communist Party among others, the division took place among communists and even whole Party organizatioins. Some of them think that the Latvian Communist Party should be independent. We too, stand for an independent Communist Party but with the maintenance of links with the Soviet Communist Party, Yan Vagris underlined. And this is what actually causes the discussion. I lay my hopes on common sense, reason, on the debate carried out from a realistic platform without any ambitions involved, said Yan Vagris. It should be based not on what the other side or myself want, but on the realistic situation in the republic.

The full-scale meeting of the Latvian Communist Party took a decision to convene a regular Congress of the Communist Party of Latvia on 6 April. The future of the party and the republic as a whole will largely depend on the progress of that Congress and the decisions that it will endorse.

Vagris Discusses Latvian Party's Incipient Split

PM1203083190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Mar 90 Second Edition p 2

[Report by correspondent O. Meshkov: "We Must Not Miss the Last Chance. Postscript to the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum"]

[Text] Riga—The times are truly dynamic and the situation is changing exceedingly quickly. Only last month the Latvian communists set the date for the republican party organization congress at the end of April, in view of the not insignificant fact that the elections to the republic's Supreme Soviet, which take place on 18 March, will require total concentration of effort on this most important political campaign. But life has stepped in and changed all that and the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee members, meeting at an extraordinary plenum, decided to bring the congress forward by nearly a month.

The thing is that in mid-February there was a conference in Riga of supporters of the formation, or, as they say, restoration of the independent Latvian Communust Party, which announced it would be convening its congress on 14 April.

"We must hold our congress first," Latvian Communist Party Central Committee First Secretary J. Vagris told the plenum participants. "There are many communists in the republic who have not finally decided what party they will be members of. They must see what kind of party the renewed Latvian Communist Party wants and is going to be. We must not lose these people and leave them outside political life. We must not miss the last chance to consolidate and preserve our communist party."

The plenum also heard the following dramatic statement: Unless we hold a congress in the very near future, the bureau members, and indeed the Central Committee members must relinquish their powers. J. Vagris agreed with this.

The critical moment has arrived, in fact. The party has already started to split. The worst part about it is that it is on ethnic lines. The following fact was also stated at the plenum: The vast majority of the republic's rural population (and that is, as a rule, the indigenous population) actively endorses the supporters of a party independent from the CPSU. Is it tolerable that the percentage of ethnic Latvian Communists in the party organization that remains on the CPSU platform (although this party organization will obviously be numerically larger) should be insignificant? At any rate, this situation is extremely undesirable.

This is the tangled skein of problems the Latvian communists have to unravel. It has to be said clearly and honestly that in many ways the situation has been aggravated by the passive attitude of the republican party organization leadership to the implementation of the processes of renewal of the organization itself and of many spheres of life.

J. Vagris divulged one of the points of the draft new CPSU Statutes, relating to the activities of union republican communist parties. It was clear to any unprejudiced individual what broad opportunities republican party organizations will be given to act independently, in conformity with particular local conditions. Certainly, this is a very strong argument and it is necessary to make the best possible use of it in propaganda work, persuading waverers who have not yet finally decided of the destructive nature of a party split. There really is a chance to preserve the Latvian Communist Party as the leading political force in the republic, bringing together the broad masses of working people of different nationalities and social strata. But how best to exploit it? It is more vital than ever before for all Central Committee members and party leaders to have the closest possible, direct contact with the working masses, with members of primary party organizations in the city and the countryside. This was pointed out at the plenum by Yu. Lyalin, first secretary of Leningradskiy Party Rayon Committee [Raykom]. He said that not once in the past three years has a Central Committee Bureau member addressed a labor collective in the rayon. Yet people have very many questions that worry them.

Kirovskiy Party Raykom First Secretary M. Rukmane—one of those behind the establishment of an independent communist party—is regarded by many as an odious figure. Suffice it to say that she was expelled from the Riga City Committee for wanting to split communist ranks. Her speech at the Central Committee plenum was uncompromising, too. She still insists that it is pointless to "wait for instructions" on what kind of Latvian Communist Party it should be.

But out of fairness I should say that one has to agree with one of the arguments in her plenum, speech. Is it normal that on the eve of the elections, M. Rukmane said, we communists should not have a unified list of candidates for deputies' seats in the republic's Supreme Soviet. The flaws in our organizational work could prove very costly.

Finally, many speakers talked of the need to hold a party conference before the congress to have a wide-ranging discussion of all the problems and differences. It would be useful, of course. It would be, but... the horse has already bolted, so to speak. The conference is a month away, so there can no longer be any question of a conference.

The plenum named the new date for the 25th congress of the republican communist party—6 April. A resolution

condemned the actions of those who advocate establishing a Latvian Communist Party independent of the CPSU.

Latvian Environmental Rally Turns Anti-Communist

LD1103183190 Moscow TASS in English 1824 GMT 11 Mar 90

[By TASS correspondent Valeriy Zaytsev]

[Text] Riga March 11 TASS—A supposedly environmentalist get- together outside the Latvian Communist Party headquarters in Riga tonight turned into what even the event's organisers themselves described as "the first anti-communist rally" in this Baltic republic.

Speakers at the meeting, which had been authorised by authorities as sponsored by a "green" movement calling itself the Nature Protection Club, demanded, among other things, that the party be suspended, all its property such as buildings and publishing houses "turned over to the people," and its archives sequestrated.

Participants, who numbered less than two hundred together with the on-lookers, also voiced nationalist slogans.

A spokesman for the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee summed up the events as "clearly insulting and provocative."

Foreign Guests Arrive for Estonian Congress

LD0903143390

[Editorial Report] Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian at 1800 GMT on 8 March broadcasts a four-minute live or recorded report from Tallinn Airport by correspondent Ain Saarna on the arrival of the guests for the Estonian Congress. Saarna greets the guests as they step off the plane from Stockholm.

Saarna talks first to Tunne Kelam, chairman of the Chief Committee of Citizens of the Republic of Estonia, who has come to meet the arrivals. He says that among other guests, he is also expecting Carl Bildt, chairman of the Swedish Moderate Party, together with some other politicians. Kelam says: "He has been entertaining a firm intention to hold a welcoming speech at the Estonian Congress."

Saarna points out that the congress is only due to start on Sunday 11 March. Kelam explains that the bulk of foreign guests will probably arrive tomorrow on the boat from Helsinki, and that there is a meeting planned for tomorrow for foreign delegates along with the members of the chief committee. Some foreigners have never been to Estonia, so Kelam expects that they will want to see Tallinn.

Saarna next meets the very first arrival, who turns out to be (Aho Rebas), chairman of the Goteborg branch of the Estonian Citizens' Committees. (Rebas) did not encounter any difficulties entering Estonia, as he explains to Saarna when asked about it. He adds: "Other people did have difficulties, of course. There were some delegates who could not come, such as, for example, Ulo Ignats and Juri Estam [both from Sweden]—and it was also said that some delegates from the United States could not come: Rein Taagepera, for example. And that is, of course, sad." He adds, on the subject of the aim of his visit, that the Estonians arriving from abroad come in support, but that the actual work is up to the Estonians who live in Estonia.

Another arrival is (Mikhel Mattiisen), member of the Estonian government in exile. He is in Estonia for the first time. He says: "Well, our government is not all that serious. We do not wish to govern anybody; we only want to adhere to legal descendency, in order to hand it over at the right moment, with the aim of building a bridge. Well, my wish is still to greet the congress, namely on behalf of the government, but it is not known if there will be any success on this score because we are, after all, in an occupied land."

Estonian Congress Opens in Tallinn

LD1103180490 Moscow TASS in English 1746 GMT 11 Mar 90

[By TASS Correspondent Albert Maloveryan]

[Text] Tallinn March 11 TASS—The Estonian congress which opened in Tallinn today intends to press for de facto restoration of the state that existed in the Estonian territory from 1918 to the summer of 1940.

The forum is sponsored by three public organisations that emerged in Estonia in the democratisation period—the Party of National Independence, the Society of Monuments Protection and the Christian-Democratic Union. As many as 499 delegates, 35 of them representatives of Estonian emigrants, were elected for the congress.

The Estonian Popular Front that initially did not approve of the idea of restoring a bourgeois republic participated actively in the election of delegates to the congress.

A debate was started at the congress about the attitude to the election to the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Republic, to be held on March 18.

Some delegates are of the opinion that the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian republic is an illegal body of the occupation authorities. Others hold that the new composition of the Supreme Soviet jointly with the present congress could form a bicameral parliament whose activity could be directed at the attainment of independence.

The congress intends to adopt addresses to the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and to people of non-native nationalities residing in Estonia.

The congress will continue on March 12.

Republic Not Declared by Congress

LD1103200990 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1800 GMT 11 Mar 90

[Excerpt] Whoever had the desire or opportunity, could have followed the Estonian Congress on the third program of Estonian Radio. One could also do so at this moment [words indistinct]. Now, however, Ain Saarna will (?briefly summarize the congress).

[Saarna] The first working day of the Estonian Congress has come to an end, but a Republic of Estonia has not been declared. There must have been both those who were waiting for and those who were fearing a sudden decision on this subject. [passage omitted].

Congress Opens Second Day

LD1203111790 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1000 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Excerpts] [Reporter Saarna] The second working day of the Estonian congress began with the discussion of one of the main resolutions: Action Program of the Estonian Congress in Respect of the Steps for Restoring the Independence of the Republic of Estonia.

Kaido Kama delivered a report. He began by acknowledging that to some people what is being said here and the resolutions which will be adopted will sound familiar and be stated in general terms. Something very specific is expected, like what was done yesterday in Lithuania. Lithuania, however, chose to restore its own statehood through structures of the occupying power. But the Lithuanians have their own legal and geographical reasons for this. The path for Estonia must be different. We do not need a new republic, but the Republic of Estonia must be restored and justice must be restored. This can take place through the Estonian congress which holds the mandate of the citizens of Estonia. Those were a few thoughts in the report by Kaido Kama.

As this was a major document, the floor was given to all those who wanted it, as an exception. Numerous proposals were received by the editorial team, and scanning those will evidently take quite some time.

Before the break the congress was able to discuss the declaration on the state borders of the Republic of Estonia. I will read out its main stance from the draft: The Estonian congress is ready to enter into talks with the Government of the Soviet Union in order to peacefully solve the problems which will arise over the restoration of the borders determined by the Tartu Peace Treaty.

And now a little bit of break-time talk. Vardo Rumessen, head of the organizing team, is responsible for everything that organizationally takes place inside the building of the Estonia theater and outside it.

[Begin recording] [Rumessen] So far we have not had any problems in principle here, in the organizational team. Up to now everything has been progressing very smoothly and I hope that this will be also the case today. We have our own security service in operation, and the Defense League has offered us its help. The Defense League is positioned outside, around the building, and has been there nearly five days and nights. [passage omitted]

Unfortunately one has to say that our work rhythm has up to a point been disturbed by an organization such as the KGB which has continuously been active either by spreading disinformation related to foreign guests' arrival here or by disseminating other items of news which have required certain attention from us and which have disturbed our working rhythm up to a point, even if only slightly.

[Saarna] The attention of the townsfolk has perhaps most of all been caught and attracted by the Defense League men who are around the Estonia Building.

[Rumessen] The Defense League is at the moment in the process of being formed. And even immediately before the start of the Estonian congress some organizational units of the league were set up, at Otepaa, for example, in which our members of the Chief Committee also took part. And the Chief Committee, at one of its meetings, also allocated a big sum in aid for the benefit of the Defense League and we hope that effective assistance will originate from this organization in the future in defending domestic order within the borders of Republic of Estonia, as well as, I hope, on the borders of the republic. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Estonian Official Says Lithuania Set Example

LD1203124390 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1000 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Excerpts] Running fast, Rein Veidemann has just arrived in the radio building from a long-distance coach. Rein Veidemann, you are very excited; you have probably come from the cauldron, straight from the wheels. As a politician, journalist, and member of the board of the People's Front, you have been to Lithuania and you have seen and heard with your own eyes and ears what yesterday happened in Lithuania. Please, could you share some of this with the Estonians.

[Veidemann] Yes, I find it indeed hard to conceal my excitement at the moment over the things which took place last night and which we in Estonia, too, have been preparing for and awaiting for a very long time—what the Lithuanians have now legalized. And I had the honor to be present at this action, together with Mart Tarmak, the so-called foreign minister of the People's Front. And even greater was the honor I had when I had the opportunity at the first independent Lithuanian parliament session, to greet the Lithuanian people and the parliament on behalf of us, Estonians, on the occasion of what they have now achieved. Everything that took place yesterday is magical in a way, while at the same time is also logical, very much worthy of being a model and also instructive to us. I would indeed like to note here that in

the given case there is every reason for us to look up to Lithuania as an example in every respect. I would first of all emphasize here the juridical choreography, via which all those rocks we avoided which we have been stumbling on here, for consolidating and following the juridical continuity of our republic. These were nicely overcome; it was done elegantly, and of course, with a logical determination. [passage omitted]

And in this respect I would like to emphasize another very important factor, namely, it seems to me that the political culture of the Lithuanians, at least at this moment, was exceptionally high and appealing. For example, Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Soviet was very polite in respect of opponents. [passage omitted] Another example of politically high culture was that all the Russians in the parliament voted to restore Lithuania's independence and to adopt this act. They understood it; they understood the endeavors of this people.

Well, feeling and sensing all this and living through this I would now indeed shout out to everybody that the beginning has been made and we will be following in their footsteps. I felt with all my being that the independence of our lives is close and that we will achieve it. [passage omitted] I would like to say that it was not so much Vytautas Landsbergis who won and Algirdas Brazauskas who lost, as the movement which won the trust of the people—that is the Sajudis. The people voted for this movement. [passage omitted] Brazauskas had to lose. Estonians also have to learn how to overcome personal disappointments and let the people decide.

RSFSR

Ligachev Talks With Belgorod Workers

PM0703125190 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 7 Mar 90 Single Edition p 3

[TASS report: "To Strengthen Perestroyka With Deeds"]

[Text] Belgorod, 6 Mar—The draft CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th party congress and the Central Committee February Plenum were at the center of attention in meetings between Ye.K. Ligachev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and Belgorod Oblast's communists, nonparty people, and young people.

Frank and at times strained discussions on ways to democratize the party and on its place and role in the socialist renewal of society developed in the labor collectives which the CPSU Central Committee secretary visited.

"We are fed up with being just payers of dues, and every one of us would like to influence affairs in the party"—this was said by a communist in the steel-smelting shop of Oskol Electrometallurgical Combine.

"I agree. Every communist and every primary organization must be a real force; and primary organizations must be given broad independence, even including the definitive right of admission to the party. Mark well, this is the aim of the draft Central Committee platform."

"Why must we assign all party dues to we know not where? Our communists believe that up to 50 percent of these funds should remain within the organizations themselves."

"I also agree. This, too, is in the draft. However, we should—perhaps without waiting for the congress—adopt a decision on the use of some of the membership dues in the interests of primary organizations."

"The draft Central Committee platform retains the principle of democratic centralism. Is it not obsolete?"—people asked at the "Belgorodskiy Zavod Energeticheskogo Mashinostroyeniya" Association.

"I believe that it is not basically obsolete; but note that the draft platform speaks of a different, renewed principle of democratic centralism which provides opportunities for the development of internal party democracy in every possible way. The emphasis is on the first word, not the second one. At the same time, it is also necessary to preserve centralist principles. You will agree that the party must be cohesive and organized. It must not be turned into a club for endlessly debating discussion problems. It is necessary to fulfill decisions."

"Is demarcation possible in the party?"

"There are people in the party who, quite frankly, adhere to overtly antisocialist, antiparty positions. I believe," the Central Committee secretary remarked, "that the CPSU must purge itself of such people and that this will only strengthen it."

And again there were questions—on Article 6 of the USSR Constitution, on the procedure for electing delegates to the 28th congress, on structural changes in the party, and on much else. People received direct, frank, exhaustive replies to all their questions. At the same time communists and nonparty people themselves actively voiced opinions on topical points in the draft party platform and suggested amplifications and additions. The people of Belgorod acutely posed this question: Without order, discipline, and organization in the country, little can be achieved and perestroyka will falter.

It was pointed out in the conversations that the key question in the draft platform is the problem of renewing the party itself. As was emphasized during Ye.K. Ligachev's meetings with communists and representatives of the labor collectives of Belgorod and the mining cities of Staryy Oskol and Gubkin, the party is the chief political force today that is capable of extricating the country from a very acute situation. And the party will confirm its role as the political vanguard of society not by legislative methods but by concrete work.

There was also an interested discussion at the meeting of the resolution of socioeconomic questions and the need to decisively strengthen discipline and order in production. The CPSU Central Committee secretary noted the positive results achieved by Belgorod Oblast in the social sphere and, in particular, in providing the population with food. This is graphically shown by the store counters in cities and settlements. There are meat, sausages, poultry, and a wide range of dairy products, and there are fresh pond fish in the stores almost all year. And all this has been achieved by the labor of kolkhoz [collective farm] members and sovkhoz [state farm] workers with mutually advantageous assistance from city people and with the participation of industrial enterprises in fulfilling the orders of the oblast's agro-industrial complex.

In discussions at Oskol Electrometallurgical Combine there was talk of increasing consumer goods production in every possible way. Oskol metallurgists are setting a good example here. They are investing the currency earned from sales of above-plan output in the construction of enterprises for the production of scarce construction materials and sanitary engineering equipment. Italian firms are erecting them at the combine under contract. The CPSU Central Committee secretary, who visited the construction site, emphasized the great social importance of this work.

The CPSU Central Committee secretary had talks with Yakovelvskiy Rayon kolkhoz members and visited a rural trade center and a new secondary school. He had an animated meeting in Belgorod with cultural figures and representatives of artistic and creative unions.

The Central Committee secretary laid flowers at the memorial to V.I. Lenin and visited the "Kurskaya Duga" memorial complex and the museum of the outstanding Russian actor M.S. Shchepkin.

Today Ye.K. Ligachev participated in a discussion of the draft CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th congress which took place at a Belgorod Oblast party aktiv meeting.

Election Official on Deputies' Nominations

LD0103221990 Moscow TASS in English 1419 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 1 TASS—"The nomination of candidates for Russian Federation people's deputies has been democratic, open and competitive," Vasiliy Kazakov, chairman of the Central Commission for Elections of Russian Federation People's deputies, told TASS.

All social strata of society displayed interest in those who will represent their interests at the Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation.

There are over 6,700 registered contenders for 1,068 seats. In 300 constituencies there are over 10 candidates for a seat, in 24—as many as 20. The elections will be a landmark in the political and social life of Russia, following the lines of perestroika.

The main contenders are from the production sphere: industry, construction, transport and communication workers account for 34.5 per cent of those nominated, with workers constituting 8.7 per cent. One in every ten candidates is an agricultural worker. Party workers make up 7.4 per cent and local government officials—7.2 per cent.

The candidates include many economists and lawyers, who will be important for the efficiency of Russia's parliament. Communist Party members and candidates constitute 86 per cent of candidates for people's deputies.

These figures will be changed slightly by elections, but one now can say with confidence that the deputy corps of Russia will be efficient and skilled, Kazakov believes.

The results of alternative elections are unpredictable, he said. Previous electoral experience and the sharply increased number of rival candidates in many constituencies give grounds to suppose that a re-run will have to be held in over half of the election districts within a fortnight, on March 18. New elections are not ruled out, although they would seemingly be on a minimum scale.

Komsomol Leader Recounts Meeting With Gorbachev

LD1702212890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2020 GMT 17 Feb 90

[Excerpt] Moscow, 17 Feb (TASS)—TASS correspondents Aleksandras Budris and Galina Vintskaya report:

Delegates of the congress of the RSFSR's [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] organizations being held in the Soviet capital today adopted a decision on the expediency of creating an RSFSR youth league. Tomorrow at the plenary meeting, the forum participants are to discuss the way in which it will be organized.

Viktor Mironenko, first secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee outlined the position of the Central Committee and of the bureau of the Komsomol Central Committee on the restructuring of the youth league, numerically the largest in the Soviet Union. He said that yesterday he met with Mikhail Gorbachev, first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and he conveyed to the delegates the words of the Soviet leader to the effect that "the party cannot imagine its existence without the support of a youth organization which shares its political goals." [passage omitted]

Northern Peoples Congress Views Ethnic Problems

LD1103103790 Moscow World Service in English 0800 GMT 11 Mar 90

[Text] A public committee has been set up in the Soviet Union to prepare a Congress of the Peoples of the North.

It consists of members of parliament, authors, scientists, and economists. The congress, due to open in Moscow on the 30th, will discuss some of the social, economic, and ethnic problems of the 26 peoples populating the Arctic regions of Siberia and the Far East. The development of oil and gas deposits, the construction of cities and settlements in the regions have upset the traditional mode of life of the Chukchis, Evenks, and Nivkhs. The forum will outline ways to strengthen the sovereignty of the northern people and promote their social and cultural development.

Urals Attains Reliable Electric Power Generator

LD0903044790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 8 Mar 90

[Text] Today electric power generated at the third block of the Perm state regional electric power station flowed into the Urals power system. It has a capacity, like the previous ones, of 800 megawatts. The integration of the third block will ensure a more reliable balance of power generation and consumption in the oblast. Like the first two aggregates, the third works on gas. At the state regional electric power station, a whole complex of necessary environmental protection measures have been carried out, while modern automation guarantees the aggregates' high degree of reliability.

Independent 'TV Siberia' Channel Operational

LD1602144590 Moscow World Service in English 0800 GMT 16 Feb 90

[Text] A new television channel has become operational in Siberia. Headquartered in the city of Barnaul, this television station called Television Siberia, is independent from the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, the country's major television center. It broadcasts for urban and rural viewers in the vast region of south Siberia. Television Siberia already has proved popular for its rapid and informative reporting. It operates under the auspices of public organizations on a shareholding basis. The chief role of the program is to educate people and to break down the barriers of mistrust and misunderstanding between them.

Western Republics

Role of Strike Committees in Donetsk Assessed

PM0603102790 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 4 Mar 90 p2

[Report by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA special correspondents A. Kalinin, V. Kosyak under the rubric "On Current Events": "Donetsk: In the Offices and in the Square"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The February events in Donetsk could not be called a sudden outburst. They are the logical continuation of July. If it had not been the imported footwear discovered in the warehouses, another motive for the explosion would have been found. The automatic safety mechanism no longer works.

There is another term in the coal industry: inert dust. This special dust barrier prevents the spread of fire and gas during explosions or sudden escapes of gas. So it was that this safety mechanism instantly swung into action during the summer strike: to seal off the conflagration and prevent it from spreading by any means possible. It was then that the sadly renowned Resolution 608 made its appearance. The miners were allowed to take complete control of the lower structures of management. But a barrier prevented them from going any higher. And the flames did indeed begin to die down. Just as a bonfire begins to die down when you throw a lot of damp branches on it all at once.

The "new authorities" found themselves swamped by an avalanche of complainers and complaints. Sensing their strength, the leaders of the workers demanded pipelines, slate, and justice from the departments. All these items were in short supply. Carried away by the role thrust upon them, the strike committees did not immediately see the danger. The "new authorities" were accused of trying to hide their heads in the sand. Come fall, the threat of new strike action was in the air. Suddenly there was an abrupt change of symbols. The miners were proclaiming themselves to be a political force. The Regional Council of Donbass Strike Committees was established in Gorlovka and clauses on the need for political reforms appeared in the miners' demands. The spontaneous events of July were becoming an organized force.

We cannot flatter ourselves that the workers movement is our ship's ballast that allows it to move confidently through the stormy waters of perestroyka. It is probably nearer the truth to compare it to freight in the hold that has come adrift. Will the ship be able to hold steady when the next wave breaks against its side? The strike committees are not sure. But then the miners are not the entire working class.

When strike action was first given as the explanation for disruptions in supply and the miners were set in opposition to the rest of the population, the strike committees tried to renounce workplace trading. Then goods and food intended for them began to be sold outside the oblast at black market prices. The strike committees tried to establish control over distribution. They were accused of wanting to seize power. Social tension constantly increased.

Then the storm broke.

Once again yesterday's confused leaders are trying to deflect the arrows. This time into Moscow. We have honestly complied with all instructions from the center, they say, tried to stamp out drunkenness and develop the cooperatives, and now we are being made to take the rap for other people's sins. You will not find opponents of restructuring in the party apparatus but hostages of

restructuring, P. Yegorychev, first secretary of the Donetsk Proletarskiy Rayon Party Committee, said at the oblast party committee plenum.

It is typical that the workers movement has freed the hands of the... directors.

As far as the latter are concerned, the strike was initially a tough ordeal. Some managed to bring their enterprises out of this ordeal with the minimum of losses. Some lost people's confidence. Some later had this confidence restored to them: Forgive us, people said, tempers had become overheated. However, they established tough control over their workers, which is not always a good thing. Sometimes directors lost their temper: Who the hell are these incompetent people meddling in other people's affairs? But realities cannot be ignored.

It was later discovered that the workers' support opened up new opportunities for economic workers. The Zasyadko Mine is an example of this. Until quite recently, public opinion showed no mercy toward its director, Ye. Zvyagilskiy: People said that he had bought up everyone from the rayon party committee to the ministry.

"If I am going to be frank, until summer last year I did not have very much faith in perestroyka as a revolutionary process," Zvyagilskiy said. "To my mind, 'revolution' is something that comes 'from below,' whereas something that originates 'from above' is an experiment, reform, reconstruction, cosmetic repair job, whatever you like, only it is not the real thing. It was only when miners all over the country rose up to support perestroyka and take it into their own hands that I understood: There will be no return to the old ways."

Today, Zvyagilskiy is involved in the strikes and rallies. He is accused of apostasy and of trying to win himself some cheap popularity. No, he is not motivated by a desire for popularity, he is motivated by an idea. He has his own model for restoring the economy and the country. But the old structure is still preventing it from being translated into practice.

The workers movement is clearing the way for enterprising people. Today they are working to smash outmoded instructions and laying the stones of the foundations upon which our revived economy will be erected. Neither a dictatorship—on whoever this dictatorship is based—nor the spontaneous elements which produce rallies will help to extricate the country from its crisis; this can only be done by businesslike people who are prepared to assume responsibility not only for the region's economic development but for its social development as well.

March in the Donbass has begun with a further deterioration in the situation. The talks started between the strike committee and the oblast party committee have reached deadlock. They have satisfied neither side. The people have come out into the square again....

Ukrainian Party First Secretary Interviewed

90UN0972A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA in Ukrainian 23 Jan 90 p 2

[Interview, published under the heading "The Party: Policy of Renewal," with First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee V.A. Ivashko, USSR people's deputy and member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, by RADYANSKA UKRAINA correspondent A. Kraslyanskyy: "More Actively Utilizing the Potential of Society"]

[Text] **First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee V. A. Ivashko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR people's deputy, answers questions put to him by a RADYANSKA UKRAINA correspondent**

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[Correspondent] Volodimir Antonovich, I would like to begin our interview with the following. Today political life in this republic, as throughout the country, is so rich and diversified that at times it is hard to say what is the most important thing in political affairs at the present stage. Right now, for example, everybody's thoughts are occupied with the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine and to local soviets. Yet it would perhaps not be wrong to say that we continue to be focused on the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies and are not only analyzing but are also beginning to implement the decisions passed at that congress. Finally, the congress devoted considerable attention to new statutes which specify the procedures of the present election process.

[Ivashko] In assessing the proceedings of the Second Congress, we should proceed first and foremost from the point that the congress was able to discuss and adopt a fairly clear-cut national economic development program. In my opinion both N. I. Ryzhkov's report and the adopted resolution faithfully reflect current party and government policy—a directional thrust toward the real needs of the people.

I consider the victory of the governmental plan calling for a flexible transition to a market economy to be a very important victory in this regard. As you remember, some opponents of the keynote speaker were advocating the idea of an immediate adoption of direct free-market relations in all domains of the economy. But this would immediately lead to worsening of the situation and the impoverishment of millions of people—especially the elderly and the young. But can this be permitted? It is for this reason that the overwhelming majority of people's deputies supported the sensibleness of the government program, which on the one hand provides a strong additional impetus to development of the economy on the basis of such a market, while on the other hand it regulates the market with appropriate instruments.

This is not to the liking of some. There are those who feel that any control or regulation of market relations will impede economic development. But this is a false

notion. An elementary, primitive market has long since disappeared from the face of the earth. Take a look at the European Economic Community or at economic processes in any capitalist country—any spontaneous market there has long since disappeared. In a recent conversation with a very prominent Canadian businessman, we talked about countries which have accomplished a major surge forward in their development. In every case a free market is combined with various means of regulating it, and with state ownership of some of the means of production, even entire production sectors. On the other hand one cannot help but see what explosive phenomena and, particularly, what an enormous, inflationary rise in prices is brought about by an unprepared, sudden transition, without any control or regulation whatsoever, to a market-dictated economy in certain countries, including neighboring countries.

All of us—politicians, journalists, and economists—must take a careful look at world processes and learn the lessons of history in order not to repeat the mistakes of others.

I am convinced that the most promising way to go is the path of harmonious combination of state planning and a sharp expansion of market relations. In addition, it is the only correct way to go, because it will enable us to get out of the difficult, complex situation in which we find ourselves, without risk of aggravating social tension to an even greater extent. Of course all this is possible under the condition that we reduce to a minimum centralized intervention in the activities of local enterprises, about which there has also been much discussion in the past.

Well, let the scientists and practical experts debate the matter, let them work together seeking out the truth, and let separate schools of thought become implacable adversaries—we have had enough of seeking the truth on the part of a single, unified entity. But let common sense also prevail, such as the common sense which, as I see it, won out at the Second USSR Congress of People's Deputies.

[Correspondent] You have stated, and the same idea was contained in your speech at the congress, that it is necessary resolutely to overcome ministerial barriers. But does it not seem to you that this valid thought is more and more frequently becoming nothing more than a slogan, a declaration, just another propaganda device, if you will forgive me? For we have not yet seen a single instance whereby some central agency has shifted its position even a little bit during the years of perestroyka.

[Ivashko] Once at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Leningrad professor Denisov stated the following: The degree of progressiveness of ministries should be assessed by their property of self-elimination. That is, a central agency can and should raise its branch to such a level of management and introduce such forms of mutual relations and self-management which would make its own existence unnecessary.

In theory this postulate is entirely correct. In practice, however, things have been working out quite differently. It is true that ministries and agencies stubbornly cling to their power, proceeding from narrow, parochial interests; they dictate their will to the enterprises and in this way impede the development of economic reform. For this reason we cannot afford the luxury of waiting for them to eliminate themselves. We are therefore beginning more and more persistently to shake the foundations on which the omnipotence of a ministerial monster is grounded. You are already seeing how this is being done. We are endeavoring, for example, to establish companies, corporations, and other organizations, which group around a specific product or type of production and are of an interministerial nature. Such an arrangement is more flexible and mobile, for it proceeds purely from production, not from administrative interests. On the one hand it quickly produces goods, which is extremely important for us. On the other hand it breaks down the system of rule by administrative fiat, because he who once experiences freedom will no longer return to his master. I am not idealizing the situation. I know that this process is proceeding with difficulty, that the ministries are making every effort to hold on to the reins of enterprise. In addition, some new associations are successfully assuming the ways of the ministry. But restructuring of management of the economy is moving forward, and it cannot be stopped.

Here is one of the ideas on which people are working in this republic. As we know, an automotive plant to build passenger cars is under construction in the Tatar ASSR. We got to thinking: Would it not be better for us in the Ukraine, since we have the Kommunar Plant in Zaporozhye, which with its subcompacts has earned a good reputation with the buying public, to bring in enterprises from certain other branches, including the defense-industry ministries, and set up a large modern automotive company? There is an interesting proposal to establish in Krivoy Rog a plant to build microbuses geared to family needs. After all, the government program for improving the health of our economy, adopted at the Second Congress of People's Deputies, exhorts us to be more resourceful and enterprising.

[Correspondent] But let us return, Volodimir Antonovich, to our initial subject: The political reform in this republic as a principal factor in making the people more politically active, which is manifested in particular in the current preelection situation. Are you satisfied with how these changes are going and with their pace?

[Ivashko] You probably noted that during the discussion at the congress of changes which must be made in the USSR Constitution as regards the system of election, mention was made from time to time—as a positive example—of our Ukrainian laws. This means that we have managed to achieve some positive results in this area. This is an entirely natural consequence of the fact that election laws in this republic were drafted, discussed, and adopted in a normal democratic manner. Of course there are still some rough edges, and some people are dissatisfied with some things, but a solid foundation

has been built for further democratization of society. And it is already bearing fruit.

This was not an easy process. People's mood and attitude were such that there were instances of going to extremes, certain confrontation, including excessively heated debate. But when all reasonable persons sat down at the table and proceeded to seek points at which the differing positions could move closer together (and this process was repeated time and again), the different elements of society succeeded in finding a consensus, which became a solid foundation for constructive dialogue. The path we traveled in drafting election legislation is important to us not only by virtue of its specific result—the adoption of appropriate laws—but also in the fact that we gained invaluable experience on how one can bring the noble intentions of different societal groups together into a single common platform, into a single legislative enactment.

As for the pace of democratization.... It is based on many factors—economic, political, spiritual, intellectual, and cultural, and it is very difficult and perhaps unnecessary to program some specific pace of development. It seems to me that we have succeeded in finding a pace at which people do not laugh at an excessive haste but where there is also no delay in settling matters which are of urgency to society.

We are currently at the height of the election campaign. It will give us certain experience and will test our concepts and ideas. There is no doubt about the fact that the new body of deputies will continue with the process of drafting new laws and improving and perfecting those we have already adopted. We have also accomplished other things: A well-conceived Law on Languages in the Ukrainian SSR has been adopted. And as we know, the language problem today is as acute as it is important. This is why in my opinion we have every reason to be pleased with what has been accomplished to date in implementing political reform.

[Correspondent] I must make one comment. As I was attending the session at which the laws on elections and languages were adopted, and as I observed the vigorous debate on these issues, I became unhappily convinced that many deputies had come to Kiev not in order to work in a genuine and effective manner, but with just one intention: To condemn, as has frequently occurred in the past, the authors of an alternative bill and anybody connected with the Ukrainian Popular Movement for Restructuring. In some speeches there was clearly present the hand of the true authors of the text—conservative apparatchiks. If it had not been for your appeal to consolidate, if it had not been for your statements at the session, who knows whether progressive laws would have been adopted?

[Ivashko] Well, there is a considerable exaggeration here. You know, this is a very dangerous procedure, looking for the cause in a single individual.... Both for the republic and for me personally. The situation is quite different. At the party Central Committee we succeeded in gathering together all ideas and proposals, in examining the conflicts between them and in finding, together with the deputies to the republic Supreme Soviet and representatives of public organizations and the creative intelligentsia, that path which led us to a fruitful dialogue and to the passage of laws. The main point, and this was repeatedly emphasized at the session, is that these laws are not directed against anybody.

What about the struggle of opposition? Nothing comes without struggle, particularly wisdom. You know, I have always been against mechanically dividing people into progressive and conservative, new and old. The fact is that people are all different, and this must be one's point of departure. The main thing is for an individual not just to listen to himself but to listen to the reason and voice of others, intelligently to analyze the situation and to arrive at positive solutions in extreme situations. I have also heard it said, for example, that the republic Supreme Soviet is old, stagnant, and incapable of arriving at modern solutions. But it was precisely this body of the Supreme Soviet which adopted the new laws!

These are all people, our people. Restructuring processes are unquestionably taking place in the thoughts and actions of each, in a different way. Change in public attitudes and the thinking of society does not mean, however, that society as a whole must be shunted aside and written off. After all, this is our people, and we must create a new life with the efforts of this people.

[Correspondent] The party once proclaimed the thesis of transferring all power to the soviets. It seems to me, however, that this process is proceeding very slowly. Is that not why one senses both at the Congress and in society as a whole a feeling of tension in regard to approaches toward the party's leadership role?

[Ivashko] M. S. Gorbachev gave an exhaustive reply to this question at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum in December of last year, and I am hard put to add anything to that at this point. I do not think that we are obliged to hold onto those formulations which were incorporated into the USSR Constitution back in 1977. But at the same time I also feel that it makes no sense to throw out everything and immediately proceed to work only with certain formulations. Everything must undergo a process of maturation; everything must be resolved in the course of the normal legislative process, and then there will be no misunderstandings.

We are presently in the course of preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress, which is drawing ever closer. The party must make major democratic changes, beginning with the process of electing congress delegates and continuing with drafting of new fundamental party documents, including the CPSU Rules. The matter of deciding the party's role in society will be determined in this way, without haste and without excessive overflowing of emotions. Regardless of censure and blame directed at the party, the reality is that at the present

time nobody is able to replace the party's consolidating role. A renewed, strong party alone, and nobody else, can lead society to a new stage in its development. There have been plenty of general words and slogans spoken out at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and at various other forums. But there have been few realistic, practical proposals followed by concrete deeds. The fact is that changing one slogan for another will of itself change nothing in people's lives. What we need, I repeat, is deeds, and it is the party which unites the people and all healthy, constructive elements behind them. Herein lies the party's vanguard and at the same time integrating role.

As for transferring the full power of government over to the soviets, this process is gathering momentum. Is this not apparent from the activity of and, in general, the growing influence on societal processes by the Congresses of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet? I am convinced that, following elections to the republic Supreme Soviet and local soviets, these bodies will become much stronger and will more vigorously address affairs in their regions.

[Correspondent] Volodimir Antonovich, you frequently say the words lyudyna [man, human being] and lyudyanist [humanity, compassion].... I must agree with you that some passions pertaining to trust in or distrust of the party flame up not over certain items in the USSR Constitution or CPSU Program. It is not only economic problems which give rise to distrust of the party. Perhaps a significant causal element here is the fact that some of our party officials lack precisely humanity and straightforwardness. After all, it is no secret that frequently certain party officials were becoming local deities, unapproachable sovereign rulers.

[Ivashko] Even now there are plenty of those types.

[Correspondent] Yes, there are. Now if every party leader saw each individual as a person, did not keep people at their distance, and cared about the individual's concerns and tribulations, I am convinced that the matter of distrust of the party would disappear by itself.

[Ivashko] Watch out for such officials. Watch out for them! But look at the present situation. Today the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee is nowhere imposing its own choice of officials, even oblast committee first secretaries. If there are instances where we do recommend somebody, it is not at all like it was as recently as three or four years ago, when a ready candidate would be brought in, placed on the presidium, upon which they would be told: "This is the way we see it: Now you can vote on it." We do present our opinion, but alongside alternative candidates and without any pressure. As for oblast committee and rayon committee secretaries, we don't send anybody out there—everything is to proceed from the local level, from the grass roots. This is the way it should be everywhere: From the primary party organization to the Central Committee. Those times are past when somebody would be brought in from the outside. They are gone forever. Let the people assemble, let them debate, discuss, and choose the one who is a genuine leader, who can lead others not by virtue of his power of authority but by virtue of his humanity and the respect he enjoys. But when they have decided on their choice, everybody should sit down together and consider what first steps the party organization should take.

It should not be like the following: What appears to be an interesting, energetic, intelligent individual is elected, and then suddenly he is thrown, like off a cliff, into a whirlpool of problems, and he flounders about in them, looking for escape. He must be helped, with everybody pulling together.

There is no need to argue that a party organization can gain respect not by words but by concrete deeds. When we began implementing this simple idea: Assign a specific task to each primary organization—we were very careful to ensure that this did not merely result in another of the old "initiatives" or some new slogan or competition. There is no place for competition here. What is necessary is that people, communists, look around themselves, identify the most critical and pressing problems, and set about resolving them. Everything may not be solved immediately. Perhaps some things will require struggle and effort. But we must proceed along this path.

I never would have started this business if I did not see how people's attitudes and the atmosphere within and around the party organization were changing, whereby people, having passed through doubts, vacillations, and difficulties, achieve a genuine end result. Then everybody sees that Communists are truly the vanguard in society, effective initiators and fighters for a better future. I see no other way to go.

[Correspondent] How simple it all would be, Volodimir Antonovich.... But we know how powerful the system of rule by administrative fiat still is. That system will fight for its power to the last breath. Do you think that one person, even an exceptionally progressive person, will be able to stand up against such force?

[Ivashko] Yes, if people are with him. Where have you seen struggle for power carried out without any losses or difficulties? It is for good reason that the party has emphasized that perestroyka is a revolutionary process, where nothing is accomplished without hard struggle. But somebody has to be the first to commence the battle against sluggishness and routinism. This is why we need perestroyka. Restructuring of intellect, character, as well as rejection of old habits. It does not consist in closing down some ministry or agency. Perestroyka lies within a person, in discovering and opening up new energies and possibilities. One should not exaggerate the strength of the administrative-command system. It is monolithic only at first glance. But when you look more closely—it is full of cracks and cavities....

[Correspondent] Your credo, as I understand it, Volodimir Antonovich, is consolidation of all constructive forces. But I am bothered by the following question. The history of revolutions attests to the fact that true success comes when the old buildings are totally demolished, right down to the foundations, and a new building is erected in their place. But what we are trying to do is to add the new onto the old.

[Ivashko] As for theory of revolution and theory of societal development in general, Marxism is strong by virtue of the fact that it has never been distinguished by inflexibility of forms and inviolability of dogmas. It has always been distinguished by an innovative approach, by a directional focus on action, proceeding from specific conditions.

As a man of practical orientation, I would also like to say that breaking things down without creating at the same time never leads to any good but sows discord and destruction. This is confirmed not only by the history of our republic but by world development as a whole. Let me ask you the following question: Why is it that from right after the revolution up until recently we so stubbornly, I would say, compared our achievements with 1913? It is because following World War I, and then following civil war and destruction, for many years—I stress, for many years!—we were endeavoring to regain the 1913 level of development.

We are strong, and therefore we must be wise in order not to repeat the mistakes of the past, in order not once again to be left far behind in our development. I would modify your image as follows: We must build, like one builds a new shop at an old plant—new structures are erected around the old building, and subsequently, when the new structures are completed, the old building is demolished and the rubble carted away. I consider this path to be reasonable and productive. We must build at once, demolishing as we go only that which impedes us. Otherwise we shall find ourselves in winter without a roof over our head. As we know, it does not take much intelligence to demolish without building anything. On the other hand intelligence, trust, and sincerity are needed in order to erect a new building.

[Correspondent] Then what place would strikes, mass meetings, and demonstrations have in a society grounded on trust?

[Ivashko] I would address strikes separately, because I do not see a place for them in the society we are building. It is very simple: Refuse to work. But who other than the people has to pay for the strikes? I can understand that circumstances could arise where people lose their patience because of certain problems. But I believe that one can always find ways to resolve critical issues without those irreparable losses which strikes cost the entire people.

We were just talking about measures proposed by the government to improve the health of our economy. But such measures can remain nothing but good intentions if nobody does the work. Who is going to obtain new apartments or acquire quality goods if we strike instead of working? It makes no sense whatsoever!

As regards various manifestations of public opinion, and particularly in a lawful manner, this is a normal phenomenon of society. But on each occasion it is necessary to bring intelligence into action in combination with truthful information. A few days ago I was talking with a person who told me how the election campaign was going at their enterprise. In particular, the subject in question was the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee's campaign platform. So, he said to me, one of the officials at a party meeting stated that he did not like this platform. But when they asked him exactly what was wrong with it, he replied: "On the whole it is well-conceived, but it is too... long." "Well then, take that brief Central Committee appeal to the voters which appears above the platform, and be guided by that," others retorted.

It is difficult to conduct a serious discussion on this basis. Now when a mass meeting contains reasonable elements and the desire to direct the attention of the government or local authorities to some important issue, then why be against such a gathering? And even if there is a lot of empty talk at the gathering, you cannot take away people's right to assemble for the purpose of discussion. People's desire to discuss their problems should not be frustrated by administrative dictate, for then we could halt the overall process of democratization. Everything should proceed in a lawful, normal manner, where reason and good sense are harmoniously combined.

We are presently in a time when many movements, public associations and organizations are appearing. I have said time and again, and I shall said it once more, that we shall find common ground and fruitful cooperation with all of them if their ideas reflect noble and constructive intentions.

[Correspondent] One last question, Volodimir Antonovich. Democracy and glasnost, in the highest, correct meaning of the terms, are probably still in the development stages in this country, gathering momentum. In your opinion, do democracy and glasnost have any limits or boundaries?

[Ivashko] Democracy has limits, which are called law. Otherwise under the banner of democracy things could reach the absurd. In a state governed by rule of law the law does not limit or restrict democratic processes. On the contrary, it protects them and stands guard to ensure that the rights of one individual are not exercised at the expense of the rights of others. Glasnost also develops within the bounds of the law, ethics and morality.

In general I would like to say that we do not yet have glasnost in the true meaning of the word. If it does in fact exist anywhere, it is primarily within the party and in relation to the party. Take journalism, for example. We

know from experience that in this area glasnost continues to be distributed among various "editorial quarters." People know that certain material can be printed in one newspaper, but in a certain other newspaper such material would never appear. The readers are also split among these "quarters," for they also know what they can obtain from one newspaper and what they can obtain from another. Is this glasnost? This is that same factionalization against which we are fighting in various organizations.

Lenin's thesis that a newspaper is a collective propagandist, agitator, and organizer, although undergoing some alteration over the decades, is still valid today. We should be guided by this in the current complex period of restructuring of our society.

[Correspondent] Thank you, Volodimir Antonovich, for this interview.